
battleship and battlecruiser displacements, and noted the importance of the latter based on its armament, speed, armour and function within the battle line.

The author then takes us aboard the different ships beginning with SMS *Von Der Tann*—the first battlecruiser of the Imperial German Navy and a participant in the Battle of Jutland and in several attacks on Russian batteries on the Baltic Coasts. Next shown are the sister ships SMS *Moltke* and SMS *Geoben*, which would go on to have a long career in the Turkish Navy. They were followed by SMS *Seydlitz* or Cruiser J, a veteran of the Helgoland, Doggerbank and Jutland Battles. A few pages further are the ships of the *Derfflinger* class, comprising SMS *Derfflinger*, *Lutzow* and *Hidenburg*. This class is considered an innovation in German battlecruiser design. The trio also took part in various engagements of the conflict. Notable is the informative piece on the lessons of the Doggerbank battle, which looks on the German view on armour protection and gun charges.

The book is a remarkable reference work, as each ship's particulars are well covered, ranging from its general characteristics, armament, armour, seaworthiness, its machinery, changes in design, namesake and service history—this section is of immense value, as it not only details the individual ship's action in battles, but also provides vignettes of information such as the names of the ship's commanding officers and their dates of command. One of the book's strengths is that technical details are comprehensible to readers. Specifications tables are given for each ship class, detailing everything from its building contract, keel laying to its complement. A comparison table of data with other battlecruisers in service with the British Royal Navy is also listed.

It is well supported by photographs, a number of diagrams showing the turret details and armour cross sections, a cutaway drawing and a bibliography. The colourful artworks will be of importance for discerning differences in design and noting ship colors.

In conclusion, the book is finely written and extraordinarily researched. It would appeal to and make a valuable addition in the library of naval and maritime historians, scale modellers, naval architects, naval ordnance specialists, marine engineers and those interested in the ships and history of the Imperial German Navy. The book is highly recommended.

VIMY RIDGE: A CANADIAN REASSESSMENT

HAYES Geoffrey, IAROCCI Andrew and BECHTOLD Mike, eds. Waterloo, Ont, Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2007, 358 pages. \$38.95 CAN



Reviewed by Major Gordon Ohlke, CD

Did Canada become a nation on Vimy Ridge? Sir John A. Macdonald thought Canada was a nation before 1866 and that the construction of the "Intercolonial Railroad" would be a worthy endeavour to express the national spirit in the wake of Confederation. Myths are powerful talismans in the life of a nation. Great personalities, great endeavours, triumphs and tragedies are key materials in the fabric of a national psyche. Typically, students of Canadian history have learned more about our railroads than our battles.

Hayes, Iarocci and Bechtold have put together a very interesting collection of essays that explore the myths of Vimy and provide a mature historical overview of the battle. The battle of Vimy Ridge is put in the context of the Great War, the Western Front and the British Expeditionary Force

(BEF) in the larger battle of Arras 1917 of which the assault on Vimy Ridge was but one operation.

But what an operation it was! The Canadian Corps operated together as a complete formation for the first time. It met all of its objectives vis-à-vis the capture of the ridge. The ground taken was held. It was a bright success in a long brutal war which had seen few such successes. Indeed, it provided a much needed boost to military and home front morale along with fuel for the British Empire propaganda machine. Operationally, the Vimy battle demonstrated that detailed operational and tactical planning combined with modern training, organization and equipment were the keys to victory.

The editors offer a collection of essays taking a thematic approach, with sections focused on the strategic background, the actual battle and the aftermath. Essays are eclectic and topical, yet eminently readable and of considerable historical value. For example, some chapters focus on the often “unsung heroes” of warfare, such as the engineer, medical and logistic units and personnel, all who are given their due. In addition, there is an interesting collection of photographs that support the themes and useful maps throughout to support the text.

Other chapters deal with the wider context of the war, the conditions of the armies engaged and the development of strategy, operations and tactics. Key personalities are profiled, as are the characteristics of the troop formations involved. For instance, each of the four Canadian Divisions, Canadian Corps troops and the attached elements of the 5th British Division and Corps troops are discussed and their combat missions critiqued.

Overall, several essays stand out: In chapter 1, “Vimy Ridge and the Battle of Arras: A British Perspective”, Gary Sheffield provides an excellent account of the overarching Allied and British strategy for the wider operations comprising the Battle of Arras 1917 and its implications. In Chapter 2, “The End of the Beginning: The Canadian Corps in 1917”, Paul Dickson relates many of the issues and growing pains in the development of the Canadian Corps, not the least of which was the erratic if not eccentric direction from Sir Sam Hughes as he ricocheted between Ottawa, London and the front. Patrick Brennan profiles General Sir Julian Byng and his highly positive influence upon individual Canadian officers and indeed the entire Canadian Corps in Chapter 5. In a somewhat sobering alternative interpretation, Andrew Godefroy examines the view from “the other side of the hill” in Chapter 13, “The German Army at Vimy Ridge”. The German Army assessment was that they won the wider battle of Arras, with the engagement at Vimy resulting in a draw.

The maturity of the work is reflected in how it treats the relationship between the British and Canadians. Essentially, this is explained factually, and the relative performances of British and Canadian troops are treated likewise. Absent are the annoying obfuscations of an obligatory “anti-British Empire political correctness” or a de rigueur “colonial cringe” often found in other Canadian historical writings.

Likewise, the book tends to refute “the donkey theory” of higher command, which portrays the higher commanders as aristocratic cavalry officers, remote from their troops, oblivious to current operating conditions and ossified of cranial content. Quite the contrary. Numerous times the authors pay tribute to the professional and even inspirational leadership qualities of the commanders and staff, especially those British professional officers who mentored Canadians as they developed into efficient commanders and staff officers at the levels of battalion, brigade, division and ultimately to the level of the Canadian Corps. Bluff, straightforward, comfortable with all ranks and professional, Julian Byng was—much to the continuing surprise of many—an aristocratic cavalry officer!

The closing theme of the book, "Part III: Aftermath and Memory" illustrates the degree to which popular myth-making and dignified commemoration may go hand in hand. It may be that there are lessons here for a generation that must honour a new cadre of veterans. Particularly in chapter 16 "After the Agony in Stony Places", Jacqueline Huckner cites the creator of the Vimy monument Walter Allward, who saw the sacrifices of the fallen as a continuum from the victory in war through the rebuilding in peace and the further progress of civilization: "So I have tried to show this in this monument to Canada's fallen, what we owed them and will forever owe them."

Ultimately, this is a book to be cherished and perhaps even shared with those who have questions about the day that Canada stood up and carved a place for itself in military history.

PEACE AT ANY PRICE: HOW THE WORLD FAILED KOSOVO

KING, Iain, MASON, Whit. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2006, 297 pages. \$29.50
CAN

Reviewed by Ms. Heather Hrychuk

In today's security environment the mention of an unsuccessful attempt at intervention and nation-building usually brings Iraq and Afghanistan to mind. Regrettably, little mention is typically made of Kosovo. To address this failing, authors Iain King and Whit Mason examine the international community's commitment to the province in, *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo*.

In the work's introduction the authors, both of whom served in the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), outline their objective, "to explain the international protectorate as a whole. By being more comprehensive than other studies, [...] avoid missing the forest for the trees." In light of this objective, the study is successful, as it is the first major examination of the UNMIK that analyzes the accomplishments of the mission en masse. In doing so, the work easily elucidates the mission's challenges and strengths, and most importantly from a critical perspective, its limitations.

Unfortunately where the work falters is its lack of precision regarding how to deem a nation-building mission successful. Where the authors criticize the UN, and NATO for operating with vague mandates, and consequently an unclear system of measurement, they fail victim to the same pitfall.

Here, attempting to write a comprehensive work on the failings on the UNMIK mission, the work starts from the unclear premise of assuming the mission had failed, without offering the criteria against which they measured the international effort. While it may be accurate to assert that the world did indeed fail Kosovo, what exactly constitutes success and failure must be addressed. Is success measured simply as the absence of war and wide spread ethnic violence? If so, then perhaps the international community was successful. If success is measured in terms of democratic principles, a functional judiciary and administrative services, the mission would surely be viewed as a failure. Or, with Kosovo being the largest per capita investment in peace building the world has ever seen, is failure attributed simply because returns have been unimpressive to contributing nations? Without clarification of the measures of success (or alternatively, failure), it is difficult to discern if the lessons identified are derived from individual biases, personal experience or from objective analysis against an explicit set of criteria.