

The Americans, in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO), at least, generally followed an approach characterized by more of an adherence to precision bombing and this by daylight, whereas the British conducted mostly night-time operations. The US approach in the Pacific theatre, with the massive use of B-29 bombers in raids on Japanese cities was quite different, an analysis of which would be a valuable comparative study by Mr Hansen to further knowledge in this area.

Throughout the war, what eventually became a combined Commonwealth/US round-the-clock effort was the subject of continued controversy over priorities of targets, which resulted in subsequent amendments to the original Directive, as well as debates over the morality of bombing urban areas, including doubts in Churchill's mind as to the approach to the campaign. What this reviewer found particularly fascinating was an extended correspondence between Portal and Harris in 1944 on the conduct of the bombing campaign. One gets the sense that Portal did not believe that Harris was conducting operations within the intent of the Directives issued him, while Harris counters, in a much stronger tone, defending his prosecution of the campaign. Indeed, this correspondence alone could be worth an academic study in itself. In retrospect, that it took place at all seems extraordinary: it seems hard to believe that such exchanges could take place today without the issue resulting in the Directive being re-written in such a way as to clarify the intent, on the one extreme, or the subordinate commander being replaced, on the other.

In the end the author concludes that, "Area bombing not only failed to win the war, it probably prolonged it", and argues that a greater focus on certain types of targets (transport, oil, ball bearings, which were included in the Portal/Harris correspondence above), would have had more decisive results. In his assessment of Harris, Hansen calls him impressive, decisive, tenacious, yet one who by war's end, "...had made the complete obliteration of German cities the end goal."


In conducting research, the author has relied not only on British, American and German archival material, but has also made extensive use of personal accounts and reports of both German and allied eyewitnesses, and the bibliographical reference in this case run to four pages alone. However, I would have been interested to learn to what extent Canadian military and political archives would have unlocked any secrets as to the extent that the prosecution of the bombing campaign was debated at home.

The book's conclusions may not appeal to all readers, though in his preface the authors states that, "...it is important to bear in mind that an evaluation of the effects and the morality of the Canadian, British and American bombing war can cast no aspersions on the bravery and sincerity of the young men who chose to serve in Bomber Command, still less on the memory of the ten thousand Canadian who died over Europe." A well researched historical study, but one with modern relevance, this book is very highly recommended.

M551 SHERIDAN: US AIRMOBILE TANKS 1941-2001

ZALOGA, Steven J.. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009, paperback, 48 pages, \$19.95, ISBN-13: 978-1846033919

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The desire to bring self-propelled armour to bear in support of U.S. airborne forces presented a considerable challenge to designers during the Second World War. Aircraft capable of lifting a multi-ton heavy tank had yet to appear, and the initial compromises between weight and firepower were brutal.

Steven J. Zaloga's book, *M551 Sheridan: US Airmobile Tanks 1941-2001*, offers a concise overview of the decades-long American quest to "drop" armour directly into the heat of battle. Beginning with an examination of the Marmon-Herrington M22 Locust aero light tank and following various designs through to the deployment of the M551 Sheridan, Zaloga offers the reader a brief glimpse into a particularly challenging land warfare