
THE “OPERATIONALIZATION” OF CANADIAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERLY UNDERSTANDING THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Lemay

Rebuilding our capabilities and standing up for our sovereignty have sent a clear message to the world: Canada is back as a credible player on the international stage... focus and action, rather than rhetoric and posturing, are restoring our influence in global affairs.¹

**Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean,
Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada**

With these words, Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, confirmed what many analysts, many Canadians and most politicians had already acknowledged: “in the eyes of the world, Canada is back.”² In his Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne, the Prime Minister went further by calling Canadians to action. According to him, it is by “effective action beyond [its] borders, in concert with [its allies,]... [action that] reflects our conviction that Canadian foreign policy must promote our values and defend our interests.”³

Today, at the beginning of the 21st century, Canada, like its allies, is having difficulty adjusting its security policy to the ideological and asymmetric threat and the new world military scene. In this environment where the enemy is able to mobilize the info sphere with ever more skill, a number of studies show that democracies are vulnerable and must rapidly harmonize, coordinate and synchronize their diplomatic, military and humanitarian efforts if they wish to promote their political and strategic objectives internationally and attempt to exert what little influence they can through diplomatic prevention and conflict resolution.

The experience thus far in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown the limits of purely military operations. Clearly, the traditional application of foreign and defence policies does not cover the entire spectrum of non-kinetic activities. Another approach, that of public diplomacy, could be a possible preventive option, a third approach to counter-insurgency and the war on terrorism. In a theatre of operations such as Afghanistan, that “draws a large amount of media coverage and is highly volatile,”⁴ [translation] synchronization of the Canadian government-wide strategy abroad is a daunting challenge faced with a public opinion whose patience is waning.

The aim of this paper will be to present an overview of the evolution of public diplomacy through the government-wide mission in Afghanistan and to analyze its impact on the information function and Defence public affairs (PA).

In the first part of this paper, we will explore the growing importance of public diplomacy over the last 20 years. In the second part, we will present the elements that, today, make it difficult to influence international and national public opinion through information.

The Importance of Public Diplomacy

Not so long ago, traditional diplomacy was solely the prerogative of professional diplomats. Acting as intermediaries between countries, they managed the application of

foreign policies in order to influence the opinions of foreign governments and the populations of other nations on behalf of their government.⁵ Today, this classic approach of diplomatic communiqués is outdated because of geopolitical, economic, technological and social fragmentation and the promotion of national interests. It is no longer sufficient for diplomats to simply urge governments and international organizations to act;⁶ public diplomacy requires targeting a larger audience and being more specific in selecting programs.⁷



Combat Camera IS2005-2050a

More specifically, the revolution in areas such as information, the proliferation of international media, the advent of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the interference of extremist groups make the concept of public diplomacy more than just an affair of the State.⁸ Today, diplomacy must combine traditional and modern ways of thinking.⁹ Where the State once made its own decisions, it must now pay special attention to the individual attitudes, judgments and convictions of the majority of individuals or groups with national and/or international sway.¹⁰



Combat Camera IS2009-0035

Evan Potter sees this public enthusiasm as a result of the increasing globalization of conflicts and the explosion of communication infrastructures and technologies.¹¹ Members of the general public are now personally addressed in their own homes by international, multi-language information sources and can respond directly on the Internet and blogs to make their opinions known, correct false reports and add to the information being communicated. Everyone can now freely question politicians and decision-makers through an infinite number of discussion forums.

Public diplomacy as a means of prevention

The term “public diplomacy” is defined by Edward Djerejian, President of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World as the promotion of national interests through information, commitment and influence of populations around the world.¹² Others, such as Professor Jarol Manheim and diplomat Christopher Ross, see public diplomacy as a means of facilitating the achievement of foreign policy goals and describe it respectively as “the management of perceptions” and the art of seeking the support of “carefully targeted sectors of foreign publics.”¹³

In its broadest sense, public diplomacy can be compared with a discreet and non-violent promotional tool for achieving national objectives. This third approach, suggested by Pierre Pahlavi and Stéphane Roussel,¹⁴ has short-term aims (media activities) and long-term aims (cultural programs),¹⁵ and targets foreign (external) audiences, leaving PA the job of informing the national (internal) audience.¹⁶ The State finds in it a means of projecting a positive image and a clear message that favours dialogue, understanding and trust. It is also a channelling system for sharing ideas and information, an open and decentralized system,

and a system that uses means such as the whole of government programs specialized in education, culture, audiovisual media and mass communications.

By developing a government-wide strategic approach, Canada has identified its specific goals (Ends) and the instruments (Means) required to achieve them. Public diplomacy has become an important instrument among a variety of persuasive, cooperative and coercive means at strategists' disposal. When Prime Minister Harper addressed Canadians and foreign ambassadors on the subject of the role that Canada and the CF should play in global security, he was not only speaking of changes in Canadian foreign policy, but also identifying a public diplomacy objective and a reference point for political strategists.¹⁷

The new security paradigm

It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.

Osama bin Laden (2002)

For many years, strategic thought put State security first. The fall of the Berlin Wall, civil wars and non-traditional threats to global security¹⁸ have drastically changed ideas and, as previously mentioned, have triggered a diplomatic change of course that has put human safety and security before the security of States.¹⁹

The language of *realpolitik*, according to Wolfgang Koerner and Joseph Nye,²⁰ is forcing us to open our eyes to the world and learn from past experience. They propose a more balanced, human, "soft power" approach that takes individuals and their insecurity into consideration. Today, there is greater emphasis on more general and subtler concepts when discussing issues of "human security, capacity building, the sanctity of the individual, multi-lateralism, and the need to hold the authority of states themselves accountable."²¹ And it is precisely because it directly affects the individual that the concept of public diplomacy has become a useful political tool, a third avenue for preventing and resolving armed conflicts.

Far removed from the concept of traditional peacekeeping missions, the conflicts of tomorrow will probably be even more complex and violent and will likely resemble what British General Sir Rupert Smith called "war amongst the people."²² And it is difficult for the nations and armies of today to adjust their military policies, strategies, doctrines, and structures when confronted with the belligerents' non-conventional, asymmetric approach.

According to Djerejian, the reason for this is quite simple. Developed countries no longer have the monopoly on technology and information tools. Their enemies, who have fewer resources and who are realistic, have become experts in using non-military means such as influence, propaganda and disinformation.²³

In "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges," Colonel Hammess defines the situation democracies will have to face in the future quite well: "Strategically, insurgent campaigns have shifted from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations."²⁴

Actually, what Thomas Hammess writes quite accurately describes the conditions in which troops are currently operating in Afghanistan and Iraq. The military objective is no longer annihilation of the enemy, but rather a battle of charm in which the local population is at the strategic centre of gravity. It is a battle where efforts are very difficult to measure in the short run; a battle where the lines between war and politics, soldiers and civilians, peace and conflict are blurred. Today, access to telecommunication technology (cellular telephony) and information technology (digital cameras, video editing facilities, Internet, blogs, YouTube) gives enemy factions unprecedented command and control and intelligence capabilities, a recruitment and education tool, and a means by which to engage in a war of information and disinformation targeting the political, social and economic weaknesses of democracies. They have learned to bypass military forces instead of attacking them directly, which means that the military command cannot win the battle alone.

The importance of public diplomacy is becoming increasingly evident. It offers a new way and provides an approach adapted to the new security paradigm. The balance between the Army, the State and the People, according to Smith, has finally been upset. The mission of military troops has become "to win the hearts and minds [of the people]...rather than the destruction of an opponent's forces."²⁵ Public diplomacy cannot do it alone; it needs the support of a global information campaign aiming for cooperation and the promotion of a common message. This is what we will discuss in the next part.

Communicating With The Public

...the printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander.

T. J. Lawrence

Following the recommendation of a group of independent experts on the future role of Canada in Afghanistan,²⁶ the Canadian government has gone ahead with a few initiatives. A parliamentary committee on Afghanistan was stood up under Minister Emerson. This committee was tasked with issuing clear directives concerning the government-wide approach, establishing the objectives and a compressed agenda for the next three years (till 2011), redefining the objectives and influencing the implementation plan and strategy. In addition, David Mulrone was appointed Deputy Minister of the Afghanistan Task Force, and he will be responsible for ensuring coordination and cohesion among the 3D components.²⁷ The government's decision to appoint Elissa Goldberg Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) in order to manage diplomatic-humanitarian activities, thus expanding the diplomatic footprint on the ground, signals a change in the management of IOs with the local population and Canadian and international media.



Combat Camera IS2009-0032

The first challenge of the government-wide approach, according to a number of authors, is identifying the resources within the Department of Foreign Affairs and the leadership required to channel all 3D initiatives into a common effort of cooperation and collaboration involving all available interagencies and NGOs. The second issue is then to find a common ground concerning the prioritization of resources and efforts so that all may commit with one accord to supporting the campaign plan of the Commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-A).

According to the Commander of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), LGen Gauthier, the CF supports the plan 100% and discussions between

planners in the military and those in the various civilian departments (engaged in a concerted public diplomacy effort in Afghanistan) are making good progress.²⁸ The reconstruction of nation-States and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, which were diametrically opposed not so long ago, have in recent years become two sides of the same coin. The civilian and military lines of operation, which were parallel and entirely separate, are now converging quite rapidly and have become interdependent. Under the strategic leadership of Canadian government-wide public diplomacy, security, governance and development now share the same goals and establish the first measures of success to achieve the desired effect.

But, as Stephen Wallace (of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)) pointed out, it is difficult to establish a common doctrine or *modus operandi* for the planning and conduct of 3D operations, hence the difficulty of maintaining the same viewpoint in analyzing problems and seeking solutions. Moreover, this reality increases the difficulty of developing team spirit and unity of effort and of quickly reaching a common vision and strategy among the various departments.²⁹

Foreign Affairs and CIDA, who were used to dealing with complex situations independently, now find themselves directly engaged in the operational bubble. They are forging ahead not only as departments establishing policies, but also as force generators deploying diplomatic and humanitarian teams in order to operate simultaneously in the same area of operations and in cooperation with Canadian troops.

Kandahar and strategic and operational communication

Since the summer of 2005, when the Canadian provincial reconstruction team (PRT) began operating in the Kandahar area, the media and the Canadian public have quickly taken an interest in the change of mandate that occurred when Canadian troops under Brigadier-General Fraser took over command of the region from the Americans and engaged in Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations.

From their arrival in Kandahar, deployed Canadian troops and civil servants had to take the thrusts of American and NATO public diplomacy into account. This diplomacy was supported by a strategic communications campaign led by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan on behalf of NATO, Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan (CFC-A), to maintain the support of the Afghan and international population and help rebuild the country and establish a new democracy. One of the major difficulties was the synchronization and convergence of politico-military operations, PA activities, Intelligence Operations (IOs), psychological operations (PSYOPS) and effects-based operations (EBOs), including theatre-wide interagency effects (TIE), within a common communications strategy.³⁰

For the CEFCOM team of public affairs officers (PAOs) and the PAOs deployed in Afghanistan in charge of managing almost all the media communications of JTF-A and the PRT, the arrival of the RoCK makes their relations with integrated media more difficult. As many Canadians have noted, reports in 2008 still show little interest in civil-military development activities in the Kandahar area. Despite the PAOs' efforts, reporters' interest in humanitarian activities still seems low.

Since this is the first time that the 3D approach is actually physically engaged in a single area of operation, not only on the ground, but also in terms of interagency and inter-departmental operational planning, it is a duty of the PAOs and the communication officers to clearly understand the new organizational interdependence and the importance of developing and nourishing a relationship of trust. On the ground military activities in support of public diplomacy will be managed by the PRT. Because of the mission's importance and following the recommendations of the Manley Report, the number one priority of the Canadian communications strategy should be to inform the public through open and transparent media coverage. Direct, concrete efforts should be undertaken with the civilian population while increasing the proactive coverage of humanitarian actions on the ground. Lastly, IOs and PA are expected to be called into question by 3D and government communications representa-

tives. As the functional authority of the Department of National Defence (DND), the group led by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) (ADM(PA)) must provide a new integrated strategic direction in order to strengthen relations between military and civilian stakeholders in Canada and in Afghanistan. This strategy should give rise to new tools for planning, coordinating, synchronizing and conducting strategic communication while “operationalizing” the techniques, tactics and procedures related to media operations on missions. Some people believe there is a need to redistribute PA elements and swell the ranks of military PAOs with civilian communication officers. The option of simply having a spokesperson should also be considered. This approach will require close cooperation between the spokespersons for humanitarian and military activities and a good understanding of public diplomacy and of how military activities can support the common effort.



Combat Camera IS2004-2071a

PAOs need to adjust to the PRT in order to face the new issues that are raised by the information effort that the Canadian representative, Ms Goldberg, has generated. Contrary to current practice, there is a need to assign a PAO more experienced in the political-strategic environment and better able to support the objectives of the Afghanistan Task Force. The fact of the matter is that not all military PAOs have the required training and experience, and commanders would greatly benefit from having more civilian communication officers in this conflict area.

Winning the Battle of Ideas

Because the battles in counterinsurgency are small-scale and often clandestine... it becomes a matter of perceptions and victory is awarded to those who weave the most compelling narrative. Truly, the world of post-modern, 21st-century conflict, civilian and military public affairs officers must become war fighters by another name.

Robert Kaplan

In his article “Mind Manoeuvres,” Frank Hoffman, a former Marine officer and a research fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, describes the predominance of perceptions and the psychological dimension in irregular warfare.³¹ In his opinion, commanders today must deploy just as many non-kinetic tools, which he calls “munitions of the mind,” as conventional munitions. Commanders must have access to mass media outlets or whatever medium the local populace normally uses to obtain information, such as

civilian radio stations, local television stations, newspapers, the Internet or simple DVD/CD production capabilities. Hoffman believes that the key to success is communicating quickly with as many people as possible and having a consistent and culturally adapted message. In addition, he states that “conceptual distinctions between bureaucracies and existing occupational fields like public affairs and psychological operations need to be rethought.”

Rethinking the Operationalization of Public Affairs

Are we truly ready for an “agile, smart, networked threat—global insurgency—that uses religion to motivate violent extremism?” is the question that Potter and Copeland debated in 2008 in a co-signed (not yet published) article entitled “Public Diplomacy and Counterinsurgency in the Globalization Age: Two Sides of the Same COIN?”³²

Potter and Copeland present two notions that are closely tied to this paper. The first is the rigidity of organizational tools, policy instruments and military doctrines, and the second is the lack of experience and training among diplomats and military members. In their opinion, a much more flexible solution would lie with the emerging convergence and interface between public diplomacy and COIN operations. Shared themes, reinforcing brain power over firepower, and winning hearts and minds instead of taking control of territory should be at the forefront of this new partnership.


But Pahlavi and Roussel advise caution in this regard. Despite the integration efforts of the government-wide strategy, “maintaining a distinction between the roles of diplomacy, defence and development is crucial³³ [translation]. Within the PRT, relations between civil-military (CIMIC) personnel and humanitarian workers have always been strained. Humanitarian workers fear that the presence of military personnel and their involvement in humanitarian projects will affect their security, neutrality and impartiality—and this is not a new problem. It is easy to separate the activities in some cases, but there will always be a grey area in other cases. The same is true for PAOs and civilian communication officers. There is not just one message; there is a multitude of messages and an equally large number of actors to convey them.

The modern media environment, including “new media” such as the Internet, blogs and YouTube, has changed drastically. Everyone now has the ability to access a wider variety of information sources, thus it could be said that no government or international organization with the ability to reach a large audience can imagine that it is alone in managing or even influencing public opinion. Also, unlike terrorist groups that use 24/7 television coverage (Al Jazeera) or alternative media (the Internet) to disseminate their images and messages quickly, the Commander of JTF-A and the PAOs do not have the means to quickly counteract the surge of images and reports, thereby leaving the door open to propaganda and disinformation.

In Canada, unlike the approach used during the Kosovo bombings (daily briefing from the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS)), the technical information sessions that have been offered every month since September 2008 do not seem to be popular among journalists in Ottawa. In a future paper, it would be interesting to analyze whether the quantity of information that comes from National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and 3D partners is sufficient to satisfy the needs of the media, and if not, whether this deficiency has pushed journalists to bypass the PAOs and turn to civilian analysts or former CF members instead.

Certainly, CF Public Affairs cannot continue with its existing concept of operations. In order to remain relevant to the CF, commanders and the public, CEFCOM and ADM(PA) PAOs must quickly rethink the method of operationalizing the PA function. As the concept in Kandahar is based on a series of analyses that were carried out in partnership with the Army PA Directorate in 2005 and adjusted in 2006, it is important to act quickly in order to keep up with the transformation and the arrival of the RoCK in Kandahar.

One of the stumbling blocks is the issue of command and control in relation to the various Canadian government departments. For JTF-A PAOs, formal and informal ties with



Canada are clear and go through CEFCOM. But what channels do military PAOs working with the PRT go through? The first impact to consider is the ability to select, train (basic courses and upgrade courses such as IO and CIMIC), equip and deploy the proper PA capability order to obtain the desired effect on the ground. The number of PAOs deployed at all times in Afghanistan is 6% of the total number of PAOs in the branch. The duration of the deployments varies between six and twelve months, depending on the position. Strength, resistance, the ability to react quickly, flexibility, innovation and adaptability are six key factors that must be considered in the development of the new PA strategy and applied directly to the training of future PAOs.

In light of the new reality of the contemporary operational environment, it is clear the traditional military response does not go far enough. Military commanders should ask themselves the following questions: "Who should be involved in coordination on the ground, and most importantly, who should support whom?" There is no doubt that public diplomacy and the government-wide approach have and will continue to have a major effect on the management of CF PA activities in Canada and on operations. More importantly, the ability to meet the strategic objectives of public diplomacy will be directly tied to the ability to inform commanders and to manage public messages in the local, national and international spheres.

Unlike Jomini's and Clausewitz's linear approach, the government-wide approach recommends a more holistic way of thinking that leads military personnel to consider different actors. For deployed PAOs and the CEFCOM HQ team, planning beyond the simple application of CF instructions and the simple theory of communication is crucial. They must understand both the political-strategic end state and the military objective to accomplish. They must strive to improve relations with civilian personnel from other government agencies and NGOs and to develop an excellent information exchange network. Within the contingent, PAOs must fully participate in supervising IOs while continuing to act as advisors to the commander.

The New War of Information

In terms of the mission, the communicator's challenge is to ensure that vertical and horizontal messages are unified at all levels because information has now become a "weapon." "Information is now an equalizer enabling the weak to challenge the strong."³⁴ In the asymmetric war, Al Qaeda and the Taliban have demonstrated a keen ability to target the public opinion of Western countries through disinformation and the discrediting of our governments while attacking the legitimacy of the mission and the determination of the population. For military analysts who think in a traditional linear fashion, information can be perceived as the centre of gravity of the operational strategic infosphere.

But "information does not create its own consequences"³⁵ [translation]. According to Jean-Claude Guillebaud, information is in some ways removed from its original purpose, which should be to inform citizens and help them make informed choices. Similarly, Potter holds that information moves along a continuum that includes monologues (the one-way communication of news releases, public speeches or official websites), dialogues (two-way communication between PRT members and the local population) and cooperation (the communicator develops a relationship with his/her audience). And one does not prevent the other.³⁶

For her part, Merrill Brown speaks of a dramatic revolution.³⁷ "The message [is] coming in loud and clear from bloggers and their readers"—there is a new form of citizen journalism and a new form of participation that targets 18- to 34-year-olds, 39% of whom use the Internet as their primary source of information and feel that the traditional news environment does not serve them adequately.³⁸ They want information on demand and choice in terms of sources. If the industry is not open to new approaches, it is in trouble. And although it may be a bit early to assess the impact of this revolution on PA, on political discourse and on journalism itself, we must recognize that a new way of delivering news is here to stay and that professional communicators may be unable to reach the emerging audience if they do not drastically adjust their delivery.

Lastly, we must realize that the wind of change is blowing in regards to public information—the public is becoming increasingly choosy about sources of information. Studies have shown that people are drawn to a specific source of information if it reinforces their system of values and beliefs. The development of military public diplomacy and PA activities and the growing movement towards public diplomacy of the Department of Foreign Affairs in conflict areas are now at the centre of an interesting public and academic debate.



Combat Camera AS2006-0309a

Conclusion

According to the International Policy Statement (2005), Canada must develop a new foreign policy and a new diplomacy. This diplomacy has increasingly become a public diplomacy that strives to reach people through new methods. Canada's credibility and influence abroad depend not only on the actions of the government, but also on Canadians themselves who interact, cultivate relations, and engage in ongoing dialogue with the goal of defending our values and interests and of helping increase our influence abroad.

As Sir Rupert pointed out, the environment of defence, security and humanitarian missions has changed, and public diplomacy has become an element of information for both domestic and international audiences. With the expansion and sometimes the intrusion of global media, what government representatives or military members do or say in foreign countries quickly becomes fodder for local public and political discussion. As the war of information is being played out today on the international scene, Canada must acquire the means to realize its foreign policy ambitions. The government-wide approach and the rapid development of new information technology compel us to take a new look at the way that the CF and its government partners operate. Canada must institutionalize its planning and its development of plans for future campaigns and design a communication strategy that supports government-wide intentions. As the Prime Minister said, we have to get past the rhetoric and take real action abroad with our allies that reflect the determination of Canada and our foreign policy to defend Canadian values and interests.

Lastly, this paper has shown the reasons why public diplomacy is an important area of university research and the transformation that is occurring in the world of public information. The unification of the government-wide effort in Kandahar and the synchronization and

harmonization of military and humanitarian activities demonstrate that there is new impetus in the three areas—security, governance and development—which are no longer parallel and linear, but are convergent and interdependent and work towards a common established narrative. The coherence of the message (physical as well as verbal), the image, the values and the information conveyed by public diplomacy is essential and will serve as a test of credibility for the 3D team. With violence that is no longer limited to traditional combatants and diplomacy that is no longer just the concern of the traditional diplomat, the question is no longer whether or not Canada must act, but rather “where, when and how” we must act.

About the Author...

Lieutenant-Colonel J.M.C. Lemay is presently serving as Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) Chief Public Affairs Advisor in Ottawa and has recently graduated from the Joint Command and Staff Program at CFC Toronto. Previously he held different PA positions as Director Army Public Affairs at NDHQ, as Sr PAO at Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters (CFJHQ) in Kingston, with which he deployed on many occasions to Eritrea/Ethiopia and FYROM, and as Deputy—Coalition Press Information Centre in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2002. LCol Lemay holds a BA in Military Strategic Studies and Military Psychology.

Endnotes

1. Canada, Governor General. “Strong Leadership. A Better Canada,” Speech from the Throne by Her Excellency Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, 16 October 2007, Ottawa, available at <http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1364>; accessed on 30 March 2008.
2. Canada, Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne, 17 October 2007, Ottawa, available at <http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1373>; accessed on 30 March 2008.
3. Ibid.
4. Pierre Pahlavi and Stéphane Roussel, “Rapport d’atelier, La diplomatie publique: un outil de prévention?” *Canadian Consortium on Human Security and Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy*, Université du Québec à Montréal, 10 February 2006, p. 3.
5. Rhiannon Vickers, “The New Public Diplomacy: Britain and Canada Compared, Political Studies Association,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 6, no 2, May 2004, pp. 182-194.
6. The Canadian government’s effort to encourage its allies to provide more troops in the Kandahar area is an obvious example. Even once the story gained media coverage, we were able to see that it is no longer as easy as it used to be to persuade other countries to act, especially if their public opinion does not support the mission.
7. Evan Potter, “Canada and the New Public Diplomacy,” Discussion Papers in *Diplomacy*, no 81, July 2002, available at <http://www.cfr.org>; accessed on 15 January 2008, p. 1.
8. “Traditionally, public diplomacy was seen by many as a narrowly focused enterprise carried out by the U.S. *Information Agency* and its predecessor organizations, the Voice of America and the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,” in Bruce Gregory, *Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications: Cultures, Firewalls and Imported Norms*, Presentation to the American Political Science Association: Conference on International Communications and Conflict, George Washington University and Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 31 August 2005, p. 5.
9. Rhiannon Vickers, “The New Public Diplomacy: Britain and Canada Compared, Political Studies Association,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 6, no 2, May 2004, p. 184.
10. According to the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, “The enhanced definition of public diplomacy should be to first listen and understand, and then inform, engage, and influence foreign audiences. This is the modus operandi of public diplomacy. What follows is how to get this done effectively, with clarity of purpose and vision.” Available at www.bakerinstitute.org/programs/public-diplomacy; accessed on 23 March 2008.
11. Evan H. Potter, “Canadians in the World: Public Diplomacy for Middle Power” (Thesis, University of Ottawa, 2008), p. 12.
12. Edward P. Djerejian, “Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World,” *Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World presented to the U.S. House of Representatives*, 1 October 2003, available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf>; accessed on 27 January 2008, p. 13.
13. Jarol Manheim, “Talking Points for Meeting with Staff of Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” 18

December 2001, in Christopher Ross, "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age," *The Washington Quarterly*, spring 2002, p. 75.

14. Pierre Pahlavi and Stéphane Roussel, Rapport d'atelier, "La diplomatie publique : un outil de prévention?" *Canadian Consortium on Human Security and Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy*, Université du Québec à Montréal, 10 February 2006, pp. 3-6.

15. Evan Potter, "Canada and the New Public Diplomacy," Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, no 81, July 2002, p. 3.

16. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed., Longman (10 July 2000), p. 352.

17. Canada, Speech by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, "Revised motion on the future of Canada's mission in Afghanistan," Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Ottawa, 21 February 2008.

18. We are referring here to climate change, global warming, the risk of pandemics and failed States.

19. Wolfgang Koerner, Security Sector Reform: Defence Diplomacy, *In Brief, Parliamentary Information and Research Service*, Library of Parliament, 17 May 2006, p. 1.

20. When Joseph Nye, Jr. first introduced the concept of soft power in his book *Bound to Lead* in 1990, he pointed out that the U.S. was the most powerful nation not only in terms of military and economic might, but also in terms of soft power. Nye defined soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion." He also noted that soft power could be "developed through relations with allies, economic assistance, and cultural exchanges." According to him, this approach results in "a more favorable public opinion and credibility abroad." Lastly, he stressed that the U.S. cannot combat terrorism alone, but rather must obtain the support of other nations and the cooperation of international institutions in order to ensure global stability. Joseph Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means of Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 107-110.

21. Wolfgang Koerner, op. cit., p. 1.

22. Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2005), pp. 17-18.

23. Edward P. Djerejian, "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World," *Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World presented to the U.S. House of Representatives*, 1 October 2003, available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf>; accessed on 27 January 2008, pp. 20-21.

24. Thomas X. Hammess, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges," *Military Review*, May-June 2007, p. 14.

25. In an interview at the Carnegie Council in January 2007, Smith said that the reality of the 21st century is such that the people have taken charge. We now wage war amongst the people to obtain the support of individuals. The population (not the government) is the prize and the strategic centre of gravity. Rupert Smith, *Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, interviewed by Joanne Myers, *Director of Public Affairs for the Carnegie Council—The Voice for Ethics in International Policy*, 24 January 2007, available at <http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5414.html>; accessed on 8 March 2008.

26. Canada. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan (Manley Report), 22 January 2008.

27. David Mulroney, "Canada's National Security Interest in a Challenging World," 24th Annual Seminar of Defence. Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 21 February 2008, CPAC; accessed via Internet on 24 March 2008.

28. LGen Michel Gauthier, "Canada's National Security Interest in a Challenging World," 24th annual Seminar of Defence. Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 21 February 2008, CPAC; accessed via Internet on 24 March 2008.

29. Stephen Wallace, "Canada's National Security Interest in a Challenging World," 24th annual Seminar of Defence. Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 21 February 2008, CPAC; accessed via Internet on 24 March 2008.

30. LCol (Ret) Pamela Keaton and Maj Mark McCaan, "Information Operations, STRATCOM and Public Affairs," *Military Review*, November-December 2005, p. 83.

31. Frank G. Hoffman, "Mind Maneuvers: The Psychological Element of Counterinsurgency Warfare can be the Most Persuasive," *Armed Forces Journal*, April 2007, available at www.afji.com/2007/04/2550166; accessed on 2 February 2008.

32. Daryl Copeland and Evan Potter, "Public Diplomacy and Counterinsurgency in the Globalization Age: Two Sides of the Same COIN?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention, *Bridging Multiple Divides*, San Francisco, CA, USA, on 26 March 2008, available at www.allacademic.com/meta/p25177_index.html; accessed on 23 April 2008 (with the authorization of the speaker).

33. Pierre Pahlavi and Stéphane Roussel, Rapport d'atelier, "La diplomatie publique : un outil de prévention?" *Canadian Consortium on Human Security and Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy*, Université du Québec à Montréal, 10 February 2006, p. 16.

34. Col R. M. Williams, "The Truth, the Whole Truth, or Nothing: A Media Strategy for the Military in

the Information Age," *Canadian Military Journal*, Autumn 2002, p. 13.

35. Jean-Claude Guillebaud, "Les médias contre la démocratie?" *Esprit*, March-April 1993, p. 99.

36. Email exchange with Dr Evan Potter.

37. Merrill Brown, "Abandoning the News," *Carnegie Reporter*, vol. 3, no 2, Spring 2005, available at www.carnegie.org/reporter/10/news/index2.html; accessed on 2 April 2008.

38. According to a Carnegie Corporation survey, over 53% of 18- to 34-year-olds use the Internet (39%) or local TV news (14%) as their primary source of information, while 10% of them use cable TV news, 8% use newspapers and 5% use national news. Source: *Magid Associates for Carnegie Corporation of New York*.

