
A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTRUSIONS INTO THE CANADIAN ARCTIC

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The possibility of an oil spill or a terrorist or a drug smuggler exploiting our back door is no longer theoretical. It is a real threat. Canada needs to be prepared.

Retired Colonel Pierre Leblanc¹



Source: unknown

Norwegian Wild Vikings sail Berserk II through the Northwest Passage

Recently, Canadian national interest in Arctic security has re-emerged amidst the converging factors of changing geopolitical conditions and an unpredictable future. International competition for access to increasingly scarce resources has begun to manifest in the Arctic. Canadian Arctic security² expert Rob Huebert states that “climate change, rising resource prices, international politics and the development of new technologies are making it easier and more attractive to exploit the Arctic.”³ According to the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, climate change is causing the Arctic to warm up,⁴ creating a progressive decrease in sea ice in the late summer. These conditions are opening the North to increasing international activity by actors attracted to the prospect of economic gain. As a result, Canada’s capacity to ensure its national sovereignty and security in the North is becoming increasingly strained. Competition for resources, alternative shipping routes and migration increase the potential for conflict in the North. Unresolved boundary disputes between Canada and its circumpolar neighbours⁵ are complicated by the growing international character of the Arctic and this may have demographic consequences for the northern population.

This environment creates ample conditions for exploitation by illicit and potentially hostile entities seeing the advantage in the vast and virtually undefended Arctic. Without a proper monitoring and enforcement infrastructure, the North could become a region for migrant smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal fishing and second-order pollution.⁶ In addition,

unregulated private enterprise could become a reality in the resource-rich region in light of Canada's status as the world's third largest producer of high quality diamonds⁷ and its oil and gas potential, not to mention the market for Arctic cruise tourism and commercial shipping. Increasing international traffic in Arctic waters creates the potential for maritime accidents, accidental (or deliberate?) pollution of the marine environment and the unintentional introduction of foreign species into the delicate Northern ecosystem. Secondary security challenges, such as cultural clashes or conflicts over access to resources (i.e. drilling rights) might also emerge from an increasing international presence, compounded by potential disputes over territory and resources in the North. Such conditions may give rise to an unregulated foreign presence in the Arctic that would pose a significant security threat to Canada and its circumpolar neighbours.

This discussion surveys documented intrusions⁸ into the Canadian Arctic,⁹ demonstrating that the North remains vulnerable to infiltration by foreign entities. Many intrusions have involved illegal and potentially dangerous activities relating to international terrorism, trans-national criminal activity, challenges to Canadian sovereignty and foreign military operations.¹⁰ This list comprises a catalogue of intrusions that have occurred from the Second World War until very recently. Some of the details are scant due to the limited availability and authority of sources on certain incidents of intrusion.¹¹ It is important to note that these details have been gathered from open source materials. The objective in producing this catalogue of significant foreign intrusions into Canada's Arctic is to highlight the reality of the threat that Canada faces in order to encourage the adaptation of national security and defence policies and the development of capabilities to meet the challenges of an otherwise remote and isolated Arctic. Following the discussion of intrusions is a brief analysis identifying issues for consideration regarding the improvement of Arctic security and defence.

Catalogue of Intrusions

The strategic potential of the Arctic has been recognized since the Second World War when, in 1942, after launching a diversionary attack on the Aleutian Islands just south of the Alaskan Coast, the Japanese occupied the islands of Attu and Kiska.¹² The May 1943 American effort to repel this foreign occupation resulted in significant Canadian, U.S. and Japanese casualties, but was followed by the retreat of the Japanese submarine fleet from Kiska.¹³ The U.S. response, with its high number of casualties, demonstrates the strategic significance of the Arctic region as an access route to the North American continent and highlights the requirement to protect it. On October 23 1943, the German Navy and Ministry of Transport's Office of Meteorology established a WFL-26 weather station on the northern coast of Labrador via a U-537 submarine.¹⁴ Similarly, Canada had also established an air base at Goose Bay in 1941 although Labrador did not officially become part of Canada until Newfoundland joined Confederation in 1949.¹⁵ The German weather station remained undetected until the late 1970s,¹⁶ dramatically underscoring the history of neglect in respect of the strategic potential of the High North. The region's environmental fragility was also revealed in a failed Soviet attempt to launch a COSMOS 954 satellite into a stable orbit. On January 24, 1978, this nuclear powered surveillance satellite crashed into the Great Slave Lake region of the Northwest Territories as well as into northern Alberta and Saskatchewan, requiring significant effort on the part of the Canadian government to clean up the nuclear contamination.¹⁷ Accidental nuclear contamination from foreign objects remains a threat to the Arctic region.

During the Cold War the Arctic was one of the main theatres of operations because the polar route posed a direct avenue of "attack against North American cities by Soviet bombers and nuclear missile forces."¹⁸ As late as the 1980s, Soviet long-range bombers were observed near Alaska conducting exercises close to U.S. airspace.¹⁹ The end of the Cold War, however, did not signal the end of the Arctic's value as a point of infiltration into North America, and Canada in particular.

1969/70: The Manhattan Event²⁰

In 1969, after an announcement of the discovery of oil in 1968 in the Alaskan North Slope region, the U.S. sent its oil tanker *SS Manhattan* to sail through the Northwest Passage on behalf of the Atlantic Richfield Company. The purpose of the voyage was to determine the feasibility of transporting oil from Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, to the American Eastern Seaboard.²¹ Although accompanied by two U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers throughout the voyage, the *Manhattan* became stuck in the ice a number of times, requiring assistance from the Canadian icebreaker CCGS *John A. MacDonald*, which accompanied the tanker through the Passage.²²

A great deal of controversy surrounds the *Manhattan* voyage because of its perceived violation of Canadian Arctic sovereignty.²³ The issue in question is whether Canada had granted permission to the U.S. to allow the vessel to enter the NWP. Canada did not officially claim sovereignty over the NWP until 1973, when the government asserted sovereignty as part of Canada's historic internal waters. However, the government did not enact any legislation or treaty to formalize this statement²⁴ and the other Arctic nations maintain to this date that the Passage constitutes an international strait. Interestingly, Canada and the U.S. strongly disagree on the internal/international status of the NWP, despite their bilateral Arctic security initiatives.

Sources indicate that in the months leading up to the *Manhattan* voyage, the U.S. Coast Guard and oil company executives had consulted Canadian officials and requested the assistance of a Canadian icebreaker throughout the voyage.²⁵ According to Navy Captain Thomas C. Pullen,²⁶ not only had Canada agreed with and supported the voyage, but in return for its participation, had negotiated an agreement with the Americans to share data on ice conditions and ship performance. In addition, Pullen affirmed that Roger Steward, master of the *Manhattan*, had followed protocol and flown the Canadian flag, making efforts not to offend Canadians.²⁷ The Trudeau government welcomed the *Manhattan* voyage and Canada's participation in the exercise, and expressed its position that there was no sovereignty challenge to Canadian territory.²⁸ Media reports at the time of the sailing misrepresented American intentions when the U.S. refused to officially request Canadian permission to enter the Passage. Media criticism effectively swayed political opinion towards accusing the Americans for violating Canadian sovereignty. In reality, a request for permission would have been interpreted as the U.S. recognition that the Passage represents Canadian internal waters.²⁹ In addition, other reports confirm Canadian participation in the voyage of the *SS Manhattan*. Although the U.S. had not officially request permission to enter the NWP, Canada officially granted permission anyway.

To be clear, the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention states that foreign vessels are granted the right of innocent passage within a nation's territorial waters,³⁰ provided that the ship does not engage in prohibited activities.³¹ The *Manhattan* voyage did not demonstrate any violation of Canadian security as it transited the Passage with Canada's full cooperation. The critical Canadian response to the voyage, although rooted in the sovereignty issue, concerned the potential for pollution of Arctic waters. When the *Manhattan* was damaged in the ice, there was fear that there could have been an oil spill, although ultimately no leakage occurred. However, the concern over setting a precedent for increased uncontrolled foreign shipping in the region considers the possibility of a vessel being damaged while transporting significant amounts of oil³² or other pollutants that could drastically affect the delicate ecosystem of the High North. But since the *Manhattan* voyage occurred in cooperation with Canada, whose ship was there to assist the American tanker with navigational difficulties through the ice, there was little real concern for uncontrolled shipping, accidental or deliberate pollution—an extension of the sovereignty issue. In the spring of 1970 the U.S. announced another *Manhattan* voyage through the Passage,³³ accompanied by the Canadian icebreaker *Louis St. Laurent*.³⁴

Interestingly, although the *Manhattan* voyage caused a considerable amount of media sensation, the previous submarine voyage of the USS *Seadragon* in August 1960 through

the Passage received little attention or criticism in the media. The reason for this might be that Commodore O.C.S. Robertson,³⁵ former commander of the HMCS Labrador, served as the ice pilot for the *Seadragon's* voyage. In a mission to traverse the Pary Channel to collect oceanic and hydrographic data, the *Seadragon* transited the Barrow Strait, Viscount Melville Sound and McClure Strait, prior to sailing to the North Pole from the Beaufort Sea. This submarine was the first submerged vessel to surface at the North Pole.³⁶ Both voyages of the *Seadragon* and *Manhattan* though the NWP occurred under similar circumstances in terms of cooperation and assistance between Canada and the U.S. including the participation of Canadian officers. Yet, it was only the *Manhattan* voyages that were politically sensitive, drawing public criticism. The reason for this controversy is speculative; however, it might be related to the perceived non-recognition of Canadian claims to the NWP, rather than the presence of vessels belonging to our allies to the south.

There is a long history of Canada-U.S. cooperation on Arctic expeditions. Great Britain transferred Arctic sovereignty to Canada in 1880.³⁷ During the period prior to and during the Second World War, Canadian Arctic sovereignty was virtually a non-issue. The World War II period saw cooperative efforts between Canada and the U.S. in continental defence, involving Arctic projects such as the Northwest Staging Route,³⁸ Crimson Route³⁹ and Alaskan-Canadian (ALCAN) Highway⁴⁰ (projects financed by the U.S.). These were mainly land-based defence projects, in which collaboration between the two nations continued into the post-war period when defence projects shifted to the maritime arena, specifically with the 1946 Joint Arctic Weather Stations (JAWS) negotiations (established in 1947) and the consideration of a northern role for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), which focussed its attention on the Pacific and Atlantic regions. Due to Canada's lack of resources to resupply the JAWS or provide ice-breaking capability or manpower to operate in the High Arctic, operations in the North fell to the U.S. Navy and Air Force, with participation by Canadian observers.⁴¹ Canadian leadership, in contrast to military interest in bilateral defence initiatives, became concerned that it could not unilaterally operate in the North. In June 1948, a report on Arctic sovereignty was requested following the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development. However, the report failed to address the issues of territorial sea, status of Arctic waters and the application of the sector principle to the waters in question. The status of Arctic waters became a concern in the late 1950s and 60s when the U.S. Navy began transiting the waters of the NWP with nuclear submarines, including beneath the sea ice.⁴² However, sources suggest that these voyages were not related to the 1961 Brock Report, which was a naval policy initiative under the chairmanship of Rear Admiral Jeffrey Brock indicating that the RCN intended to reassert Canadian Arctic sovereignty, on a "research and operational evaluation" basis.⁴³ Its recommendations included a three-ocean Navy and submarine patrols.⁴⁴ Although these recommendations sowed the seeds of national sovereignty over Arctic waters, they had a greater security objective in the notion of a visible northern military presence and an interest in anti-submarine warfare. Indeed, the security focus of projects in the later 1950s, such as the construction of the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line (1954),⁴⁵ the 1958 establishment of NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense)⁴⁶ in addition to discussions on creating an underwater acoustic surveillance system and a high frequency direction finding network,⁴⁷ occurred in partnership with the U.S.

The distinction between sovereignty over land versus sovereignty over water complicated the NWP sovereignty debate that reared its head with the Canadian media response to the 1969 *Manhattan* voyage. With respect to the accusation of intrusion into Canadian sovereign territory, the issue of the Americans not requesting permission from Canada to enter what Canada considers internal waters, could set a precedent for other nations interested in exploring Arctic territory, pressing the issue of innocent passage within Canada's territorial waters in terms of the potential of intruding on Canadian sovereignty. Indeed, a 1970 document from the U.S. State Department states the U.S. position that: "We cannot accept the assertion of a Canadian claim that the Arctic waters are internal waters of Canada ... Such acceptance would jeopardize the freedom of navigation essential for the United States naval activities worldwide."⁴⁸ If indeed, the Passage is regarded as high seas, it would be easier for foreign entities to enter Canadian Arctic territory and adjacent national waters with the potential to cause environmental damage or pose a national security threat.

1984: Denmark Raises its National Flag on Hans Island

The ongoing dispute between Canada and Denmark concerns the ownership of Hans Island—a small 1.3 km² unpopulated island just south of the 81st parallel in the Kennedy Channel between Greenland and Ellesmere Island. The island has been a sovereignty concern for Canada since 1973, when Canada and Denmark drew borders in the Nares Strait between Canada and Greenland,⁴⁹ but delayed decisions regarding the sovereignty of Hans Island.⁵⁰ On numerous occasions since July 28 1984, the Danes have raised their national flag on Hans Island with assistance from the Danish Royal Navy. The last incident, which occurred on March 30 2004, prompted Canada to respond with Exercise *Frozen Beaver*, which involved two visits by Canadian Forces (CF) helicopters to the island to raise the Canadian flag. In participation with the Canadian Rangers,⁵¹ the Canadian flag, a plaque and an Inukshuk replaced the Danish flag. Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham accompanied the CF on the second visit as part of a tour of Canadian northern installations.⁵² The Danish government responded by protesting to the Canadian ambassador in Copenhagen, while the Danish Ambassador to Canada, Poul E.D. Kristensen, published a letter in the *Ottawa Citizen*,⁵³ asserting Denmark's sovereignty over Hans Island and threatening to send HDMS *Tulugaq* to the island. These actions set off a series of negotiations within the United Nations General Assembly in New York to attempt to resolve the sovereignty question. Although agreeable in terms of bilateral initiatives, no resolution was reached regarding the sovereignty of Hans Island.⁵⁴



Source: Fox News (Mar. 26, 2007)

Danish sailors raise national flag on Hans Island in 2002

The planting of a country's national flag on disputed territory is provocative and is often perceived as a direct sovereignty challenge. A similar incident occurred when Russia planted its national flag on the seabed at the North Pole (see below). Although it takes more than mere flag-planting to challenge Canada's territorial integrity, the act itself provoked a response by the offended nation.

The Hans Island dispute indicates the economic potential on and around the island, for which the final decision regarding sovereignty might impact the status of Canada's other disputed regions in the North. Currently, the diplomatic status quo, reflected in Canada's and Denmark's agreement to disagree on the issue and consent to informing one another of each nations' activities on the island, is favourable to both parties. However, if the sovereignty issue is resolved in favour of Denmark, a precedent would be set for the disputed region of the Beaufort Sea between the U.S. and Canada, and possibly for the status of the NWP, if Canada is perceived as unable to reinforce its claims.⁵⁵ Canada's questionable ability to control its northern territories might motivate other nations to challenge Canada's sovereignty and security capabilities in the Arctic. Northern defence specialist Kyle Christensen asserts that the best possible outcome to the Hans Island dispute is maintenance of the status quo, while proceeding with a string of diplomatic negotiations where both nations can claim success without challenging one another's claim.⁵⁶ Other Arctic security experts view the issue as irrelevant. For instance, Michael Byers considers the Hans Island dispute as a venue for politicians to "thump their chests" about sovereignty for elections purposes, distracting Canadians from important Arctic issues.⁵⁷ The larger picture concerns Canada's ability to assert itself when its sovereignty is challenged. The planting of the Canadian flag by the CF demonstrates a willingness to assert national sovereignty, but the question remains whether Canada is capable of enforcing that assertion.

The Hans Island question extends to other sovereignty issues in the region with respect to the potential for foreign intrusions and the requirement for a security presence. For instance, Inuit hunters from Greenland (under Danish jurisdiction) have been known

to travel to Ellesmere Island to hunt polar bears. Canadian Forces personnel participating in the March 2007 Operation NUNALIVUT reported that in the previous year's exercise, they discovered snowmobile tracks from the East, indicating intrusions by Inuit from Greenland. The goals of Operation NUNALIVUT were to establish a military presence, provide a sovereignty patrol and evaluate terrain and infrastructure capable to facilitate Search and Rescue in the event of a crash or forced landing in the High Arctic. The military presence was useful in detecting foreign activity in Canadian sovereign territory—activity that might otherwise be undetected unless a Ranger patrol happened to be in that location at the opportune moment. With regard to Greenlandic Inuit intrusions into Canadian sovereign territory, the issue also concerns claims by these Inuit that parts of Ellesmere Island constitute part of their traditional hunting territory.⁵⁸ Such claims serve to reinforce Denmark's claim to Hans Island; but, the intrusions threaten Canadian national wildlife, in particular the polar bear population and the ecosystem as a whole.



Source: National Post (Aug. 2, 2007)

Canadian Forces Northern Area troops raise the Canadian flag on Hans Island in July 2005

August 1985: The Polar Sea Event

In 1985, the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker *Polar Sea* sailed through the NWP to Greenland from the West Coast in order to resupply the American airbase at Thule. Initially, the *Polar Sea* was slated to travel from Seattle to the Panama Canal to the Atlantic to Thule; however, time constraints required a shorter voyage. The alternative required sailing through the Northwest Passage. The U.S. Coast Guard reviewed its plans with the State Department and Canadian Coast Guard, affirming that the voyage posed no sovereignty challenge. Canadians were invited to participate in the operation,⁵⁹ and two captains from the Canadian Coast Guard represented these “invited observers.”⁶⁰ The Canadian Coast Guard vessel *John A. MacDonald* escorted the *Polar Sea* at the beginning of the voyage.⁶¹

Canada granted official permission to the Americans to sail the NWP, although no such request was made for the same reason that the U.S. did not request permission for the *Manhattan* voyage.⁶² As previously discussed, such request would otherwise be interpreted as the U.S. recognizing the NWP as Canadian internal waters and negating the American position that an international strait runs through the Passage. This arrangement was acceptable until public criticism, comprised of media, academics, aboriginal representatives and special interest groups expressed anti-American sentiment and projected the notion that the U.S. intended to challenge Canadian sovereignty by deliberately not asking permission to enter the NWP. On August 7 a group named the Council of Canadians flew a plane over the *Polar Sea* and dropped two containers—one containing a Canadian flag—the other containing a message that the *Polar Sea* voyage insulted Canadians and threatened its sovereignty.⁶³

Canadian leadership responded to popular demand that the U.S. be required to seek permission prior to entering Canadian internal Arctic waters; the U.S. promptly refused. Canada granted permission anyway to make a point.⁶⁴ In 1988, Canada and the U.S. reached an agreement on Arctic cooperation, in which the U.S. agreed that it would consult with the Government of Canada prior to sailing its icebreakers through the NWP. Significantly, this agreement does not alter either nation's legal or political position regarding the status of Arctic waters.⁶⁵

Canada's ability (or inability) to reinforce its sovereignty claims in either region might affect the resolution of other competing territorial claims. With regards to the *Polar Sea* voyage, the perception that Canada is weak would be reinforced if Canada did not speak out against the perceived intrusion or violation of territorial sovereignty. However, seeing beyond the disputed status of the NWP, Canada and the U.S. saw the greater advantage in

cooperation in the *Manhattan* and *Polar Sea* voyages. The notion of intrusion and Canada's response therefore highlight Canada's preoccupation with the sovereignty issue, while relegating security to a secondary consideration. Canada has the option to continue to rail against the unyielding U.S. position or put its efforts towards reinforcement of maritime security in the passage.⁶⁶ Indeed, whereas the U.S. notified Canada about its intention to traverse the passage, other foreign entities might not be so accommodating, especially if their motives are suspect. At the moment, Arctic Canada Traffic System (NORDREG) is a voluntary reporting system that tracks all marine traffic North of latitude 60°, Ungava Bay and southern Hudson Bay. In 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced plans to amend NORDREG from "encouraged" reporting to a mandatory reporting system for all incoming traffic.⁶⁷ However, the challenge with making NORDREG mandatory is that it requires international recognition of the NWP as internal Canadian waters, a requirement that is not likely to be accepted by nations with shipping interests in the Arctic.⁶⁸ A bilateral security apparatus would suit the interests of both Canada and the U.S. without requiring an immediate resolution of the status of the NWP. Such an apparatus would address concerns of the unauthorized entry of foreign entities into North America via waters considered to constitute an international strait. Indeed, although a foreign vessel or aircraft might be observed through NORAD or other Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, there remains the requirement for a timely response capability to ensure that the foreign entity does not constitute a security threat to Canada or the U.S. In other words, if reinforcing sovereignty is the primary concern, it would be best supported by a capable security and defence force.

1993: Al Qaeda Flight through Iqaluit

In 1993, an aircraft allegedly purchased by Al-Qaeda operatives made a stop-over in Iqaluit on its way to the Middle East. It is understood that the stop-over was intended as a rest-stop to fuel the aircraft, although official sources have not confirmed these details. According to Colonel (Ret.) Pierre Leblanc, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) likely kept track of the flight having monitored the transaction of funds used to purchase the aircraft. According to media sources, this intrusion was only revealed after 9/11.⁶⁹ Little else is known about this occurrence as intelligence services continue to protect the security of information in certain investigations.

Al Qaeda has been in existence since August 11 1988 when it was formed by the senior leaders of the Al Jihad movement.⁷⁰ The organization's first terrorist attack occurred on December 22, 1992, when bombs were detonated at two hotels in Aden, Yemen. Al Qaeda's objective was to obstruct the U.S. military's participation in international famine relief efforts in Somalia.⁷¹ The date of this violent attack predates the 1993 flight through Iqaluit indicating that the organization would likely have been "on the radar" as a global security threat.

Since NORAD creates a fence around Canada and U.S. air space, it would have observed the aircraft entering North American airspace. It has been suggested by Colonel Leblanc that the aircraft was permitted to continue on to the Middle East under observation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and CSIS as part of a larger strategic intelligence initiative, possibly to determine the destination of the flight and to whom within Al Qaeda the crew was linked. However, this assessment is speculative since official sources cannot reveal the details concerning this intrusion.



Source: undetermined

Russian jet freighter IL-76

Fall 1998: Russian IL-76 Lands in Churchill ⁷²

In November 1998, a Russian Ilyushin-76 flew over the North Pole to Churchill, Manitoba.⁷³ The landing of this large cargo plane was an unusual occurrence at the Churchill airport, as reported by airport duty personnel present when it landed. The

pilot switched off his landing lights as soon as he touched down on the tarmac despite unfavourable weather conditions and poor visibility. This suspicious behaviour suggests a possible criminal purpose. Sources do not report the precise duration of Russians' stay in Churchill, but they do say that the crew did not stay long. Following the arrival of a Bell 206 helicopter at Churchill, the Russian crew drove back to the airport, loaded the helicopter onto the plane and took off. Airport personnel affirm that no one was there at the tarmac to inspect documents or question the crew—a role for the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC).⁷⁴ However, the media reports that Canadian intelligence officials were monitoring the aircraft from its landing in Churchill to the point when it landed in a region of Russia known for organized crime. Colonel Leblanc suggested that if the nature of the flight was related to organized criminal activity the intelligence officials monitoring the craft would likely have been the RCMP, CSIS and Transport Canada, who allowed the flight to proceed to its destination. Some sources question whether intelligence officials let the Russians fly in and out of Churchill for intelligence purposes or because they lacked the power to intervene.⁷⁵ Others suggest that CF-18s could have been deployed from Cold Lake to the Forward Operating Location at Rankin Inlet, or that NORAD could have intervened, but chose not to for a greater strategic purpose.⁷⁶ The consensus is that intelligence officials allowed the flight to continue in order to monitor the activities of its crew. Although suspected, a connection between the flight and organized crime has not been confirmed.

The use of Canada's northern regions in organized criminal activity is a genuine concern. The Russian mafia is already involved in the Asian black market, including the illicit diamond trade.⁷⁷ Their interest might extend to Canada's diamond mines, which represent the third largest diamond industry in the world. The irregularity surrounding the Russian flight into Churchill begs the question of who provided the helicopter for pickup and for what purpose. According to a 2007 RCMP report there are numerous examples of organized crime syndicates using Canadian airports,⁷⁸ and a 2004 CSIS report states that:

*Organized crime exploits any potential conduit to move illicit commodities from source or transit countries to their illegal consumer markets in Canada, in particular marine ports, airports and land border areas ... illicit commodities are either concealed within the large volume of legitimate commercial and traveler movement entering through designated customs entry points or smuggled surreptitiously through the vast stretches of less controlled border areas ... organized crime will exploit the less-monitored areas between the designated customs ports of entry.*⁷⁹

Indeed, if Canada's Class 1 airports⁸⁰ are being exploited by illicit elements, the seaport of Churchill and its airport are all the more vulnerable to infiltration, as are less controlled ports in the far North. Colonel Leblanc was quoted in the *Nunatsiaq News*: "It's only a matter of time before organized crime starts to use the Arctic as a back-door into Canada." He warned that criminals would be attracted by the sudden emergence of new levels of wealth introduced by the northern diamond mines.⁸¹

1999: Chinese Research Ship⁸²

In 1999 the Chinese icebreaker and research ship *M/V Xue Long* ("Snow Dragon")⁸³ arrived at Tuktoyaktuk, Northwest Territories. The vessel is reported to have sailed undetected into Canadian waters, although once discovered, the Canadian Ice Service⁸⁴ assisted the ship's voyage using Radarsat⁸⁵ to navigate through the thick ice north of the Alaskan coast. The unannounced arrival at Tuktoyaktuk was apparently the result of miscommunication between agencies in Canada, as sources report that the Canadian embassy in Beijing had been notified by the crew of their intentions to sail into Canadian waters.⁸⁶ Assuming that the ship intended to sail north, away from Canadian waters, the Canadian Ice Service did not communicate the seemingly unannounced presence of the Chinese ship to Canadian authorities—i.e., the CCRA, CIC and Transport Canada.⁸⁷ In addition, Beijing would have informed Foreign Affairs, whose role would have been to inform the RCMP and relevant agencies that the Chinese had requested permission to sail into Canadian waters.⁸⁸ The ship's crew alleged that they were meeting a tour guide who was a Chinese national who had claimed refugee status in Canada in 1993.⁸⁹ The guide informed Canadian authorities that he was conducting a tour for the Chinese government.⁹⁰

Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence indicate that the voyage was relatively innocent because the Chinese gave Canada notification. The information was mishandled in Canada due to a breakdown of communication between agencies that could have had disastrous consequences in more threatening circumstances. One critic stated that “we had no independent capability” in terms of having a presence, surveillance and immediate law and order enforcement capability.⁹¹ If the voyage had more serious implications, such as smuggling migrants from China, transporting illegal armaments or if the crew was infected with a disease like SARS, Canada might not be capable of a proportionate response.⁹² Remarks at the Senate Standing Committee concluded that:

...we are totally unprepared, we actually have the capability from a combination of air and space assets that we have the necessary RCMP, customs, health officials waiting at Tuk to do the necessary clearance ... It gets down to the ability to actually have those assets so we have a proper intelligence picture of what is going on, so we can then respond to whatever level.⁹³

The refugee status of the Chinese national who was meeting the crew in Tuktoyaktuk arouses suspicion. It seems unusual that a Chinese refugee would be meeting with a research vessel representing the nation from which he claimed refuge. This circumstance might have alerted Canadian intelligence officials in conjunction with the fact that China is on the Canadian intelligence radar for economic espionage activities in Canada.⁹⁴ In addition, China has a rising interest in the economic potential of the Arctic, namely alternative shipping routes to the Suez and Panama Canals, as well as the oil and gas potential in light of its rising energy needs.⁹⁵ With regard to criminal intent, the *Xue Long* crew was reported to have been armed with machine guns.⁹⁶ Former commander of Joint Task Force North (JTFN), Colonel (Ret'd) Pierre Leblanc stressed that when the RCMP boarded the ship at Tuktoyaktuk, the cargo contained an “excessive” amount of weapons and ammunition, begging the question of arms smuggling. The RCMP also found one passport too many. These discoveries highlight a potential security threat posed by the Chinese voyage, regardless of the well-intentioned notification from Beijing.

September 1999: A Foreign Submarine in Cumberland Sound⁹⁷

Canadian scientists observed a foreign submarine in Cumberland Sound,⁹⁸ an inlet located on the East Coast of Baffin Island in early September 1999.⁹⁹ Colonel (Ret'd) Pierre Leblanc noted that the presence of this submarine coincided with a visit by French President Chirac to Canada. This submarine may have belonged to France, but there is no indication in open sources whether the captain of the submarine or any nation associated with the vessel, requested Canadian permission to enter Canadian waters.

Unconfirmed sources report that unusual activity combined with the presence of unidentified objects have been observed in Arctic waters for some time. Indeed, reports indicate that foreign submarines have been sighted traversing Canadian Arctic waters unannounced for the past decade.¹⁰⁰ These observations, if valid, demonstrate foreign activity in Canadian Arctic waters for reasons undetermined. Furthermore, the presence of undetected foreign vessels poses a significant security threat to Canada because their activities (and intentions) are shrouded in secrecy. An incursion discussed below profiles an explosion in the East of the NWP that occurred under mysterious circumstances. Examples such as these suggest that other intrusions could occur without the knowledge of Canadian authorities, a fact which is alarming. The potential for other intrusions highlights the probability of increasing numbers of undetected foreign operations in the North, which at the very least constitutes a breach of national sovereignty. At the other end of the spectrum, such incursions pose a potential security threat to northern Canadians, the Arctic environment and the larger strategic interests of Canada and the U.S.

September 2006: Deported Romanian Sneaks Back into Canada through Grise Fiord

Another potential threat to security and national sovereignty is the infiltration of illegal immigrants into Canada through the Arctic. In early September 2006, Romanian national Florin Fodor, who had previously been removed from Canada on a series of criminal charges

in 2000,¹⁰¹ re-entered the country via a 6-metre motorboat travelling from Greenland to Grise Fiord,¹⁰² Nunavut (south of Ellesmere Island).¹⁰³ Fodor was apprehended by RCMP Cpl Tim Waters upon his arrival and pleaded guilty to immigration charges for entering Canada without permission from CIC. The Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) reported that Fodor was also charged with failing to report to officials upon his arrival at the Canadian port.¹⁰⁴ Fodor was charged with two counts of violating the Canadian Immigration Act and sentenced to seven and a half months in jail, after which he was to be deported.¹⁰⁵

Although he was apprehended by the appropriate authorities, reports indicate that Fodor was met at Grise Fiord by curious Inuit prior to encountering the RCMP. Northern Inuit populations might seem open and curious, but they provide a useful intelligence source to Canadian authorities in the event that an individual attempts to enter Canada illegally. In this instance, the system of observing and reporting worked in conjunction with local law enforcement. However, if Fodor had somehow evaded detection by the locals and the RCMP, he might have succeeded in his plans to infiltrate Canada and escape undetected to Toronto.¹⁰⁶ One might also question whether Fodor's presence was even detected before reaching Grise Fiord, suggesting a maritime awareness gap in sensing small vessels. Finally, Fodor's prior deportation from Canada on grounds of criminal convictions illustrates the severity of the threat in which foreign entities with criminal ties might attempt infiltration into Canada through gaps in Arctic security.

November 2006: Turkish Sailors Jump Ship in Churchill

Very little has been reported about an occurrence in which two Turkish sailors jumped ship in Churchill in order to avoid apprehension by Canadian authorities. Upon landing, they purchased train tickets to Winnipeg, but were apprehended by a rail ticket clerk, after which they tried to claim refugee status.¹⁰⁷ Sources do not specify what measures were taken following the apprehension of these individuals.

This example highlights the potential for alert civilians to thwart unauthorized entry, as in the previous case of the Romanian illegal alien, who just happened to be discovered by the RCMP in Grise Fiord. In this case, the rail ticket clerk was alerted to the unusual presence of Turkish sailors in Churchill. Had the clerk been less alert, one might consider how far the sailors could have infiltrated Canada.



Source: abc.net

Immersion of MIR-2 Russian Mini-Sub

August 2007: Russia Plants National Flag at the North Pole

Canada responded to a potential sovereignty challenge when Russia sent a submarine to plant its national flag on the seabed at the North Pole in August 2007. Russian political personality and polar explorer, Minister of Parliament, Artur Chilingarov, and MP Vladimir Gruzdev led the mission to launch two Mir submarines to plant a titanium capsule with a Russian flag on the ocean floor 4200 m below the pole.¹⁰⁸

The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter MacKay,¹⁰⁹ dismissed the act as a publicity stunt and asserted that the North is Canadian property:

This isn't the 15th century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory' ... There is no threat to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic ... we're not at all concerned about this mission—basically it's just a show by Russia ... The question of sovereignty of the Arctic is not a question. It's clear. It's our country. It's our property. It's our water ... The Arctic is Canadian.¹¹⁰


This statement might be misunderstood as suggesting that the North Pole is Canadian, which it is not, but it does highlight the degree to which sovereignty politics affects Canadian sensitivities.

The status of the North Pole is complicated by politics and the uncertain geomorphology of the continental shelf beneath the sea at the North Pole. In light of its oil and gas potential, Russia claims that this underwater continental ridge, known as the Lomonosov Ridge, is a geographical extension of Asia's continental shelf. If this is indeed proven to be the case, then it could strengthen Russia's claim to the North Pole.¹¹¹

Russia's Arctic interests are becoming increasingly clear. On January 7 2007, a Russian envoy led by former KGB (now FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev, arrived via an Mi-8 helicopter to raise a flag at the South Pole. This act was dismissed as a stunt; however, sources report that Patrushev traveled to the North Pole in 2004 with a similar agenda.¹¹² These exploits have been criticized as part of Russia's attempt, known as the Russian Resurgence, to re-establish its Soviet-era influence globally.¹¹³ Former Russian President and KGB operative Vladimir Putin announced Russia's interest in securing its strategic, economic, scientific and defence interests in the Arctic. Russia's act of planting a flag at the North Pole is just one of many ways in which the former Soviet state is attempting to demonstrate assertiveness towards its international competition.¹¹⁴ Although not regarded as a credible threat to Canadian Arctic sovereignty, this act shows that Russia is serious about its northern strategic interests. It should be kept in mind that the Kremlin has not been tolerant of opposition in the past. For example, in November 2006, former FSB¹¹⁵ officer, Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned by radioactive material, coincidentally following his public criticism of Russian political leadership and misdeeds of the FSB.¹¹⁶ The nation of Georgia was invaded in late summer 2008 in response to its attempt to secede from Russia. In January 2009, Russia was revealed to be probing Canadian northern airspace (see Russian Bomber below). These aggressive actions suggest that Russia is not likely to back down from a challenge to the disputed northern territory estimated to yield significant quantities of oil and gas.¹¹⁷ Indeed, Russia recently unveiled its national strategy for Arctic development up to 2020.¹¹⁸

August 2007: Wild Vikings Land in Nunavut

Five Norwegian sailors who called themselves the "Wild Vikings" attempted to sail through the NWP in August 2007. Led by Jarle Andhoy, this group intended to make a documentary of the voyage of their boat, the Berserk II, through the Passage to Nunavut



Mini Russian submarine on ocean floor at North Pole

in the spirit of the historical 1903 expedition of Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen. This group was notorious for dressing up as Vikings, chasing polar bears, cozying up to walruses and drinking vodka with Russians, as documented in their previous voyages to northern Russia and Antarctica.¹¹⁹ On August 24 2007, the Vikings were arrested in a western hamlet in Nunavut by the RCMP after failing to report their presence to Canadian immigration officials in Gjoa Haven, Cambridge Bay, Nunavut. It was revealed that Andhoy had misled the RCMP in Nunavut by hiding a member of his crew, Frederick Juell, who had been deported previously when the Vikings travelled to Halifax. Juell faced possible criminal charges for re-entering Canada illegally.¹²⁰

The activities of this group may not have had sinister undertones, however, sources indicate that these Norwegians attempted to sail Canadian waters with two people undercover.¹²¹ Regardless of intentions, this voyage constitutes illegal activity. The intrusion highlights the potential for criminal elements to enter Canada through its porous northern border, as observed in previous examples of intrusions at Tuktoyaktuk, Grise Fiord and Churchill.

August 2008: Foreign Submarine Sighted Following an Explosion at the Entrance of the Northwest Passage

Ten days following a mysterious explosion near the eastern entrance of the NWP, a foreign submarine was sighted only 10 to 15 kilometres from the location of the explosion.¹²² The explosion occurred early on July 31, 2008 and was reported by Inuit hunters at Borden Peninsula, northeast Baffin Island to a northern Canadian Ranger, who investigated the occurrence. The hunters' report indicated that they heard a loud explosion, observed black smoke and several dead whales on shore. Joint Task Force North determined that there were no known vessels operating in the region and could not determine what might have caused the explosion. A long-range Aurora aircraft was dispatched to conduct reconnaissance over the site. Parks Canada reported to the site to assist in investigating the explosion.¹²³

On August 9, 2008, a foreign submarine was sighted at the northern end of Baffin Island by the Inuit hunters who reported it to Canadian Rangers responsible for monitoring the Arctic for foreign intrusions. The CF has chosen not to comment on the details of the submarine sighting or the explosion, probably in the interest of preserving operational security. Whether the explosion was linked to the submarine has yet to be determined.¹²⁴

This incident highlights Canada's inability to detect or stop underwater incursions. As previously stated, undetected intrusions or incursions constitute significant threats to Canadian security, specifically when security officials are not made aware ahead of time of the intentions of foreign entities operating in Canadian northern territory. Foreign submarines could be embarking on data gathering or espionage activities, military exercises, probing or testing Canada's detection and response capabilities. Unless the vessel is detected and the crew questioned, its purpose for traversing Canadian northern waters is speculative.

Inuit hunter communities are often the first to provide intelligence concerning unusual activity in the North. If the explosion had not occurred, it is possible that the submarine would have evaded detection. It might be extrapolated from this instance that other submarines successfully traverse Canadian Arctic waters without being detected if they do not affect the sea life or have any accidents that would result in destruction or noise on the surface of the sea.

February 16 2009: Russian Bear Bomber Approached Canadian Airspace

Reports from mid-February 2009 indicate that a Russian Tupolev Tu-95 aircraft approached (but did not enter) Canadian airspace three days prior to President Barack Obama's visit to Ottawa. Later reports confirm that there had not been one, but two aircraft that attempted to probe Canadian Arctic airspace. NORAD detected the Russian Bear long-range bomber heading toward Canada.¹²⁵ Sources indicate that this was not the first instance of such activity and Canadian officials report that this incident represents the twentieth incursion in the past two years.¹²⁶ Chief of Defence Staff General Walt Natynczyk

states that Russian incursions started about one and half to two years ago, “when we had not seen anything for decades,” although the General did not report on the frequency of such flights or specific locations of occurrence.¹²⁷

A spokesman for the Russian Defence Ministry stated that the flight was part of “regular military training and air patrol plans in the northern latitudes ... All the international flight regulations were strictly respected ... Therefore, the very possibility of a violation of Canadian airspace is out of [the] question. The adjacent countries were informed of that flight in good time.” Another spokesman from the Russian Embassy in Washington downplayed the incursion: “It was a routine flight over international airspace.” However, Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay suggested that there was a “strong coincidence” that the flight occurred around the same time that Canadian security and defence assets were concentrated in Ottawa for President Obama’s visit, and noted that the Russian Bear was met with ... “CF-18 fighter planes and world-class pilots that know their business ... [The pilots] sent a strong signal they should back off and stay out of our airspace.” Prime Minister Stephen Harper noted that Russian incursions into Canadian airspace are a “real concern” and stated:

I have expressed at various times the deep concern our government has with increasingly aggressive Russian actions around the globe and Russian intrusions into our airspace¹²⁸ ... We will defend our airspace; we also have obligations of continental defence with the United States. We will fulfill those obligations to defend our continental airspace and we will defend our sovereignty and we will respond every time the Russians make any kind of intrusion on the sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic.



Source: AirforceTechnology.com

Tupolev-95 Russian Strategic Bear Bomber escorted by F-15C Eagle

The nature of these flights recalls Cold War incursions of Russian aircraft into North American airspace that ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989. The resumption of such flights in recent years demonstrates elements of a Russian resurgence.¹²⁹ Indeed, Russia has openly expressed its national interest in claiming Arctic oil and resources.¹³⁰ NORAD spokesman Michael Kucharek noted the possibility that the Russian bomber was engaging in a military exercise:

These types of exercises occur and have occurred over the past few years in quite a few different times and places.¹³¹

The intent of these flights is suspicious. Vladimir Drik, the aide to the Russian Chief of Staff confirmed to *Novosti* news that indeed the flight occurred on February 18, and that “the

Tupolev-160 fulfilled all its air patrol tasks ... It was a planned flight.” However, Canadian officials indicate that the crafts intercepted were a different model—the Tu-95.¹³²

One might suspect that, in probing Canadian airspace, Russia is testing NORAD’s ability to detect foreign aircraft in North American airspace and capabilities to respond. As noted, following Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, Canada has been watchful of Russian Arctic activities. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has gone so far as to suggest that Russia has reverted to a “Soviet-era mentality,”¹³³ an opinion that could be supported by General Natynczyk’s statement that until two years ago, Canada had not seen any activity from Russia for decades. Russia’s re-activation of a former Soviet military station at Nagurskoye, where soldiers, scientists, meteorologists and FSB personnel are stationed, and which even had a personal visit by Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov,¹³⁴ indicates a resurgence of Russian power in the North that might become increasingly aggressive in light of the strategic potential of the Arctic region. Notably, in late March 2009, Russia released a document on its Security Council website, titled “The basis of the national policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region until 2020 and beyond prospects.”¹³⁵ This document indicates Russia’s intent to increase its assets in the Arctic to support its political, economic and security interests in the region. A statement from the Russian National Security Council announced plans to establish FSB control of the Arctic and create a highly qualified special Arctic military force known as the Arctic Group of Forces created under the auspices of the Russian Federal Security Service.¹³⁶ Canada and its Arctic neighbours might now be on alert for aggressive Russian activities in the High North.



Source: unknown

L.A. class submarine USS Annapolis on surface of Arctic Ocean in March 2009

Summary of Intrusions¹³⁷

INTRUSION/FOREIGN PRESENCE	Date
German weather station in Labrador	1943
USS Seadragon Submarine transit through NWP	1960
Manhattan Event	1969
Soviet nuclear satellite crashes into NWT / Alberta / Saskatchewan	1978

Denmark staking claim to Hans Island	1984-present ¹³⁸
Polar Sea Event	1985
Al Qaeda Flight through Iqaluit	1993
Russian Ilyushin-76 lands in Churchill	1998
Chinese Ship <i>Xue Long</i> lands at Tuktoyaktuk	1999
Foreign submarine at Cumberland Sound	1999
Romanian infiltrator lands at Grise Fiord	2006
Turkish infiltrators at Churchill	2006
Russia plants flag at North Pole	2007
Wild Vikings land at Nunavut	2007
Foreign submarine in NWP	2008
Russian bombers probe Canadian airspace	2009 ¹³⁹

The following table categorizes the types of threats posed by each intrusion and includes those beyond Canadian territory to illustrate potential threats due to proximity, such as the Japanese invasion of the Aleutians. In some cases an intrusion can constitute a range of threats and suspected motivations, whether national, or criminal, terrorist or individual. Secondary environmental effects are no less serious as these affect public health and safety. All of these intrusions constitute some degree of sovereignty challenge, whether intended or not, as a result of entering Canadian Arctic territory without consent.

Intrusion Perpetrator(s)	Total Intrusions ¹⁴⁰	Nature(s) of Threat			
		Military	Security	Economic ¹⁴¹	Environmental
National	11	7		1	5
Criminal/ Terrorist	2		2		
Individual(s)	3		3		
	16				

The motivations for intrusions constitute mostly a national character with a significant military interest. Notably, the environmental risk comes in a close second to the military threat, indicating that unregulated foreign activity in the North carries significant hazards beyond the realm of traditional threats. Individual intrusions pose a security threat when such activity runs contrary to Canadian national laws and regulations, as in the case of the Wild Vikings transporting an individual associated with global criminal activity or in the case of the Romanian who violated Canadian immigration laws.

Considerations

So far, there has not yet been a major national security emergency in the Canadian Arctic, but the potential remains, especially if Canada fails to build the capabilities necessary to respond to foreign intrusion or other emergency situations that could manifest in the North such as a Search and Rescue (SAR) incident,¹⁴² or continued domestic attacks against oil and gas pipelines.¹⁴³ Analysis of the intrusions represented in this survey highlight a number of issues for consideration with respect to northern security and Canadian sovereignty:

- **There exists a valid security and sovereignty threat.** The events presented herein comprise known foreign intrusions. It is assumed that there are many others that have either been missed or that have not been reported in open sources. Foreign entities will likely continue attempts at unlawful entry into Canadian Arctic territory to infiltrate Canada (or transit through) from the North. Such threats originate from a variety of sources, such as organized criminal elements, terrorist entities, former

superpowers looking to reassert their strategic interests in the Arctic, other nations of questionable integrity conducting a range of covert activity beneath the sea ice, such as stealth submarine voyages.

- **The Arctic is vulnerable to infiltration.** Gaps in surveillance remain in spite of existing Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The intrusions presented herein demonstrate that Canada still lacks both effective situational awareness to know what is entering its northernmost territories and the ability to share that information across relevant agencies (not to mention timely response capabilities). The detection of foreign submarine activity is a concern, as Canada lacks an undersea surveillance system. The examples discussed demonstrate that any submarine detection is often the result of Inuit reports seeing or hearing something unusual, like an explosion or observing adverse affects on the environment, such as pollution or harm to local wildlife. Illegal fishing is also a significant concern because it could result in a loss of Canadian profit and resource depletion, not to mention adverse affects on the marine ecosystem. Indeed, foreign vessels operating in northern waters pose some degree of environmental threat in terms of the potential for pollution, particularly from vessels transporting oil. The *Exxon Valdez* oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, on March 24 1989¹⁴⁴ attests to significant risk of pollution occurring from unregulated shipping in Canadian Arctic waters.

- **Northern populations provide a valuable ISR resource.** The Rangers constitute an effective human surveillance (eyes and ears) apparatus to report unusual occurrences to JTFN. However, at times when these assets are not present at the moment of an intrusion, Inuit hunters or other northern residents might be in the vicinity to observe and report, as was the case of the explosion in August 2008. Northern communities have a clear interest in northern security since harmful foreign activities in their territory have the potential to affect their health, safety and lifestyle. In addition, the Inuit often provide a sovereignty presence in areas where Ranger patrols are less frequent and there are no RCMP detachments.

- **Existing arrangements have been successful in some cases.** In the two examples of the deported Romanian and the Wild Vikings intrusions, the combination of Inuit reporting and RCMP enforcement have successfully prevented unlawful entry into Canadian territory. Indeed, the presence of Inuit populations, Rangers, RCMP and CF (on exercise) acts to discourage unregulated or illegal foreign activity.

- **The harsh environment of the High Arctic provides a security advantage.** Extreme Arctic weather conditions serve to deter intruders. For instance, recent CF exercises¹⁴⁵ have revealed operational difficulties in the Arctic environment, such as complications due to dense fog, failing communications and equipment malfunction.¹⁴⁶ Although these conditions might inhibit response efforts to a northern emergency, it could be assumed that these shortcomings would similarly complicate attempts by unwelcome intruders. Complications on Canada's end can also be offset by Inuit Ranger capabilities of overcoming the challenges of Arctic conditions by using simpler, more traditional methods of operating and communicating in the Arctic.¹⁴⁷

- **Bilateral initiatives have worked.** Canada's cooperation with the U.S. served to provide a security presence in the North to deter Soviet activities during the Cold War. Later attempts by Canada to assert sovereignty at the expense of collaborative security efforts with the U.S. undermine its Arctic security interests. Unilateral assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic would otherwise be extremely (perhaps, prohibitively) expensive because of the security infrastructure required to reinforce sovereignty claims.

- **Security enforcement is complicated by disputed territorial zones.** The challenges associated with the threat of foreign activities in Canada's Arctic are

complicated by disputes over the status of Arctic waters, such as the Northwest Passage and the unconfirmed geomorphology of the continental shelf extension of the Lomonosov Ridge. The complication extends to the sovereignty issue in terms of where Canada has an interest in establishing a national security presence. As noted, a bilateral security arrangement between Canada and the U.S. might serve to alleviate concerns of foreign activities in the North, facilitated by relaxing the sovereignty issue.

Conclusion

The intrusions discussed in this paper demonstrate that Canada's North remains a region of uncertainty with regard to international interest in Arctic opportunities and obvious vulnerability to foreign exploitation. The implications for Canada concern the continuation of intrusions, by which other nations might attempt to test Canada's ability to respond. Such consideration requires a critical assessment of Canada's capabilities in conjunction with an evaluation of the method and magnitude of response. Although the final section highlights a number of shortcomings in security and situational awareness in the Arctic, it also provides an analysis of resources that work. The latter might see further consideration by Canadian leadership and security and defence advisors in the development of Arctic capabilities to meet the challenges which Canada will inevitably face in the near-to-distant future. Huebert, among other Arctic security experts,¹⁴⁸ has noted that Canada is already on the course of rebuilding its Arctic capabilities.¹⁴⁹ Increasing academic publications and media reporting on Arctic security encourages Canadian leadership to remain committed to these initiatives.

History demonstrates that, however proactive they may seem at time of announcement, government proposals to improve Canadian Arctic capabilities have seen little action in reality, as observed in the abandonment of the 1965 initiative to acquire some U.S. *Skipjack*-class submarines,¹⁵⁰ the 1990 cancellation of the 1985 proposal to construct a Polar 8 class icebreaker¹⁵¹ and the 1987 intention to build 12 nuclear submarines that was abandoned at the end of the Cold War.¹⁵² If this trend continues, Canada and the greater North American continent remain vulnerable to increasing numbers of foreign intrusions through an insecure Arctic.

About the Author...

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Endnotes

1. Former Commander of Canadian Forces Northern Area (now Joint Task Force North, JTFN). The quote appeared in Ed Struzik, "Who will Guard Our Gaping Back Door," *Edmonton Journal* (Nov. 18, 2007): <http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/features/thebigthaw/story.html?id=df997504-b305-46f9-bd83-a2b11bc6a591>. A briefer version of Struzik's article appears in the November 18, 2007 edition of the *Toronto Star* "Who's guarding our back door?" <http://www.thestar.com/Arctic%20In%20Peril/article/277429>.
2. National security as it pertains to the prevention of threats to Canadian public safety and security in (and from) the Arctic—this domain requires individual attention as defence analysts have described the North as a region vulnerable to external activity and/or internal human or environmental threats, pollution, threats to economic security, etc.
3. Ed Struzik (2007).
4. *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*. Cambridge University Press (2005).
5. Such as the international status of the Northwest Passage, disagreements on the Canada-U.S. boundary in the Beaufort Sea, and the continental shelf extension of Lomonosov Ridge
6. Natalie Mychajlyszyn, *The Arctic: Canadian Security and Defence*, International Affairs—Trade and Finance Division (Oct. 24, 2008), [PRB 08-13E]: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0813-e.htm#theapex>.

7. "Canada's Diamond Rush," CBC News (Sept 20, 2007): <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/diamonds/>. Canada: A Diamond Producing Nation, NRC Canada (Dec 19, 2008): <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/diamonds/>.
8. An *intrusion* is understood to be "the act of wrongfully entering upon the property of another," which fits as a definition for the wrongful or unlawful entry of foreign entities into Canadian Arctic territory. *Infiltration* generally has the same meaning with a more subversive purpose. An *incursion* on the other hand describes a hostile entrance or invasion of territory.
9. Known intrusions are those that have been reported in open academic and media sources. This article acknowledges that there may have been numerous unreported intrusions as well as undetected and therefore unknown presence of foreign entities at various times within Canada's Arctic.
10. Such as the recent Russian Bear flights near Canadian airspace and the announcement of a new Russian Special Arctic Military Force (see below)
11. Not to be confused with an *incident*, which according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary suggests an event causing trouble, or rather signifies an action that results in significant consequences, often with diplomatic implications—see the *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary*.
12. LCol Paul Dittman. "In Defence of Defence: Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 11.3 (Spring 2009), 9.
13. "US Army, Alaska (USARAK)," GlobalSecurity.org (Dec. 27, 2005): <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usarak.htm>.
14. W.A.B. Douglas, "Beachhead Labrador," *Quarterly Journal of Military History* 8.2 (1996): 35-37.
15. Goose Air Base, Labrador, GlobalSecurity.Org (April 26, 2005): <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/goose.htm>.
16. Douglas (1996).
17. Health Canada, Emergencies and Disasters, "The COSMOS 954 Accident," (June 24, 2008): http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ed-ud/fedplan/cosmos_954-eng.php.
18. Huebert, Rob. "The Rise and Fall (and Rise?) of Canadian Arctic Security." Chapter 1 in *Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic*. Edited by Brian MacDonald. CDAI Vimy Paper, 2007. pp 10. http://www.cda-cda.ca/Vimy_Papers/Defence%20Requirements%20for%20Canada's%20Arctic%20online%20ve.pdf.
19. The most commonly observed aircraft conducting these exercises was the Tupolev-142 (the Bear-H bomber), capable of carrying AS-15 air launch cruise missiles. Another craft observed is the Tu-95 (Bear-G), capable of carrying several AS-4 nuclear missiles—Douglas L. Clarke, "Increase in Soviet Training Flights Near Alaska," RAD Background Report 118 (June 28, 1988): <http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/143-4-200.shtml>.
20. Although many sources describe the *Manhattan* voyage as an *incident*, this discussion views its categorization as an event, or noteworthy happening, since an incident rather suggests an act with significant diplomatic implications, which we would argue is not the case in the *Manhattan* voyages.
21. Under the auspices of Humble Oil & Refining Co.®—"The Manhattan's Epic Voyage," *Time* (Sept. 26, 1969): <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,844952-1,00.html>. Currie (2007), p. 6. Ken S. Coates, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, William R. Morrison, & Greg Poelzer, *Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North*, Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers (2008), pp. 94-95. Christopher Kirkley, "The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Initiatives: Canada's Response to an American Challenge," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 13 (Spring 1996): 41-42.
22. Indeed, the *Time* account notes that while traveling through the Barrow Strait, a Soviet submarine was detected by radar operators on board the *Manhattan* — *Time*, "Epic Voyage," (1969).
23. Sovereignty: The right in international law to exercise State functions over a given territory to the exclusion of any other State—*Island of Palmas Arbitration* (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 839—cited in Duncan E.J. Currie, "Sovereignty and Conflict in the Arctic Due to Climate Change: Climate Change and the Legal Status of the Arctic Ocean," *Globelaw* (Aug. 5, 2007): 3: <http://www.globelaw.com/LawSea/arctic%20claims%20and%20climate%20change.pdf>.
24. Canada claimed the Northwest Passage and all waters within the Arctic Archipelago as historic internal waters in 1973 and again in 1975, although there was no official treaty or legislation to legitimize this claim. Therefore, the U.S. continues to deny this claim. In 1986, the formalization of Canadian sovereignty was initiated in the implementation of straight baselines—Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel, "Still Unresolved After Fifty Years: The Northwest Passage in Canadian-American Relations, 1946-1998," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 29.3 (Fall 1999).
25. Coates, et al (2008), p. 95.
26. Captain Pullen participated in the *Manhattan* voyage as a representative of the Canadian Government, providing a link between the tanker and the Department of Transport's, and served as an ice advisor—Ibid.
27. T.C. Pullen, "What Price Canadian Sovereignty?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 113 (Sept. 1987): 70.
28. Christopher Kirkley, "The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Initiatives: Canada's Response to an American Challenge," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 13 (Spring 1997): 42.

29. Coates, et al (2008), 96.
30. 12 nautical miles from the coast.
31. See articles 52 and 53 of Part IV: Archipelagic States of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm. However, according to article 52.2, “The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security.”
32. Charron (2006). The resulting legislation, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) enabled Canada to exercise jurisdiction over shipping to protect Arctic waters—therefore, the issue of innocent passage under section 52.1, was superseded by provision 52.2 (see footnote 28).
33. *Time*, “Epic Voyage,” (1969).
34. D. Bradford, “Sea Ice Pressures Observed on the Second ‘Manhattan’ Voyage,” *Arctic* 25.1 (Mar. 1972): 35.
35. Commodore Owen Struan Robertson had commanded Arctic patrol vessel, the HMCS Labrador on polar operations in the 1950s.
36. Elliot-Meisel (1999), footnote 27—Nathaniel French Caldwell, *Arctic Leverage: Canadian Sovereignty and Security*, Praeger New York (1990), p. 44, 45. “China is Top Espionage Risk to Canada: CSIS,” *CTV News* (June 27, 2007): http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070627/arctic_submarine_070627/20070627?hub=Canada: “In 1960, USS Seadragon conducted the first submerged transit of the Northwest Passage with a Canadian officer on board.” Department of the Navy (U.S.), “Seadragon,” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships—Naval Historical Center (undated): <http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/s8/seadragon-ii.htm>. Awards to the Royal Canadian Navy, “ROBERTSON, Owen Connor Struan (“Robbie”), Commander, RD”: <http://www.rcnvr.com/R%20-%20RCN%20-%20WW2.php>.
37. Elliot-Meisel (1999).
38. A series of airstrips and radio stations established during WWII.
39. In 1941, a series of airfields and weather stations were established in the North in a cooperative arrangement between Canada and the U.S. Iqaluit served as one of the airbases along this route.
40. Otherwise known as the Alaska-Canadian Highway—a supply route constructed in 1942, linking the U.S. to Alaska through a highway running through B.C. and Yukon.
41. Elliot-Meisel (1999).
42. *Ibid.* Nathaniel F. Caldwell (Lt. Cmdr. USN), *Arctic Leverage*, New York: Praeger (1990): 44-45.
43. Elliot-Meisel (1999). Joel Sokolsky, “Canada and the Cold War at Sea,” in W.A.B. Douglas, *RCN in Transition*, University of Washington Press (1988), p. 221.
44. Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas Bland, “Continuity in Canadian Naval Policy 1961-1987,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (April 1989), 30-31.
45. Distant Early Warning system, later upgraded with the North Warning System (NWS) in 1985. This system constitutes a series of radar sites across Arctic North America providing surveillance of airspace in polar territories.
46. The North American Aerospace Defence Command renewed its maritime warning system in May 2006, expanded its monitoring capabilities from space and air defence to maritime defence—About NORAD: <http://www.norad.mil/about/index.html>.
47. Elliot-Meisel (1999).
48. U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Relations 1969-1976,” *Documents on Global Issues*, 1969-1972, Vol. E-1.
49. Guy Killaby (Lt. Comm.), “‘Great Game in a Cold Climate’: Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty in Question,” *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2005-2006): 31. The 1973 agreement between Denmark and Canada involved the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between the Canadian Eastern Arctic islands and Greenland—U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Limits of the Seas No. 72, Continental Shelf Boundary: Canada-Greenland, Issued by the Geographer* (Aug. 4, 1976).
50. Jackie Wallace, “Canadian Wins Right to Prospect Hans Island,” *Nunatsiaq News* (Aug 26, 2006): http://www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/60825/news/nunavut/60825_02.html.
51. For a detailed discussion on the role of the Canadian Rangers, see works by P. Whitney Lackenbauer: “Teaching Canada’s Indigenous Sovereignty Soldiers & Vice Versa: ‘Lessons Learned’ from Ranger Instructors,” *Canadian Army Journal* 10.2 (Summer 2007): http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_2/CAJ_vol10.2_09_e.pdf; “The Canadian Rangers: A Postmodern Militia that Works,” *Canadian Military Journal* 6.4 (Winter 2005-2006): <http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vol6/no4/doc/north-nord-03-eng.pdf>; “Canada’s Northern Defenders: Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers, 1947-2005,” in *Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives* (Eds. P. Whitney Lackenbauer & Craig Mantle). Kingston: CDA Press (2007). pp 171-208; “Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers: Canada’s ‘Eyes and Ears’ in Northern and Isolated Communities,” in *Hidden in Plain Sight: Contributions of Aboriginal Peoples to Canadian Identity and Culture*, Vol. 2

- (Ed. David Newhouse). University of Toronto Press (2008).
52. Killaby (2006), 31-32.
53. *Ottawa Citizen*, letter to the editor (July 25, 2005).
54. "Canada-Denmark Joint Statement on Hans Island," *Polar Politics: Arctic Sovereignty and International Relations* (Sept 19, 2005): <http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/canadadenmark-joint-statement-on-hans-island.html>.
55. Christensen, *Realpolitik Extraordinare*, p. 2.
56. *Ibid.*
57. Wallace (2006).
58. "Canadian Forces Head out on High Arctic Patrol," CTV News (March 25, 2007). Bob Weber, "Patrol Visits Former RCMP Arctic Detachment to Deter Polar Bear Poachers," *Arctic Musings* (April 3, 2007): [http://dl1.yukoncollege.yk.ca/agraham/stories/storyReader\\$3991?print-friendly=true](http://dl1.yukoncollege.yk.ca/agraham/stories/storyReader$3991?print-friendly=true).
59. Coates, et al (2008), p. 113.
60. Jessie C. Carman, "Economic and Strategic Implications of Ice-Free Arctic Seas," in *Globalization and Maritime Power*, Edited by Sam T. Tangredi, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (2002), Footnote 50. However, Lackenbauer, et al, (2008), indicate that three Canadian observers were on board.
61. Coates, et al (2008), p. 114.
62. Indeed, one CF source reports that leaflets were dropped by the Air Force onto the deck of the ship informing the crew that they were passing through Canadian waters and that Canada was officially granting them permission to traverse the passage.
63. Coates, et al (2008), p. 115.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Matthew Carneghan & Allison Goody, *Canadian Arctic Sovereignty*, Government of Canada Parliamentary and Research Service, Prepared by the Political Social Affairs Division (Jan 16, 2006), Library of Parliament—PRB 05-61E: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0561-e.pdf>, p. 5.
66. The U.S. interest in strengthening continental security following the events of 9/11 are not likely to alter this position, as indicated by the recent reiteration by former U.S. President George W. Bush that the Northwest Passage constitutes an international strait. Although such possibility was alluded to in Carneghan (2006), p. 5., Andrea Charron, "The Northwest Passage," *International Journal* 60.3 (Summer 2005): p. 847, suggests that an agreement in which the U.S. agrees that Canada would control the passage would provide "a way of security the North American perimeter."
67. "Extending the Jurisdiction of Canadian Environment and Shipping Laws in the Arctic," *Background—Office of the Prime Minister* (Aug 27, 2008): <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2246>. "Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans Report on the Canadian Coast Guard, Ice-breakers, and Canadian Sovereignty," *Canadian American Strategic Review* (June/Aug 2008): <http://www.casr.ca/doc-dfo-senate-arctic-1.htm>.
68. The greater ramifications of mandatory reporting with respect to foreign interests in the Northwest Passage would have to be examined in greater detail in a separate discussion.
69. Jane George, "Arctic Borders need Tighter Control, Former Commander says," *Nunatsiaq News* (Feb. 1, 2002): http://www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/nunavut020201/news/nunavut/20201_4.html
70. Lawrence Wright, "The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda Mastermind Questions Terrorism," *The New Yorker* (June 2, 2008): http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?currentPage=all.
71. Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, Alfred A. Knopf (2006), p. 174.
72. Naval Operations in an Iceless Arctic—Symposium Notes (April 17-18, 2001): <http://www.natice.noaa.gov/icefree/Arcticscenario.pdf>.
73. The most complete report on this incident is a publication by journalist Ed Struzik in the *Edmonton Journal*.
74. In December 2003, these roles were superceded by the Canada Border Services Agency.
75. Struzik (2007).
76. According to Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.'d) Rory Kilburn of RGK Consulting (March 2009). LCol Kilburn had served as Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of Canadian Forces Northern Area (precursor to JTFN) from 1999-2002. His credentials demonstrate significant expertise in Arctic security, as he oversaw planners for exercises Narwhal and Nanook, closely worked with Ranger patrols in the High Arctic, and worked with other government departments on northern scenarios. In addition, LCol Kilburn was the CFNA representative for the submarine sighting in Cumberland Sound (1999), CF representative for the North during and after 9/11, participated in ASIWG conferences, and coordinated with law enforcement agencies operation in Yukon (1999) and the North (2000).
77. Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Far East—Russian or Eastern?" *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin* (Spring 1998), pp 65-66. "Russia in the Kimberley Process: The Leader's Responsibility," *Civil*

Research Council, Moscow (March 2005), see pp 8-12—"The Internal Russian Market of Diamonds: Chances of Criminal Attacks."

78. *Project Spawn: A Strategic Assessment of Criminal Activity and Organized Crime Infiltrating at Canada's Class 1 Airports*, RCMP Criminal Intelligence (2007): <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ci-rc/spawn-eng.pdf>.

79. Highlights of the 2004 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada, Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (2004): <http://www.csgv.ca/counselor/assets/OrganizedCrimeHighlightsCISCREport.pdf>.

80. i.e. Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal (Trudeau) and Halifax.

81. George, Nunatsiq News (Feb. 2002).

82. *Naval Operations in an Iceless Arctic* (2001).

83. *This Vitus Bering Class icebreaker* built in Ukraine in March 1993. Equipped with an advanced self-contained navigation system and weather observation apparatus, this A-2 class icebreaker has the capacity of breaking ice up to 1.2 m, including 0.2 m of snow—Polar Research Institute of China, M/V Xue Long (2006): <http://www.pric.gov.cn/enindex.asp?sortid=18>.

84. The Canadian Ice Service is a subset of Environment Canada. The Ice Service provides information on ice conditions and iceberg occurrences within the coastal regions of the Western and Eastern Arctic, Hudson Bay, East Coast, and the Great Lakes—Environment Canada, Canadian Ice Service: <http://ice-glaces.ec.gc.ca/App/WsvPageDsp.cfm?ID=1&Lang=eng&Clear=true>.

85. Remote sensing satellites; see Canada Centre for Remote Sensing, "Radarsat," Natural Resources Canada (Jan. 17, 2008): http://www.ccrs.nrcan.gc.ca/radar/spaceborne/radarsat1/index_e.php.

86. Parliament of Canada, "Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans," Issue 5—Evidence, 2nd Session, 39th Parliament, Chaired by Senator Bill Rompkey, Ottawa, ON (March 13, 2008): http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/fish-e/05ev-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=39&Ses=2&comm_id=7.

87. By 2003, the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) was established as part of the clearance process to land on Canadian soil. CBSA took over the customs role of the CCRA and the intelligence and enforcement role of the CIC.

88. Struzik (2007).

89. *Ibid.*

90. According to Colonel (Ret.'d) Pierre Leblanc (March 2009), former Commander of Canadian Forces Northern Area (now known as Joint Task Force North) where he was responsible for coordinating military activities in Yukon, NWT, and Nunavut. During his command up North, Col Leblanc established the Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group (ASIWG—now ASWG) in 1999 providing a forum within the Canadian security/defence community—Canadian Forces, the RCMP, Coast Guard, Revenue Canada, Citizenship and Immigration, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and Foreign Affairs and International Trade—to discuss and evaluate Canadian Arctic security interests.

91. Rob Huebert on the requirement for the capability of knowing and then responding to activities occurring in the far North—Parliament of Canada, "Canada's National Security Policy," Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 17 – Evidence, 1st Session, 88th Parliament, Chaired by Senator Colin Kenny, Calgary, AB (March 8, 2005): http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/17eva-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=38&Ses=1&comm_id=76.

92. Unconfirmed sources report that in late 1997, two groups of Chinese illegals were apprehended in Iqaluit en route from Kangerlussuaq Greenland. These illegals held fake Japanese passports when they arrived on First Air airlines with one-way tickets bound for Montreal. Sources suggest that as many as 100 or more Chinese might have been smuggled into Canada through Iqaluit until the first group had been caught on November 8, 1997. Both groups comprising 16 people applied for refugee status upon apprehension and none of them had visas—Jason Van Rassel, "Iqaluit May be Gateway for Refugees," Nunatsiq News (Jan. 12, 1998): <http://www.nunatsiq.com/archives/back-issues/week/60112.html#1>.

93. Parliament of Canada, "Canada's National Security Policy," (2005).

94. CTV News, "Government 'Concerned' About Chinese Espionage," (April 14, 2006): http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060414/china_espionage_060414/20060414?hub=TopStories—former CSIS intelligence officer Juneau-Katsuya provided estimates to the Canadian government regarding the number of Chinese spies in Canada stealing Canadian industrial and high-technology secrets. Intelligence reports estimated that 1000 Chinese agents and informants operate in Canada. Former Security Intelligence Director Jim Judd indicates China tops the CSIS list of countries known for foreign intelligence-gathering or interference in Canadian affairs (although China continues to deny accusations of espionage)—CTV News, "China is Top Espionage Risk to Canada: CSIS," (April 30, 2007): http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070430/csis_china_070430/20070430?hub=Canada. See also IntelNews.org, "Canada Aggressively Infiltrated by Spies,

- Claims New Report,” (April 15, 2009): <http://intelligencenews.wordpress.com/2009/04/15/02-88/>.
95. Huebert warns that Asian nations, such as Japan and China are increasing their interest and activity in the Arctic—Rob Huebert, “Canadian Arctic Security: Preparing for a Changing Future,” *Behind the Headlines* (July 1, 2008): <http://www.articlearchives.com/north-america/canada/2217696-1.html>. Joseph Spears, “China and the Arctic: The Awakening Snow Dragon,” *China Brief Volume* 9.6 (March 18, 2009)—China’s economic dependence on international shipping and the opening of the Arctic creates an opportunity for China conduct shipping with greater efficiency. George Kolisnek, “Canadian Arctic Energy Security,” *Journal of Energy Security* (Dec. 2008)—China and India are major energy importers in a time when existing hydrocarbon resources are being depleted. Kolisnek warns that the melting of the Arctic ice cap enabling access to potential oil deposits, combined with possible future energy security issues worldwide creates the potential for low to high level friction among Arctic states and others (e.g. China, India, etc.). See also, David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy,” *Foreign Affairs* (Sept-Oct. 2005).
96. Parliament of Canada, “Canada’s National Security Policy,” (2005).
97. Naval Operations in an Iceless Arctic (2001).
98. Ibid., Struzik (2007). Association of Former Intelligence Officers, “New Security Threat 2020: Global Warming Opens Arctic,” *Weekly Intelligence Notes #01-01* (Jan. 8, 2001): <http://surveillant.us/sections/wins/2001/2001-01.html>: “Canadian military intelligence has already detected undeclared foreign submarine activity in Cumberland Sound, off Baffin Island in the far north.”
99. Doug Finlayson, “Cumberland Sound,” *The Canadian Encyclopedia*: <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0002073>. An alternative source has noted that the submarine had not been sighted by anyone, but rather during an interview it was revealed that the scientists, RCMP, and Inuit had only seen or heard strange phenomena normally associated with submarine activity. The scientists in particular reported that beluga whales retreated to a sanctuary used when killer whales are in the vicinity, however, there was no evidence of such a presence. Thus, the conclusion was that something else was in the area—Kilburn (2009).
100. RSOE EDIS: Canada—Explosion—2008.08.08, RSOE Emergency and Disaster Information Service, Budapest, Hungary (Aug. 8, 2008), EDIS Code: EX-20080808-17966-CAN.
101. “Grise Fiord Refugee to Court,” *Siku News* (Nov 11, 2006): <http://www.sikunews.com/art.html?artid=2257&catid=5>.
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103. Struzik (2007). “Canada Troops Assert Arctic Sovereignty,” *LiveLeak Media* (Aug. 16, 2007): http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=8b0_1187298316.
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105. “Jail for Border Hopper,” *Siku News* (Nov 22, 2006): <http://www.sikunews.com/art.html?artid=2317&catid=5>.
106. Nathan Vanderklippe, “Border Jumper Finds it Hard to Melt into Arctic,” *Edmonton Journal* (Sept 21, 2006).
107. Michael Byers, “A True North Strong and Free,” Chapter 7 in *Intent for a Nation: What is Canada For?* Vancouver, B.C.: Douglas & MacIntyre (2007): 155. Struzik (2007).
108. “Russian Subs Near Arctic Target,” *BBC News* (Aug. 1, 2007). Matthias Schopp & Gerald Traufetter, “Russia Unveils Aggressive Arctic Plans,” *Spiegel Online* (Jan. 29, 2009): <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-604338,00.html>.
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113. Peter Zeihan, “The Russian Resurgence and the New-Old Front,” *Stratfor—Geopolitical Intelligence Report* (Sept 15, 2008): http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20080915_russian_resurgence_and_new_old_front?ip_auth_redirect=1.

- 114 Stratfor, "The Russian Resurgence." http://www.stratfor.com/themes/russias_standing_global_system.
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118. "Fundamentals of the State Policy of Russia in the Arctic up to 2020 and Beyond," Russian Federation: <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/>. See Russian Bear Bomber discussed below.
119. "They are a Wild Party: Norwegian 'Vikings' Set Sail for Nunavut." CBC News (Aug. 13, 2007): <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/08/13/nu-vikings.html>; Struzik (2007) reports that the Vikings attempted to sail through the NWP with 2 people undercover.
120. "Norway's Wild Vikings Booted out of Canada." CBC News (Sept. 4, 2007): <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/09/04/cda-vikings.html>.
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122. Steven Chase, "Military Scramble over Foreign Sub Sighting," *Globe and Mail* (Mar 20, 2009): <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090320.wsubmarine20/BNStory/National/home>. "Military Probes Mystery Blast in Arctic," Edmonton Journal (Aug. 7, 2008): <http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=46bcc3e3-d4d1-4cb4-a024-902ef385a602>.
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125. Mike Blanchfield, "Harper Warns Russians After Two Bombers Intercepted," Canwest News Service (Feb. 27, 2009).
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127. Blanchfield (2009).
128. Other sources indicate that the Bear did not enter Canadian airspace, but rather the buffer zone used to identify possible intruders—Rory Kilburn.
129. Schepp & Traufetter (2009).
130. Ibid.
131. "Russia Denies Plane Approached Canadian Airspace," CBC News (Feb. 27, 2009): <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/27/arctic-russia.html>.
132. Blanchfield (2009).
133. Andrew Mayeda, "Canada to Keep Watch on Russia's Arctic Activities," *Canwest News Service* (Aug. 19, 2008).
134. Matthias Schepp & Gerald Traufetter, "Russia Unveils Aggressive Arctic Plans," *Spiegel Online* (Jan. 29, 2009): <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-604338,00.htm>.
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137. In this instance, intrusions will represent an umbrella term for such events, intrusions, incursions, etc. This table covers only those intrusions that occurred in Canada's North.
138. Negotiations (and debates) between Canada and Denmark are still under way regarding the status of Hans Island.
139. The most recent incursion of Russian bombers near Canadian airspace occurred in February 2009.
140. The USS *Seadragon* voyage is not included in this table, as the voyage itself never constituted a breach of sovereignty.
141. In the case of the *Manhattan* event, the motivation was commercial/economic, however, the motivation defaults to national in the sense that the vessel was accompanied by the U.S. Coast Guard. Whether this event constitutes an economic threat is debatable, as the ship was travelling toward a U.S. destination.
142. Notably, LCol Kilburn states that the ability of Canada to exercise its SAR responsibilities in the North in the event of an airliner crash is woefully inadequate, comprising in a huge hole in Canada's capabilities in the North.
143. In regards to the six *EnCana Corporation* pipeline bombings in 2008-09 by an alleged local activist(s) near Dawson Creek, B.C., just north of the 55th parallel—see CBC News, "RCMP Urge

Patience in B.C. Pipeline Bomb Probe,” (July 5, 2009): Royal Canadian Mounted Police, links relating to Dawson Creek pipeline blasts (Oct 2008-June 2009): http://bc.rcmp.ca/ViewPage.action?categoryId=525&categoryKey=major_investigations&siteNodeId=62&categoryName=Dawson%20Creek%20Pipeline%20Explosion&languageId=1; <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2009/07/05/bc-dawson-creek-sixth-pipeline-bombing.html>; Schneider, Katie, “Pipeline Bomber a Serious Threat,” Sun Media (July 6, 2009): <http://www.edmontonsun.com/news/alberta/2009/07/06/10034856-sun.html>.

144. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the President (Executive Summary), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency—National Response Team (May 1989): <http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/valdez/04.htm>.

145. i.e. joint exercises Nanook and Narwhal, involving participation by the CF, Canadian Coast Guard, Inuit Rangers, and the RCMP.

146. Struzik (2007).

147. For instance, the HF radio works well in the summer, although not so well in the winter when it would be difficult for intruders to operate in the High Arctic—Rory Kilburn (2009).

148. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Franklyn Griffiths, Andrea Charron, and Michael Byers.

149. Huebert, “Rise and Fall,” (2007).

150. Rob Huebert, “Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security?” *Canadian Military Journal* 6.4 (Winter 2005-2006): <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no4/doc/north-nord-eng.pdf>, pp. 19-20, see also footnotes 8 and 9 in Huebert (2005-06), p. 29.

151. Andrew Charron, “The Northwest Passage Shipping Channel: Sovereignty First and Foremost and Sovereignty to the Side,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 7.4 (Spring 2005), p. 18: <http://www.jmss.org/2005/summer/articles/charron.pdf>. Donald McRae, “Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction?” *Northern Perspectives* 20.4 (Winter 1994-95): <http://www.carc.org/pubs/v22no4/loss.htm>.

152. Adam Lajeunesse, “Sovereignty, Security and the Canadian Nuclear Submarine Program,” *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2007-08), 74-82: <http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vo8/no4/doc/lajeunes-eng.pdf>.



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