

# Purple Haze:

## Joint Planning in the Canadian Forces from Mobile Command to J-Staff, 1975-1991 (Part 1)

by Sean M. Maloney, Ph.D.

*The problems of allied planners were complicated by the appearance of various monarchs in the field, usually surrounded by a vast array of their own private advisors. Although the monarchs normally refrained from exercising their authority over the nominal command, they had to be briefed on plans, their objections countered, and even their advisors had to receive a hearing...[at Austerlitz this] moved even the politic Swartzenberg to complain that "it is really inhuman what I must tolerate and bear, surrounded as I am by feeble-minded people, eccentric projectors, intriguers, asses, babblers, and niggling critics."*

-Gunter E. Rothenberg, *The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon*

### INTRODUCTION

**P**urple Haze is the first part of a two-part series examining the origins and antecedents of the J-Staff, the primary Canadian Forces strategic planning and coordination organ. Between 1964 and 1968, Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer unified the existing armed services (the Royal Canadian Navy, the Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force) and created the Canadian Armed Forces. The three service headquarters were disposed of and replaced by a Canadian Forces Headquarters. CFHQ eventually was merged with the civilian Department of National Defence into a National Defence Headquarters. Unification was the law of the land, and the leaders of the Canadian Armed Forces struggled to adapt to it.

In 1990, after a decade of failed

exercises and operations, with native unrest and a looming war in the Persian Gulf, Chief of the Defence Staff John DeChastelain authorized his Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General David Huddleston, to form a Joint Staff (commonly called the J-Staff) within the unified National Defence Headquarters. This was done so that the Canadian Armed Forces could react effectively to the crises and provide the Government of Canada appropriate responses to fulfill Canadian global objectives, something the existing National Defence Headquarters was incapable of doing. By 1992, the J-Staff was and remains a permanent part of the Canadian defence establishment.

This study can in some ways be considered a sequel to the previous two-part series on Mobile Command that appeared in the Summer and Autumn 2000 issues of *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*. As before, the objective of this series is to provide insight into a sometimes hidden aspect of the Canadian Army's role in the joint planning processes and to demonstrate once again that the actions of today and tomorrow are firmly rooted in the past.

### WHY SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT JOINT OPERATIONS AND PLANNING?

**P**rior to 1945, military operations were generally grouped into either declared large wars between established powers or undeclared small wars, usually between colonial powers and indigenous populations. There was, however, a growing recognition that military operations in support of national policy outside

of declared large wars required new terminology.

The advent of the Cold War (1946-1990) produced an impetus for additional definition. In global terms, "cold war" was a state of being in which nations constantly prepared for declared war during peacetime at levels of activity much higher than those prior to the Second World War. This state also included the conduct of military operations in preparation for declared war; for example, the extensive use of military forces for intelligence gathering activities or the airborne alert of nuclear-armed bombers. As the Cold War evolved, the stalemate between NATO and the Warsaw Pact prompted the Soviet Union to conduct overt and covert military preparations and operations in the emerging Third World. This coincided with the de-colonization efforts of some Western powers with

***the objective of this series is to provide insight into a sometimes hidden aspect of the Canadian Army's role in the joint planning processes***

resultant Western military operations short of declared war. All in all, there was no real peace; nevertheless, there was no open conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The post-Cold War period, the one we are in today, has not brought us back to a state of peace, assuming that one ever existed. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact was similar to the British withdrawal from empire in the twentieth century. It has re-opened old wounds and created new ones. New and potential enemies have appeared, and military operations short of declared war will continue.

What does this mean in the Canadian context? Before the Cold War, the Canadian command and control organizations were peacetime administrative ones. Their job, once war was declared, was to mobilize an army, a navy, and an air force around an embryonic cadre force, deploy the forces, and fight the monolithic enemy—in this case, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. Command and control structures created during the war were on the whole temporary ones, and Canadian forces were incorporated into coalition command systems. The Canadian system was in theory supposed to revert back to peacetime administration once the war was won, but the need to have an increased state of readiness and to participate in alliance operations globally during the Cold War produced a command structure that had to deal with joint operations.

As Canadian politicians fleetingly grasped the increasingly complex nature of the use of military force to support Canadian “peacetime” aims—diplomacy, peacekeeping, the evacuation of non-combatants during revolutions, fisheries patrols, and the like—the command system struggled to adapt so that joint planning and operations could be conducted on a day-to-day basis in the absence of declared war—a diplomatic declaration which itself is almost obsolete today in the world of covert operations, information warfare, and resource protection.

In effect, the spectrum of military options available to the civilian policymakers is so great today, that we should consider degrees of intensity of military operations, in terms of numbers of forces and the efforts to support them, as opposed to “peacetime”—a state of no declared war, military forces in embryo and “off”—and “wartime”—a state of declared war, mobilization and “on.” Certainly the complexity of the technology involved in military operations these days militates against quick mass mobilization to respond to the

political requirements on the use of force, which in today's media-based system is mainly speed. Consequently, joint military planning organizations must exist alongside military administration organizations at all times. JTF HQs must exist on a day-to-day basis so



**A mobile guard for the Royal Yacht during Ex Gamescan 76, in support of the 1976 Summer Olympics. Domestic operations can involve large troop deployments and require detailed joint level planning. (Courtesy CFPU)**

that they can respond to Canadian interests on a moment's notice.

It is readily apparent that the end of the Cold War did not create the global utopia predicted by those who thought the bulk of the world's problems were generated by superpower rivalry. Recognition of this fact within Canadian policy circles outside DND since 1990 was slow, however, despite the 1990-91 Gulf War. Such ignorance was tolerated probably because there were perceived political benefits to be reaped from reducing the defence budget. Coupled to this, perhaps, was the lack of recognition that Canada's armed forces could, in fact, be systematically used a political tool outside of the NATO context.

Though it was clear that a new defence policy was required to guide the armed forces into the post-Cold War era, the process took some time, with the 1994 Defence White Paper emerging as the primary expression of the new policy. In 1991, however, policy guidance was issued under the

authority of the Chief of the Defence staff “on the requirement for the CF to be prepared for global-wide contingency operations.”<sup>2</sup> This guidance appears to be the first move in a shift away from NATO-centric defence planning which dominated Canadian planning for forty years.<sup>3</sup>

The NATO-centric force employment vision was focused almost exclusively on the European continent, with the bulk of military activity aimed at high intensity operations working as part of an alliance effort in a defined war situation. After 1991, however, “global contingency operations” meant that Canadian forces had to be prepared to operate in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, or Latin America. The forces had to be able to conduct operations across a wide spectrum of conflict. The bulk of the operating areas do not possess

Western infrastructure and were further away from North America than Europe, which meant that the forces had to be relatively self-supporting. Thus a premium was now placed on joint planning to get the forces into the theatre of operations, support them in areas that retained primitive infrastructure, and extract them under threat if necessary. Under the new guidance, it was even conceivable that Canada might have to conduct operations on its own.

The eagerly anticipated 1994 Defence White Paper did not, however, provide the specifics of Canada's new national security policy sought by the national security policy implementers at NDHQ. It was a vague document in many ways, and the planners were initially quite loath to exploit its ambiguity. The White Paper identified several problem areas—failed states, refugees, regional instability, sovereignty protection, weapons proliferation—but did not attempt to predict what environment NDHQ should plan for. Nevertheless, the White Paper encouraged NDHQ to retain

“combat capable forces” capable of operating within the whole spectrum of military operations in support of whatever policy the government deemed necessary in the future. NDHQ planners were left to their own devices to determine how this should be done.<sup>4</sup>

The environment in which the J-Staff was formed and later evolved mirrored the American experience when their national security system was overhauled in the early 1980s. The problems identified at the time by General David C. Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were similar to those encountered by Canadian planners. Jones noted that there was a “disconcerting pattern” in American military history, in which he noted, “We could do things poorly at the start of past wars and still recover because time was on our side.”<sup>5</sup> Jones identified a number of deficiencies, which also pertain to the Canadian case, particularly in the 1980s:

- strategy is so all-encompassing as to mean all things to all men.
- leaders are inevitably captives of the urgent, and long-range planning is too often neglected.
- authority and responsibility are badly diffused.
- rigorous examination of requirements and alternatives is not made.
- discipline is lacking in the budget process.
- tough decisions are avoided.
- accountability for decisions or performance is woefully inadequate.
- leadership, often inexperienced, is forced to spend too much time on refereeing an intramural squabble for resources.
- the combat effectiveness of the fighting force—the end product—does not receive enough attention.<sup>6</sup>

Why are these deficiencies significant? They had (and in some cases still have) to be overcome to prevent exposing Canada's soldiers, sailors, and airmen to needless risk in an increasingly lethal global environment. Effective Canadian planning and command organizations are critical if we are to reduce the possibility of failure. To do this we need to reduce the ad hoc reactive responses inherent in Canadian crisis management. Canada cannot afford another Dieppe or Hong Kong at one end of the spectrum, or another Rwanda or Somalia at the other, with all the attendant political and human backlash contained in the fallout from such situations.

### ***most contingency operations conducted in the 1950s and 1960s were planned using the “back of the cigarette pack” approach***

In short, Canada is not going to suddenly retreat from its international responsibilities or its independent global national interests. It cannot afford to. Attempts to avoid involvement based on the assertion that Canada's military forces are not equipped, prepared or commanded effectively will fall on deaf ears when the next crisis hits and an effective military response is demanded by Cabinet or the people of Canada. The Armed Forces must have an effective command and control system that is capable of conducting joint operations globally across the spectrum of conflict.

#### **A PROBLEM IDENTIFIED: THE RENEWED NEED FOR JOINT PLANNING IN THE 1980S**

Throughout the 1970s, the bulk of the NDHQ planning staff activity was devoted to the day-to-day operations and maintenance of deployed forces committed to the UN and NATO and, in the case of Operation GAMESCAN 76, domestic operations. Wartime planning, of secondary importance, focused on the employment of the Europe-based commitments in the Central Region,

the reinforcement of those commitments, and deployment of Canada-based forces to other European commitments at sea and to Norway. Virtually no capability existed to plan for and execute contingency operations, joint or not. None of the existing commitments appeared at the time to demand a joint planning and command approach.

As we have seen,<sup>7</sup> most contingency operations conducted in the 1950s and 1960s were planned using the “back of the cigarette pack” approach. Commanders and planners during these years had wartime experience and were used to hasty improvisation without the burden of reams of paperwork and large staffs. In most cases, they all knew each other or at least had the Second World War as a common experience and reference point. The force

structure was conducive to improvisation since a wide range of capabilities existed within it. The acceptance of a nuclear warfighting strategy in the 1950s and 1960s discouraged complex mobilization planning, and, in any case, mobilization resources were cut to the bone by 1958.

Contingency planning was, however, reaching the point where it could no longer be improvised on short notice, be efficient, and achieve success. The shift in NATO to a flexible response strategy in 1967 placed a new premium on conventional forces and thus mobilization planning. There were decreased operational resources available after the cuts in the early 1970s, which discouraged mobilization planning in Canada. The new guard in NDHQ had no wartime experience and were perhaps more career-minded. The administrative culture at NDHQ was at odds with an effective operational culture. A factor compounding this discord was the instability of the planning and command system over the course of the decade. Increased civilianization, whereby untrained but powerful people thought that

they needed to be involved in all aspects of CF activity to retain their personal power within the civil service, was another factor. At another level, the civilian political leadership felt an increased need to micromanage operations because of the perceived and real political repercussions brought on by near-instantaneous media coverage. All in all, the lack of trust between the elected civilian officials, the non-elected civilian bureaucrats, the uniformed bureaucrats, and the uniformed commanders and operators was reaching critical mass.

Two events highlighted the decrepit state of the planning organs in NDHQ. The first was the 1979 WINTEX NATO-wide command post exercise. This exercise series had been run throughout the 1970s on a biannual basis. In general terms, WINTEX was to exercise and evaluate government and national military command procedures in a crisis scenario leading up to mobilization and limited nuclear war. During the play of WINTEX 79, Canada was unable to meet its long-established NATO requirements. The breakdown occurred in the alert phases leading up to the start and beginning of the war.<sup>8</sup> Essentially, WINTEX 79 demonstrated that Canadian planners and operators were not capable of carrying out dyed in the wool, planned, NATO wartime operations—the CF's *raison d'être*—let alone conducting rapid reaction contingency operations for national purposes outside of the NATO area.

The first official examination of the problem was the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces. The Progressive Conservative government of Joe Clark, elected in 1979, had as its election platform a promise to re-examine Unification. A Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces was then established, which reported in March 1980. The Task

Force reported directly to the Minister of National Defence, Allan B. MacKinnon. However, the Liberal upset election in March 1980 interfered with the Task Force's process and the ultimate disposition of the final report. The Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Robert Falls, was sensitized by the change in government and subsequently recommended that the work of the Task Force be examined by a Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification in the Canadian Forces. This was done in part because it was believed the report “would not reflect favourably on the Liberal government.”<sup>9</sup>

The bulk of the report dealt with items like training, recruiting, and the personnel system. The most important discussion was, however, on command and control issues, and there were some damning conclusions. There was the belief that “there had been insufficient sea, land, and air environmental expertise available to the senior decision makers.” The Commanders “acted as advisors only when asked for advice, and that consultation usually occurred after a major decision was made.” Worse yet, “the chain of command was perceived as being blurred”: “communications to [NDHQ] bypassed command headquarters and, in other cases, the command acted only as a clearing house for information.” In addition, NDHQ was “not being responsive to

operational requirements” in that there “had been insufficient attention to tactical doctrine formulation” at NDHQ. One suggested solution was “a Joint Chiefs of Staff organization.”<sup>10</sup>

The situation was aggravated by the merging of CFHQ and NDHQ. At the Assistant Deputy Minister level, “civilians were making or contributing to the making of decisions of a military nature and that control by the civil power should not mean control by the Public Service...this perceived civilianization had resulted in a loss of focus at the ‘sharp end’...civilian rank and job tenure acted to the detriment of the influence of serving military personnel.”<sup>11</sup>

The CDS's Review Group examined all recommendations and evidence generated by the Task Force. It then elaborated on the themes and came to its own series of recommendations, which were more detailed those of the Task Force. In the area of command and control, the Review Group concluded that there needed to be “strong emphasis on operational matters and on the need to recognize environmental differences” and agreed with the Task Force's conclusions that there were “too many sources of direction” and “lack of environmental direction” at NDHQ.<sup>12</sup> As to the charge of over civilianization, the Review Group agreed and elaborated, “civilian standards and values are displacing...proven military counterparts and in the process are eroding the basic fibre of Canadian military society...the Forces are facing a crisis of the military ethos.”<sup>13</sup> This over civilianization contributed to the trend away from operational matters and towards d a y - t o - d a y administrative (and p r o j e c t implementation) ones at NDHQ.

The Chief of the Defence Staff of the day (1980-83), General



**The results of poor joint planning. We cannot allow this to happen again. (Courtesy National Archives of Canada)**

Ramsay M. Withers, directed that a re-examination of the national command and control system take place in 1981. The draft policy directive generated by his staff identified a necessary corrective to the existing state of affairs:

*As increasingly sophisticated information exchange and management systems become available, there will be a discernible tendency to centralize control of the CF. At the same time, the very nature and seriousness of the military threat to Canadian national security demands a flexible, robust and reliable exercise of command and control. Command and control is a dynamic and occasionally indistinct process linking any commander to the resources he controls and to the authority to which he is responsible. It facilitates planning, implementation, coordination, monitoring, and modification of any operation or activity, and to be effective, must provide for a secure and reliable two-way flow of direction, advice, and information.<sup>14</sup>*

In effect, the draft policy directive was suggesting Canada's command and control system by the early 1980s was decentralized, inflexible, not robust, unreliable, and un-dynamic.

While the NDHQ system was processing the CDS's policy directive, NDHQ conducted Exercise RENDEZVOUS 81 (RV 81). This exercise was designed to conduct collective training at the division-level for Mobile Command units across Canada. It had been delayed two years in a row, partly because NDHQ had lost the ability to conduct a strategic movement of resources within Canada, let alone deploy them outside of North America. An ad hoc movements cell had to be created at the last minute so that Mobile Command units could strategically deploy from all over Canada to CFB Gagetown, the exercise area.<sup>15</sup>

It took another year, almost 21/2 years after the initial directive had been implemented, to finalize a CF command and control policy. The exact reasons why the process was drawn out are obscure, but it appears as though there were snags discovered by the judge advocate general staff over the exact legal authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff to command. At one point it even appeared that the Chief of the Defence Staff might only have the authority to advise in the command of the CF as opposed to actually doing so. In addition, all of the operational commanders and civilian bureaucrats were consulted and asked for their views, which took time.<sup>16</sup> The possibility that personal friction between various uniformed and civilian members interfered with the process should not be discounted.

The final version of the CF command and control policy was promulgated in April 1983. It called for the capability to "deploy and redeploy forces in Canada or abroad and sustain these forces under peacetime, crisis, or war conditions." It also noted, "a commander must be able to assign missions and tasks to subordinates and adjust these as circumstances dictate."<sup>17</sup> The role of the Chief of the Defence Staff and his relationship to the Minister of National Defence (MND) was extensively clarified. For example, the Chief of the Defence Staff was to be the senior military adviser to the MND and responsible to him for "the effective conduct of military operations and for the readiness of the CF to meet the commitments assigned to him by the Governor-in-Council." The policy further stipulated that "the CDS...exercises command over the Canadian Forces" and he was permitted to delegate this command.<sup>18</sup>

The Department of National Defence and the CF were "two separate and distinct but interdependent organizations" even though they were intermingled in one building. The Vice Chief of the

Defence Staff (VCDS) was the Chief of Staff of the CF, while the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) was responsible for the CF's operations. The primary organ for this was Directorate of Military Planning and Operations, under the DCDS, which was to "meet programmed and emergency activities." The NDHQ Operational Staff was to consist of the DCDS Battle Staff, the National Defence Operations Centre (NDOC) Staff and augmentation teams, the DCDS Operational Planning Staff, and the National Defence Intelligence Centre. Supporting staff would be

**Exercise RENDEZVOUS  
81...had been delayed  
two years in a row,  
partly because NDHQ  
had lost the ability to  
conduct strategic  
movement of resources  
within Canada**

provided by the Personnel Coordination Centre and the Logistics Coordination Centre.<sup>19</sup>

General Withers was replaced by General Theriault in 1983, and the Trudeau government was defeated by the Progressive Conservatives under Brian Mulroney. The new government's defence minister, Bob Coates, was out to eliminate the last vestiges of unification. Though Coates was replaced by Erik Neilson after the embarrassing incident in Lahr, there was serious movement in the government to overhaul defence policy at all levels.<sup>20</sup>

The most visible manifestation of this process was the 1987 White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment*. Less visible were the efforts to rationalize the planning system in NDHQ. Part of this process was the commissioning of another study to re-examine unification. Part of the final report, "The Impact of Integration, Unification, and Restructuring on the Functions and Structure of National Defence Headquarters," known as the Loomis

Study, was released in 1985.

The Loomis Study was commissioned by General Theriault. Theriault believed that defence planning was “stalled by the expectation that the civilian public service had isolated the CDS.” In his view, the public service “invaded the command structure,” and it was driven “primarily by budgetary and process means,” which were not conducive to operational planning since the “public service culture is fundamentally at odds with the command culture.” Theriault even asserted that the CDS “was essentially neutered by the administrative culture of NDHQ since 1972.”<sup>21</sup> There were other aspects to this problem, however. Some officers in NDHQ used their military position to build contacts and then springboard into the public service in DND. The inability of the

***Exercise BRAVE LION was yet more evidence that the operational joint planning capability to mount a major operation was seriously deficient***

officer corps to build an ethos to strengthen their own position and to develop ways of beating the bureaucracy rather than joining it contributed to the problem.

The Loomis Study noted that the operations planning component within the DCDS was deficient. There were problems between Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) (ADM(Pol)) and the DCDS group over the continuity of policy. The DCDS group did not have enough personnel to handle ongoing missions and potential contingency operations. There was a split within the organization between planners trying to conduct forward planning as a whole and other planners attempting to handle specific environmental planning to meet existing commitments. Additionally, there was a conflict of interest between the chiefs of the elements

within the DCDS group in that they were complicit in carrying out service advocacy. Finally, the DCDS did not have a strong Chief of Staff to mediate these disputes as they arose, which, in addition to the manning problem, distracted the staff from their primary tasks.<sup>22</sup> The Loomis Study concluded by stating, “Unification was not an optimal solution ...the solution to a proper grasp of combined operations lies not in Unification but in strengthening the concept of a joint staff derived from service experts but owing some higher allegiance to a common cause.”<sup>23</sup>

**EXERCISE BRAVE LION: CAST TO NORWAY, 1986**

The case of Exercise BRAVE LION was yet more evidence that the operational joint planning capability to mount a major operation in NDHQ was seriously deficient.

Some background about the Canadian Air Sea Transportable (CAST) commitment is necessary before diving into the intricacies of BRAVE LION. After the 1968 election, the Trudeau government sought to end the existing Canadian land force commitment to NATO in Europe. The existing commitment was one division, with one brigade group deployed to West Germany in peacetime. In the 1968 defence review, the feasibility of replacing the two brigades with one brigade group was tabled. After some consultation, the decision was made to commit this “Air/Sea Transportable” (AST) brigade to north Norway in the event of a crisis.<sup>24</sup> This decision was made without adequate military input, probably due to the confusion reigning within the CFHQ organizational structure of the day. For example, there was no realistic discussion how a Canadian Forces logistic structure geared to fight a 30-day nuclear war with little or no mobilization could transport and support the AST brigade group in Norway and support 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) in central Germany simultaneously.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, the Canadian government also committed two

CF-5 squadrons for operations in Norway. Despite all of the rhetoric of unification, no attempt appears to have been made at the time to connect the deployment or operations of the renamed CAST Combat Group and the Rapid Reaction Squadrons. Indeed, the relationship between these commitments and the existing AMF(L) commitment were ambiguous at best.

The responsibility for the CAST role at the brigade group level changed hands at least three times between 1968 and 1986. It appears as though the CAST group exercised only once in the 1970s—and then only in Canada.<sup>26</sup> CAST became a paper commitment, and the complexity of transporting a brigade group by sea through hostile waters to Norway and then deploying and supporting it in an active theatre was forgotten, probably deliberately, over time.

By the 1980s, the credibility of the CAST commitment came into question particularly during Ex BOLD STEP but more importantly after the return of the Progressive Conservative government in 1984. Consequently, the decision was made in either 1983 or 1984 to conduct an exercise to test the CAST concept. BRAVE LION “was a combined/joint exercise to practise and validate all plans and agreements for the deployment and employment of Canadian reinforcement forces [to Norway].”<sup>27</sup> The CAST brigade group and one Air Command Rapid Reaction Squadron (RRS) consisting of ten CF-5s would participate.

It took two years to plan BRAVE LION, a long time considering the fact that the commitment had been in existence since 1968 and it was part of SACEUR's crisis management contingency plan, which was to be executed before war started. When finally executed in August-October 1986, the results were predictable. Once on the ground, the CAST brigade (by this time based on 5e groupement brigade du Canada or 5e GBC) functioned well under exercise conditions, as did the air movement component, which had

been considerably strengthened since RV 81.<sup>28</sup> Where the exercise fell apart was in the staffing, deployment, and, most importantly, in the command and control relationships.

BRAVE LION was commanded by the CDS and delegated to the DCDS. Director General Military Plans and Operations was the planning office for the exercise, with support provided by the rest of the DCDS group. They immediately discovered that the existing contingency plan, OPLAN BOREAL, was sketchy and the plans to support CAST (reinforcements, casualty evacuation, and logistics) were non-existent. There was no written relationship between the RRS and CAST. On reflection, the planners noted that “NDHQ planners...were addressing a large scale joint/combined exercise for the first time...”<sup>29</sup>

Since there was no logistics capability, an ad hoc Canadian Support Group (North) (CSG(N)) was formed for the exercise. It had to be cobbled together from existing logistics units that were committed to other wartime tasks. As for planning:

During any major exercise or operation, especially in peacetime, C2 and coordination of NDHQ operational activities are [sic] effected by a form of matrix management and by regrouping of elements of the headquarters into various ad hoc organizations and systems....such an approach is possibly neither as effective nor as efficient as it might be.<sup>30</sup>

There did “not appear to be a definitive concept document which is available and understood by all concerned.” NDHQ Policy Directive P1/83, a report noted, was inadequate since it only generally “described policy and terms of reference for the Principle NDHQ staff.”<sup>31</sup> Once again, the DCDS staff

was undermanned and had problems coping with an exercise, let alone a real crisis situation. The decision to cut Headquarters Canadian Forces



**5e Groupe Brigade du Canadian deployed to Norway in 1986 to exercise the CAST brigade commitment. Then, as now, strategic movement of ground forces has been difficult. (Courtesy CFPU)**

Europe (CFE) out of the exercise was “a significant weakness” since CFE was the command responsible for the reinforcement forces coming into the theatre. In sum, the operational planning system was in trouble.

A second problem was the confusion over the role of Canadian and NATO naval forces both in the plan and in the exercise. Planners thought that Maritime Command (MARCOM) participation in the exercise was an “unaffordable luxury” and chose not to exercise convoy escort.<sup>32</sup> This is just as well since it would have exacerbated the workload of the already floundering DCDS planning staff. Operationally, MARCOM planners already had their anti-submarine ships and aircraft committed to SACLANT for operations at the very start of the conflict. Finding enough Canadian escort ships to cover the CAST deployment prior to the war starting was not built into national or NATO naval plans—another serious flaw.<sup>33</sup>

Another problem was the command and control arrangements for the air units involved in BRAVE LION. Planners determined that they would test what they referred to as a “Senior Airman in theatre concept,” which, if there had been a proper JTF for the exercise, would

have been part of it with a headquarters increment. Air units in BRAVE LION consisted of the RRS, three Chinook medium lift helicopters, fourteen Iroquois, and ten Kiowa light observation helicopters. Significant problems encountered in fitting the Senior Airman position into the deployed command structure included “the jealous guarding of traditional land and air element areas of independence and responsibility.” In theory, the CDS delegated authority for air operations to the Canadian National Commander, though Commander 5e GBC was not really designated as such for BRAVE LION. Existing doctrine at the time incorporated the helicopter units into the brigade headquarters. Despite this, the Aviation Wing under the Senior

Airman was formed and the ad hoc headquarters was co-located with the helicopters. He had nothing to do with the RRS and was not allowed to evolve into a theatre “air commander” at the CSG(N) or the deputy commander of the CAST brigade.<sup>34</sup>

Though the post-exercise analysts collected significant data on planning and command problems encountered during BRAVE LION, they thought it would be “unwise to attempt to report on problems related to the overall organization and command and control at NDHQ and its relationship to commands.” “Weaknesses in methods by which the way NDHQ addresses crisis management are most important and can be dealt with discretely.” The analysts noted that “the ability of the current matrix management system (vice a joint staff) and the ability of the DGMPO organization to cope with a real crisis was brought into question during the exercise.”<sup>35</sup> The reasons for this skittishness on the part of the analysts are obscure but most probably related to the CDS's push to move away from the Central Region and focus on north Norway. General Theriault was adamant that Canadian defence policy was too “random” and that several commitments could be

consolidated with an appropriate savings and rationality.<sup>36</sup>

In the wake of BRAVE LION, the new CDS, General Paul Manson, and the Deputy Minister, D.B. Dewar, took another shot at reviewing NDHQ's ability to command and control deployed forces. The resultant NDHQ Policy Directive P2/86, "The Operation and Organization of National Defence Headquarters," was done concurrently with the ongoing White Paper process. Both men agreed that the existing "integration of military and civilian staff works well," but they thought that the CDS and Deputy Minister (DM) needed better access to Cabinet in wartime. The Policy Directive noted that there were problems in policy coordination between the ADM(Pol) group and the DCDS group and between these two entities and other government departments, including the Privy Council Office (PCO). P2/86 proposed two changes: the creation of a policy coordination group in ADM(Pol) and the creation of a reporting system in the DCDS group to improve operational readiness.<sup>37</sup>

P2/86 was eventually "abrogated and consequently shredded."<sup>38</sup> The reasons are obscure. They appear to be related to the realization after BRAVE LION that the system needed a more thorough reorganization since the directive was issued prior to the exercise and rescinded after the Hunter/Little study was produced in 1989.

#### **OPERATION BANDIT: JTF TO HAITI, 1987-1988**

The icing on the cake was Operation BANDIT. BRAVE LION was an exercise in a known and planned for operating area, while BANDIT dealt with a serious, unforeseen emergency in a region generally believed to be peripheral to Canadian interests. The collapse of the "Baby Doc" Duvalier regime in Haiti and the subsequent 1987 elections produced massive mob violence that threatened Canadian interests. Over 1000 Canadians, including many aid workers and missionaries who were mostly from

Quebec, were caught in the middle. The Canadian government was under pressure from the Haitian community in Montreal to respond. External Affairs contemplated the worst-case scenario and predicted that violence would be increasingly directed against foreigners.<sup>39</sup>

On 1 December 1987, NDHQ quietly started a contingency planning process, Operation SPEAR, to extract Canadian using CF airlift resources. This anticipatory planning was based on media reports regarding what was going on in Haiti. Canadian Ambassador Claude Laverdure, however, was recalled on 11 December. After being briefed on the situation, the Prime Minister directed that External Affairs and DND formulate a discrete contingency plan to evacuate Canadians from Haiti. The staff check was changed into a formal contingency plan and called Operation BANDIT.<sup>40</sup>

DND then sent the Director Military Operations Coordination (DMOC) to Haiti on a one-man reconnaissance that lasted six days. Concurrently with this, intelligence estimates indicated that the situation would remain stable until perhaps 6 January 1988 since, they reasoned, the opposition would need time to formulate a response. That response would probably be a violent one given the nature of the massacre. French and American analysis concurred with this assessment, and they were also creating their own contingency plans.<sup>41</sup>

There was more driving Operation BANDIT than just an in-and-out, non-combat evacuation operation, however. External Affairs analysis concluded that there were two possible scenarios affecting Canadian interests:

- a general deterioration of internal security such as might threaten the safety of Canadians in the country; and
- the conduct of elections on the 17th of January under conditions which could cause a forceful rejection of the results by the

Haitian community and the media in Canada and demands for Canadian Government action.

The worst case scenario, as envisioned by External Affairs, was that there would be prolonged civil strife presumably between military and Macoute forces. It could lead to: the collapse of already tenuous political and military control; descent into anarchy; settling of old scores; xenophobic outbursts against foreigners and the church.... This and other less grisly scenarios would be exacerbated by the increase in consumer shortages.<sup>43</sup>

Intelligence analysis concluded that there would be two distinct windows of potential violence: the week of the announced 17 January elections (accompanied by a probable general strike and labour violence) and between 17 January and 7 February, the period between the election and the inauguration.

The Mulroney government was concerned about the Montreal media and the Haitian community in Montreal. There was a "concerted campaign, calling for the Canadian government to break relations," which was "organized mainly by the Haitian community, the missionary societies, with help of the media (principally *Le Devoir* because of its links with the Church, and the labour unions, because of their support for leftist causes."<sup>44</sup> The government planned to inoculate the media, which was anticipated to call for Canadian condemnation of the Haitian government, by emphasizing the themes of not placing Haiti's poor in jeopardy, concern for the safety of Canadians, and accepting the "realities of Haitian history."<sup>45</sup>

This policy stance should not be interpreted as outright support for the Haitian government or its aims by the Canadian government, though the Americans did support the Haitian government and Canadian aid flowed while it was in power. There were domestic political realities relating to Canada's ongoing constitutional crisis. The Meech Lake Accord had passed the previous June and the clock was ticking. Quebec separatists were now coming

out against the accord, and Mulroney faced increased unpopularity and the loss of votes in the province.<sup>46</sup> The large expatriate Haitian community in Montreal would probably demand sanctions or even Canadian action in Haiti. It is clear that there was concern that an explosion in Haiti would be value-added grief for the government at this point.

The initial plan envisioned an airlift extraction. Ambassador Laverdure identified four airfields, two of which would probably be secured by hostile forces, and two others which would not be able to handle C-130 aircraft. This meant that a purely air operation was not feasible, though a C-130 was placed on two-hours notice to move at CFB Edmonton. Helicopters and ships were needed, and ground forces would also be needed to secure the pick up zones. There were three options which External Affairs and DND agreed would constitute the contingency plan:

- ongoing legal peacetime activity such as voluntary evacuation;
- military activity with the consent of the government of Haiti; and
- military action without the consent of the government of Haiti.

Detailed contingency planning commenced on 20 December 1987. Fourteen hundred Canadians were identified as residing in Haiti, but External Affairs thought that only 600-800 would want to leave (this was based on the Embassy's establishment of a warder system and registration list in preparation for evacuation).<sup>48</sup>

Overland evacuation of Canadians to the Dominican Republic was considered far too hazardous to seriously contemplate given the nature of the terrain and potential opposition.<sup>49</sup> Eventually, options for the use of Canadian military forces explored by a special joint External Affairs-DND team came down to the deployment of two

DDHs with helicopters to the "Caribbean for training and port visits with voluntary evacuation of Canadians on these ships" and the use of CC-115 Buffalo aircraft using outlying airfields to pick up Canadians in the countryside (this



**Divisional Commander's pennant from Exercise RV 87, held in April and May 1987. This series of exercises provided considerable experience in strategic movement and command and control. (Courtesy Commanding Officer LFDTSHQ)**

was the original option for evacuation in a permissive environment, that is, one in which the Haitian military did not interfere). The other option was the use of a naval force and helicopters with infantry in support to rescue Canadians from outlying villages and then evacuate them by C-130 Hercules from airheads assumed to be secured by the French and the Americans.<sup>50</sup>

On 30 December 1987, the first warning order was issued. A joint task force (JTF) was to be formed under the command of Commodore L.C.A. Westropp. MARCOM was to be prepared to sail one AOR and two DDHs to Puerto Rico. Four Sea Kings and three FMC Twin Huey helicopters, along with an expanded medical team and an infantry battalion headquarters, would be embarked. FMC was to prepare an infantry battalion group. The deception plan for Operation BANDIT was to relate naval preparations and movements to a joint Canadian-American exercise called FLEETEX 1/88.<sup>51</sup>

There was an initial concept of operations. The naval task group, TG 300.1, would proceed to Puerto

Rico or Guantanamo Bay. It would stand by at the location and proceed to the operating area on order from either the Minister of National Defence, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, or the Prime Minister. The two DDHs would have three Sea Kings, while the AOR would have two Sea Kings and the Twin Hueys. Six C-130 Hercules and four Buffalos would move 3 R22eR to the staging base and then embark one company on the ships. One company would remain with the transport aircraft and fly in with them if they were ordered in. The other would remain in reserve at either Puerto Rico or Guantanamo Bay. The sea-going company would secure beach and helicopter landing zones.<sup>52</sup>

The ships selected for Operation BANDIT initially were the AOR HMCS PRESERVER, the 280-class DDH HMCS ATHABASKAN, and the DDH HMCS NIPIGON. At the last minute, however, NIPIGON was replaced with the St Laurent-class DDH HMCS SKEENA. TG 300.1 sailed from Halifax on 5 January 1988.<sup>53</sup> 3 R22eR, a platoon from 5 Field Ambulance, a troop from 119 Air Defence Battery, and two flights of Twin Hueys from 403 Tactical Helicopter Squadron stood by. A small planning cell from 3 R22eR embarked prior to departure from Halifax.

A serious problem had developed, however. Despite the deception plan, the media in Halifax noticed that the deployment was occurring during the holidays and that the announced FLEETEX 1/88 used the Caribbean as an operating area.<sup>54</sup> This had undue political effects. The leaks and media speculation "increased tension in Haiti" and External Affairs "requested no further actions be taken which would indicate military preparedness for operations in Haiti."<sup>55</sup> The news reports "angered Namphy and have not improved the situation for Canadians in Haiti."<sup>56</sup>

Task Group 300.1 was now at the Puerto Rico Operating Area, while

Mobile Command and Air Command movements continued covertly. Ambassador Laverdure then announced that “Canadian vessels that are transiting to the Caribbean area are there for military training and their presence is not related to the current situation in Haiti,” which was done specifically to “defuse the speculation that has arisen in the press.”<sup>57</sup>

As the election approached, Canadian planning evolved. Operation BANDIT remained but one option. The press leaks increased External Affairs skittishness about an armed intervention. Fortunately, NDHQ was able to point out that the Operation BANDIT forces had a minimal “offensive capability...which therefore offer[ed a] minimum threat to [the] Haitian government and could not present the impression that Canada was invading Haiti or interfering with the election.”<sup>58</sup>

Though the situation Haiti was noted as calm by External Affairs, the CDS, General De Chastelain, ordered that TG 300.1 be moved to a position 50 nm south of Haiti. This was done on 16 January 1988, the day before the election. Commodore Westropp was to exercise “maximum discretion, minimum electronic emission, avoid shipping [and] remain covert.”<sup>59</sup> The elections were relatively quiet, with an estimated 5% turn out, and the Haitian forces were not alerted to repel the Canadian hordes.<sup>60</sup> Operation BANDIT was then terminated.

In the post-operation analysis, serious problems with the joint planning process and command relationships were identified. The operation was planned in the DCDS group, but the initial estimates were far too compartmentalized (mostly for security reasons), which left critical staff planners like the air movements people out of the loop. Because of this, the DCDS was unable to direct air movements to allocate resources for the operation (in fact, air movements provided their estimate up to the DCDS group, which amounted to them directing the DCDS). Linked to this

was the fact that there was no coordination meeting for the first 27 days after the warning order was given by the CDS. Once the planning system got into gear, daily coordination meetings were held by an ad hoc Joint Planning Team.<sup>61</sup>

Apparently, a formal DCDS Joint Planning Staff (JPS) existed on paper. This DCDS JPS was an outgrowth of the changes proposed by General Withers back in 1983 and had been incorporated into NDHQ SOP manuals dealing with the shift of NDHQ from a peacetime to a wartime posture.<sup>62</sup> Operation BANDIT, however, was neither war nor peace, and Canadian doctrine did not formally accept what we now refer to as operations other than war (American doctrine) or conflict (Canadian doctrine). Activation of the NDHQ war plan would have been excessive since it was geared towards World War III, yet not activating it diminished the ability of the headquarters to plan.

Significant communications problems were encountered during Operation BANDIT. Since there was “no joint operations doctrine and a common pool of equipment to project CF command and control to the Caribbean, joint communications planning started from nothing.” NDHQ had to borrow satellite communications equipment from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, while a secure communications system was borrowed from the RCMP. As one signaler noted, “we borrowed from ourselves in putting a satellite terminal on the roof of NDHQ off of a West Coast ship in re-fit.” In addition, the communications systems between the land contingent and the naval contingent were incompatible.<sup>63</sup>

A very blunt post-operational analysis conducted by Vice Admiral Chuck Thomas made some scathing and accurate comments about the CF's ability to mount contingency operations:

Operation BANDIT exposed a weakness in command and control of operational forces. My analysis is that NDHQ does not have the capability

to plan a multi-dimensional operation. The formulation of such operational planning should be tasked to a lead command, which would liaise with NDHQ and other commands. Once the plan was formulated, execution of the mission could be assumed by NDOC or left with the operational commander.<sup>64</sup>

Furthermore:

the issues of command and control, communications, media liaison, and logistics response must be addressed by NDHQ....Operation BANDIT proved conclusively that the Canadian Forces does not possess such a system and future attempts to conduct similar operations will be severely hampered until this deficiency is resolved. Also, a system which activates the logistics network in response to short notice operational requirements must be developed.<sup>65</sup>

On the positive side, the DCDS after action report noted that the JTF organization for the in-theatre command of Operation BANDIT worked well. It was the connection of the JTF to NDHQ and NDHQ's ability to plan and mount the joint operation that was a problem. For example, the NDOC and Canadian Forces Communications Command jumped down several levels in the chain of command to the deployed units, which caused confusion as to who was in command. Mobile Command and Air Transport Group resorted to “bilateral” negotiations to move equipment and personnel from Valcartier to Halifax.<sup>66</sup>

#### **OPERATION VAGABOND: UNIIMOG TO THE PERSIAN GULF, 1988**

In September 1980, Iran and Iraq initiated a bloody eight-year war in the basin of the vital oil-bearing Persian Gulf. Eventually, this war degenerated into a horrific First

World War-like stalemate, which was characterized by Iranian massed human wave attacks and Iraqi chemical weapons use. The conflict spread to encompass the Gulf itself during the so-called “tanker war” in which vessels were wantonly attacked by each side in order to disrupt the flow of oil and thus the economy of the adversary. Eventually, the eight-year UN effort to mediate and bring about a ceasefire paid off: in February 1988, Iran accepted a UN resolution calling for a ceasefire. On 2 August 1988, UN Secretary General sent in a recce party. Within six days, the UN had generated an implementation plan (Resolution 598), subsequently accepted by the belligerents, which involved the creation of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). UNIIMOG was to monitor the ceasefire and subsequent withdrawal and verify and report on belligerent activity in the ceasefire zone.<sup>67</sup>

Canada immediately announced that it would contribute to UNIIMOG on 8 August. By 10 August, a Canadian recce party of five men left for the operational area. The UN plan called for the deployment of 350 observers with an additional 174 administrative support personnel and an undefined signal capability. Canada elected to provide the UNIIMOG signal unit.<sup>68</sup>

To handle the higher-level planning for this deployment, a temporary Battle Staff, which included the VCDS and several Major-General-level positions, was formed. The Battle Staff was superimposed on the existing NDHQ system and quickly bogged down in its deliberations. There were several personality conflicts extant, but to cap it all off, an argument broke out over how many USAF C5A Galaxy transport aircraft could fit on the ramp at CFB Trenton. At one point, a senior member of the Battle Staff was down on the floor sketching out the Trenton ramp and preparing to place paper cut-outs of C5As on it to prove his point.<sup>69</sup> In the end, the force deployed using Soviet Aeroflot

aircraft since Iran would not permit American aircraft into Tehran. Naturally, if Canada had owned its own strategic airlift fleet of C-141s as the 1960s Mobile Command structure demanded, this would not have been an issue.

The formation selected by Mobile Command to send the Canadian contingent was the Special Service Force (SSF), which was normally tasked with defence of Canada operations under the CANUS commitments. Operation VAGABOND was the second major deployment of SSF units in 1988: the Royal Canadian Dragoons had deployed earlier that year to Cyprus on a normally scheduled peacekeeping rotation.

The first warning order sent to SSF Headquarters asked the commander to consider sending a 100-pers signal unit, possibly drawn from the 200-pers SSF Headquarters and Signal Squadron. There was no

***A filter was desperately needed so that...briefings to senior leaders could be made without the senior leaders dropping down too far “into the weeds.”***

statement of aim, no discussion of scope, and no terrain analysis sent to SSF HQ so that this operation could be planned. When the CF cartographic establishment in Ottawa was queried about providing the appropriate maps, SSF Headquarters was told that there were none. The SSF commander, Brigadier-General Ian Douglas, and his staff used a National Geographic map that he received in the mail to conduct their initial planning.<sup>70</sup>

The chain of command between NDHQ and SSF remained convoluted for the duration of the mounting of Operation VAGABOND. The DCDS planners knew little, while the Mobile Command planners knew next to nothing. There was a complete lack of intelligence flowing down to SSF Headquarters. The intelligence staff

scrambled to get open source information at the local level. Eventually, the 100-pers commitment grew to 500 pers. The exact process by which this happened and at what level is obscure. This forced the continual alteration of plans. The lack of clear direction forced the SSF planners to query both Mobile Command and various NDHQ departments like Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), or ADM(PER), and Assistant Deputy Minister (Material), or ADM (MAT). At one point, the SSF planners were told by the NDHQ staffs not to talk to Mobile Command, and then Mobile Command told SSF Headquarters not to talk to NDHQ!<sup>71</sup>

Eventually, the SSF put together an organization based on the 200-pers SSF Headquarters and Signal Squadron. But where were the other 300 pers going to come from? ADM(Per) essentially drafted Maritime Command and Air Command signals personnel from as far away as Esquimalt and ordered them to proceed to Petawawa. On arrival, many of the augmentees had no equipment, no field training, not even combat uniforms. They had not been briefed on what they were being moved for or where they were ultimately going. In the end, the contingent commander had to build the entire unit from the ground up.<sup>72</sup>

This deprived the SSF of its command and control elements. The entire 200-pers signal squadron was incorporated into 88 Canadian Signal Unit. Consequently, SSF was unable to meet the CANUS commitment if the international situation had worsened. It was even incapable of repeating Exercise RAPID STRIKE, held earlier that year, in which the SSF deployed to multiple locations across Canada to counter “enemy” forces attacking Canadian radar and command and control sites supporting NORAD, which in turn supported the protection of the nuclear deterrent.<sup>73</sup>

Operation VAGABOND after action studies were revealing: “Once again, the cancer of double-hatting

seriously aggravated the provision of support to the operation....”<sup>74</sup> Notably, the Canadian doctrine for mounting such an operation was obsolete. There were too many phases and too much staff involved for such a compressed time line. There had to be formal work-arounds of the “peacetime” procedures, particularly in Ottawa. During Operation VAGABOND, the informal bypasses generated by the time compression created too much confusion.<sup>75</sup>



**A crisis management operational concept and joint doctrine to implement it is important given the complexity of operations. (Courtesy Combat Camera)**

Colonel L.W.F. Cuppens, the Assistant DGMPO, conducted his own analysis and concluded that “there was a need for a mechanism whereby NDHQ resources could be mobilized to plan and execute a contingent operation which would be limited in scope and duration, vis-a-vis full mobilization envisioned [in existing plans] and secondly the need to have a sound understanding of the fundamentals of good joint staff procedures.”<sup>76</sup>

The larger NDHQ operating plan was modified to include a section for “Augmentation for Operation in Situations Short of War.”<sup>77</sup> In this modification, the National Defence Operations Centre was augmented with an Operations Director (full colonel), an SSO Operations (lieutenant-colonel), three component advisors from Navy, Land, and Air (majors), and liaison officers to finance, transport, External Affairs, engineering, personnel, Public Affairs, Mobile Command, Air Command, and Maritime Command. This organization would be set up for the duration of the operation and then disbanded.<sup>78</sup> On paper, at least, the grandfather of the J-Staff as we know it today was conceived.

Major-General John Arch McInnis determined that the gyrations over Operation VAGABOND were too dangerous to be repeated and accepted Cuppens’ plan. A filter was desperately needed so that organizational and coordination briefings to senior leaders could be made without the

senior leaders dropping down too far “into the weeds.” A special staff responsive to the DCDS—which could not only keep the military leadership informed but could make executive military decisions and implement them without interference from ADM(Mat) ADM(Per) and ADM(Pol)—was needed.<sup>79</sup> Then the Mulrone government decided to send Canadian Forces to Africa.

#### **OPERATION MATADOR: UNTAG TO NAMIBIA, 1989**

The origins of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia went back to 1974. The conflict in Namibia and Angola amounted to a Cold War proxy fight, with the Soviets and Cubans supporting the Marxist government in Angola (the MPLA) against the South Africa and US-supported rebels, UNITA. The Portuguese had removed themselves from power in Angola in 1974 after a bitter war. The MPLA also supported an anti-South African guerrilla force in Namibia called SWAPO. The South Africans had administered Namibia for the UN until 1966, when the UN ruled that the occupation was now illegal. In 1978, a five-nation contact group, which included Canada, sought to mediate an end to the fighting.<sup>80</sup>

In 1979, the then-Minister of National Defence Barney Danson authorized planning to begin for a Canadian contribution to the planned seven-battalion UN peacekeeping force. The fighting continued, but the UN remained

prepared to insert a peacekeeping force into the 1980s. When it appeared that peace might break out in 1982-83, DND told Cabinet that Canada was prepared to provide four Chinook helicopters and 130 personnel. If more forces were necessary “for political visibility reasons,” six UH-1 Huey helicopters and 120 more personnel could also be deployed. Nothing more was done until 1988 as the fighting did not cease.<sup>81</sup>

In 1988, it looked as if there might be a breakthrough in another round of peace talks. In mid-September 1989, the UN asked Canada about the feasibility of providing five Chinooks, a 300-pers maintenance company, a 150-pers supply company, 250 construction engineers, and 150 signalers. Over time, Canada-UN negotiations produced a formal UN request in October 1988 for two Field Maintenance Area groups (300 personnel), engineers, and a 35-pers headquarters staff. The political problem at this time was that South Africa did not want Canada in UNTAG. On 13 December 1988, the Brazzaville Protocol was signed between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. On 22 December, further agreements were signed in New York. Cabinet then approved a force of up to 600 Canadian personnel to serve with UNTAG for one year.<sup>82</sup> It was clear to Canadian planners that the Government of Canada wanted an “in and out quick” operation, something akin to today’s “first in, first out” philosophy.<sup>83</sup>

By 10 February, the UN finally stabilized its requirements and asked Canada to provide 215 logisticians to establish a logistics base for UNTAG. The Minister of National Defence, Perrin Beatty, approved this change, and operational planning began. Like VAGABOND, Operation MATADOR cobbled together a composite unit called 89 Canadian Logistics Unit (89 CLU). 2 Service Battalion from the Special Service Force provided the bulk of the personnel, with Militia and other

augmentation.<sup>84</sup> This time, SSF was ready and applied all the lessons learned from Operation VAGABOND.

In Ottawa, however, the special staff set up to handle the Canadian UNTAG commitment ran into problems similar to those encountered with Operation VAGABOND. The main problem, though, was the UN in New York. Canadian planners were seriously hampered by the lack of a UN concept of operations “despite the fact that UNTAG had been “planned” for ten years.” Canada had to put together a logistic unit for a force of undetermined size operating without an operational plan.<sup>85</sup> The situation was aggravated by the fact that the UN requested and received two Canadian C-130s for in-theatre support missions. This necessitated deployment of a small air control element. There appears to have been no joint Canadian contingent headquarters for Operation MATADOR. No one thought the different Canadian organizations might have to work together.

Other deficiencies included the fact that there was no definitive mission statement, no estimate of the problems that could be encountered or how they would be dealt with, and, as before, there were no maps. The special staff was hamstrung, which forced SSF HQ to make assumptions about equipment, lift, and operating conditions for the contingent. These ad hoc solutions were made to work, but not without a great deal of aggravation.<sup>86</sup> The initial plan for Operation MATADOR was an air movement of personnel and a sea movement of vehicles and equipment via commercial carrier. In the middle of the deployment, fighting broke out and delayed portions of the deployment. Eventually, 89 CLU arrived and was in operation by 12 April 1989.

The different nature of this UN operation was also evident to some Canadian planners. Unlike traditional “thin blue line” peacekeeping, this mission was the shape of things to come in the 1990s:

UNTAG was a transition to independence, a decolonization mission that involved large military, police and civilian components. Traditional peacekeeping tasks overlapped with the supervision of elections and the involvement in security issues. Probably because UNTAG was not a classical peacekeeping mission, its structure lacked coordination and leadership. Because of this the [UNTAG organization]...was illogical.<sup>87</sup>

***Canada was entering a new era, one in which a more sophisticated approach..was required***

The lesson here was not only that Canada had to re-organize its command and control elements in Ottawa: Canada was entering a new era, one in which a more sophisticated approach to Third World intervention was required. Operations BANDIT and VAGABOND were not isolated occurrences that could be handled by ad hoc means. Operation MATADOR should have been a warning, but the lack of participation by Canadian combat forces ensured that the lessons learned and analysis were dismissed as just another ad hoc service support UN job in a nasty, far away country.

**FROM THE LITTLE/HUNTER STUDY TO OKA: 1989-1990**

Despite the problems encountered on Operations BANDIT, VAGABOND, and MATADOR, these experiences contributed to the creation of the J-Staff in 1990. Impetus was also provided by an NDHQ study called “The Functions and Organization of National Defence Headquarters in Emergencies and War,” better known as the Little/Hunter Study, named after its authors. This study, commissioned by CDS General Paul Manson in April 1988, was

undertaken as part of the 1987 White Paper restructuring. The study reflected Manson's view that the organization of NDHQ “may not be the most appropriate in the event of emergency or war.”<sup>88</sup> The principle authors of the study were Major-General W.E.R. Little and Mr. S.P. Hunter, with Lieutenant-General John De Chastelain as the director.<sup>89</sup>

After a great deal of research, the authors concluded that “there is no indication to indicate that emergencies and war were major considerations” in the development of NDHQ organization since 1968. There were “considerable transition problems” between peace, emergency, and war, which were highlighted by Operations BANDIT and VAGABOND. “A sufficiently detailed crisis management system that provides for a graduated response to crises of varying intensity” was desperately required, as was “more clearly defined arrangements for command and control of combined and joint operations.” There was, in fact, no express policy for what we now call operations other than war (OOTW) or low intensity conflict (LIC). NDHQ barely had the capability to transition from peace to a mid-to-high intensity war in Europe.<sup>90</sup>

The source of these problems lay in the weakness in the relationship between the DCDS group, ADM(Pol), and ADM(Mat). Responsibilities were blurred, authority was not clear, and there were problems in that the “organizational and resource programs caused problems between groups,” a polite way of saying that there was serious bureaucratic competition and infighting in NDHQ between these groups.<sup>91</sup>

The key issue, as identified by the Little/Hunter Study, was the question of the “appropriate balance between central (joint) and environmental staffs within a unified or integrated headquarters?” The authors critically noted “this problem has been identified by every NDHQ organizational study since unification in 1968.” In essential terms, “the current central staff [the DCDS] is inadequate to provide properly coordinated, unified advice...and the

environmental staffs are too parochial,” which also produced inadequate advice. In effect, the DCDS was incapable of handling joint planning. The DCDS could not provide environmental advice to the CDS either. Furthermore, there was a duplication of effort between the DCDS, the environmental staffs, and ADM(Pol).<sup>92</sup>

Hunter, Little, and De Chastelain developed several options. They were, however, constrained by the terms of reference for the study, which told them that the CF was to remain a unified force, that NDHQ remain combined, and that the CDS and Deputy Minister remain as co-equals.<sup>93</sup> The study group struggled to find ways to solve the problems within these unrealistic parameters and came up with four options. The first was to retain the status quo. The second was to maintain a similar organization, but dual task commanders of Mobile Command, Maritime Command, and Air Command as the Chief of Army Operations, Chief of Naval Operations, and Chief of Aerospace Operations so that they could give direct, environmental advice to the CDS. They would each have command functions and advisory functions, which would preserve unification but allow for direct access on operational, logistical, and personnel matters. The DCDS would be expanded to improve the environmental commanders' responsiveness to DCDS's operational requirements.<sup>94</sup> The third option was similar to the second in that the DCDS was strengthened to facilitate operational planning, but the three advisory positions were left out. The final option had all environmental commanders, plus the other commands—Canadian Forces Communications Command, Northern Region Headquarters, and Canadian Forces Europe—reporting directly to the CDS. The doctrine and operations functions residing in the DCDS group would then be split up and placed under the three environmental commands, which would decrease the workload on the DCDS and allow him to focus operational planning.<sup>95</sup>

In analysing the options, the study group used the following criterion: what was the best structure to facilitate the transition from peace to war? The fourth option was best, they reasoned, followed by number three. The second was rejected as a peacetime establishment because “it would give too great an appearance of de-unification.” Essentially, the study group was concerned with muting anything that “could give rise to the perception of de-unification.” In effect, they really wanted to de-unify but could not do it blatantly.<sup>96</sup>

The discussion then swung to the DCDS organization. How was the reorganization recommended by P2/86 doing? Could this be modified to solve the problems? Unfortunately, P2/86 had not been fully implemented. In 1988 conflicts arose between the DCDS group and ADM(Pol) over who should serve on what committees, and this delayed the policy directive's implementation.<sup>97</sup>

Joint Operations remained a serious problem. The study group clarified that there were two command and control procedures if joint operations were required. The first was that the CDS could task the commander of a command to conduct an operation and task other commands to provide support (like Operation VAGABOND). The second was that the CDS could order the formation of a task force and appoint a task force commander. The task force would be formed by the CDS directing the commands to provide the resources necessary for the operation (like Operation BANDIT).<sup>98</sup>

As we have seen, there were problems with both approaches. The Little/Hunter Study noted that the central staff at NDHQ—the Minister, the DM, and ADM(Pol)—might see the operation “as so delicate that political and media sensitivities require the...retention of command and control at the highest levels.” The study group failed to note that, because of the speed and thus impact of the media, this would happen in every case of military involvement in a crisis, no matter how minute that

involvement. Additionally, the environmental command headquarters were not organized to command and control joint operations (though, as we will recall, they had been during unification, particularly Mobile Command). Finally, the study group was concerned that “there may be a tendency for NDHQ staff to involve themselves inappropriately in the *execution* of an operation,” a pervue which should always be left to the commander of the group in the area of operations.<sup>99</sup>

In its conclusions, the Little/Hunter Study suggested that the DCDS needed reorganization and that the role of the environmental commanders should be clarified. ADM(Mat) needed a crisis capability to respond to short-term emergencies. These alterations, they noted, were useless without the adoption of a DND-government crisis management operational concept and the development of joint doctrine to implement it.<sup>100</sup> The basic concept underlying the NDHQ crisis management system is the formalization, within the existing functionally organized, unified and military/civilian integrated NDHQ structure, of a joint staff system that brings together departmental and CF expertise....<sup>101</sup>

In essence, the proposed system was to consist of five graduated responses. As a minor crisis escalated to a major crisis, the existing NDOC and the National Defence Intelligence Centre (NDIC), which were already manned on a 24/7 basis, would become the J3 (Operations) and J2 (Intelligence) respectively. They would then be joined by three group response cells: J1 (Personnel), J4 (Logistics) and J5 (Civil-Military Relations). These would work on a 24/7 basis throughout the crisis. If the crisis expanded, a Crisis Action Team (CAT) would be activated by the J3 to prevent staff overload of the NDOC. Several CATs could be formed if necessary. To prevent staff overload at the VCDS/DCDS level, a Crisis Response Committee could then be formed to handle one or more CATs. The final stage was a Crisis

Management Group, which could be formed by the DM and CDS.<sup>102</sup>

The theoretical basis of what would become the J-Staff was embedded in the Little/Hunter Study and in the incremental developments that had taken place just prior to and after Operation VAGABOND in

1988. This, however, did not mean that the formal generation of the Joint Staff was inevitable, and it would take the dual-headed snake of the 1990 Oka and Gulf War crises to make it so.

*Part II will examine the formalization of the J-Staff in 1990 and the attempts to*

*preserve its unique capability in the years thereafter.*



## ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Dr Sean Maloney received his BA and MA from the University of New Brunswick and his PhD from Temple University in Philadelphia. His military service included duty with the 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) as a troop officer and an appointment as the official historian to 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. His writing and research focuses on Canadian national security policy. Dr Maloney's publications include "War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993" (1997), "Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970" (2002), "Chances for Peace: Canadian Soldiers in the Balkans, 1992-1995" (2002), numerous articles, and the forthcoming book "Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada's Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1951-1968." He currently teaches in the War Studies Department of The Royal Military College of Canada and is a Research Fellow at the Queen's University School for Policy Studies. Dr Maloney is also the Academic Advisor to "The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin" and regularly contributes articles and commentaries.

## ENDNOTES

1. Gunter E. Rothenberg, *The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 210.
2. Access to Information (ATI), DND, (11 Jan 93) Briefing Note: "Future Contingency Operations: Force Planning and Development for Contingency Operations."
3. Note that attempts to move Canadian defence policy away from NATO really were initiated by the Trudeau Government in 1968. The objectives of that attempt were not to shift Canadian military focus from NATO to global operations, however. The objective was to effect economic savings coupled with the perceived need to focus on internal security and sovereignty operations after the FLQ Crisis of 1970.
4. National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994). See 3-7, 12-15.
5. David C. Jones, "Past Organizational Problems," *Joint Forces Quarterly* Autumn 1996, pp. 23-28.
6. Ibid.
7. See Sean Maloney, "'Global Mobile': Flexible Response, Peacekeeping and the Origins of Forces Mobile Command, 1958-1964," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* 3,3 (Fall 2000), pp. 20-34, and "'Global Mobile II': The Development of Forces Mobile Command, 1965-1972," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* 4,2 (Summer 2001), pp. 7-23.
8. Email interview with Peter Haydon, 28 August 1998.
9. Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), 80/225, letter dated

- 31 March 1980, CDS to MND, "Final Report-Task Force on Unification."
10. DHH, 81/747, "Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces: Final Report 15 March 1980."
11. Ibid.
12. DHH, 91/91, "Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces, 31 August 1980."
13. Ibid.
14. ATI, DND, (6 Jul 81) memo EA/CDS to EA/DCDS, "Command and Control of the CF-NDHQ Policy Directive"; Draft NDHQ Policy Directive /81, "Command and Control of the Canadian Forces."
15. Interview with BGen (Ret'd) Ian Douglas, 11 September 1998.
16. ATI, DND, (21 Aug 81) memo to D NDHQ Sec, "Command and Control of the CF-NDHQ Policy Directive"; (7 Oct 81) ADM(Pol) to D NDHQ Sec, "ADM(Pol) Comments on Draft NDHQ Policy Directive on Command and Control in the CF"; (7 May 82) memo to D NDHQ Sec, "Command and Control of the CF-NDHQ Policy Directive"; (28 May 82) memo to distribution list, "Command and Control of the CF-NDHQ Policy Directive."
17. ATI, DND, (5 Apr 83) NDHQ Policy Directive P1/83, "Command and Control of the Canadian Forces."
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), pp. 245-252.
21. DHH, General Theriault, interview transcript 17 December 1992.
22. The Loomis Study, pp. 167-178.
23. Ibid., p. 83.
24. ATI, Privy Council Office, (28 Oct 68) memo to Cabinet, "Canadian Military Contribution to NATO Europe."
25. Sean Maloney, *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993* (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997), pp. 277-278.
26. "Exercise RUNNING JUMP II," *The Connecting File* 1971 edition, p. 89; Rock Michon, "For a While...Gagetown Meant Northern Europe," *Sentinel* January 1972, pp. 13-18.
27. ATI, DND, (30 Mar 87) memo to distribution list (dl), "Exercise BRAVE LION Post Exercise Report (PXR)."
28. Interview with BGen (Ret'd) Ian Douglas, 11 September 1998.
29. ATI, DND, (13 Feb 87) "Director General Military Review (Trial) 1/86 Report Exercise BRAVE LION: Part II Analysis of Potential Issues for Detailed Review."
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. ATI, DND, (Feb 1984) memo to CDS, "CAST 86: Request for Formal Approval."
33. Email interview with Peter Haydon, 28 August 1998; ATI, (13 Feb 87) "Director General Military Review (Trial) 1/86 Report Exercise BRAVE LION: Part II Analysis of Potential Issues for Detailed Review."
34. ATI, DND, (13 Feb 87) "Director General Military Review (Trial) 1/86 Report Exercise BRAVE LION: Part II Analysis of Potential Issues for Detailed Review."
35. ATI, DND, (4 Nov 86) memo to Director General Military Review (DGMR), "Ex BRAVE LION-DGMR Report."
36. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, pp. 245-252.

37. ATI, DND, (24 Oct 86) NDHQ Policy Directive P2/86, "The Operation and Organization of National Defence Headquarters."
38. Letter Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) to Maloney, 25 February 1998.
39. This section is in part drawn directly from another study, "Maple Leaf Over the Caribbean: Gunboat Diplomacy Canadian-Style," a conference paper given by the author in Halifax, June 1998 and subsequently published in a compilation entitled *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, edited by Ann Griffith, Richard Gimblett, and Peter Haydon (Halifax, NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2000).
40. ATI, DND, (18 Dec 87) "Potential Evacuation of Canadian Citizens from Haiti: Codename Op BANDIT"; ATI DND, (15 Jul 88) "Operation BANDIT After Action Report."
41. ATI, DND, (18 Dec 87) "Potential Evacuation of Canadian Citizens from Haiti: Codename Op BANDIT."
42. ATI, Department of External Affairs (DEA), (4 Jan 88) memo from Michael Bell for The Minister for External Affairs, "Haiti."
43. Ibid.
44. ATI, DEA, (n/d) Memorandum for the Prime Minister, "Haiti: Options for Canadian Policy."
45. ATI, DEA, (4 Jan 88) memo from Michael Bell for The Minister for External Affairs, "Haiti."
46. Joe C.W. Armstrong, *Farewell the Peaceful Kingdom* (Toronto: Stoddart Books, 1995), Ch. 13.
47. ATI, DND, (4 Jan 88) "National Defence Logistics Coordination Centre SITREP Operation BANDIT as of 0600 hrs 04 Jan 88."
48. ATI, DND, (4 Jan 88) Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence, "Operation BANDIT Update."
49. ATI, DND, (18 Dec 87) Aide-memoir for the MND, "Op BANDIT."
50. ATI, DND, (21 Dec 87) message NDHQ to MARCOM HQ, "Op BANDIT SITREP."
51. ATI, DND, (30 Dec 87) message NDHQ to all commands, "Op BANDIT WNGO."
52. ATI, DND, (4 Jan 88) Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence, "Operation BANDIT Update."
53. ATI, DND, (5 Jan 88) National Defence Logistics Coordination Centre SITREP Operation BANDIT as of 0600 hrs 05 Jan 88.
54. ATI, DND, (10 Feb 88) memo to DCDS, "Short/No-Notice Exercises: Media Reaction to DND Activities."
55. ATI, DND, National Defence Logistics Coordination Centre SITREP Operation BANDIT as of 0600 hrs 08 Jan 88.
56. ATI, DND, message NDHQ to MARCOM HQ, Op BANDIT SITREP 9 Jan 88.
57. ATI, DND, (11 Jan 88) National Defence Logistics Coordination Centre SITREP Operation BANDIT as of 0600 hrs 11 Jan 88.
58. ATI, DND, (19 Jan 88) message NDHQ to distribution list, "Op BANDIT: The need for flexibility in contingency planning."
59. ATI, DND, message CDS to CTF 300.
60. ATI, DND, National Defence Logistics Coordination Centre SITREP Operation BANDIT as of 0600 hrs 19 Jan 88.
61. ATI, DND, (18 Mar 88) memo Director Transportation Resources and Plans (DTRP) to Director Military Operations Coordination (DMOC), "Op BANDIT After Action Report"; (3 Mar 88) memo to DMOC, "Op BANDIT Lessons Learned."
62. ATI, DND, (15 Jul 88) DCDS to dl, "Operation BANDIT After-Action Report."
63. ATI, DND, (18 Mar 88) memo to Director General Military Plans and Operations (DGMPO), "Op BANDIT-After Action Report Communications and Electronics"; (1 Jun 90) memo to Director Maritime Operations Plans and Reserves (DMOPR) 2, "Op BANDIT After Action Request Update."
64. ATI, DND, (28 Sep 88) memo VCDS to dl, "Operation BANDIT After Action Report."
65. Ibid.
66. ATI, DND, (15 Jul 88) DCDS to dl, "Operation BANDIT After-Action Report."
67. Brian Smith, "United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observation Group," in William Durch's, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 236-257.
68. "Persian Gulf Deployment," *Sentinel*, 1988/6, p. 21.
69. Confidential interview.
70. Interview with BGen (Ret'd) Ian Douglas, 11 September 1998.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. ATI DND, (24 Nov 88) Special Service Force (SSF) HQ, "Operation VAGABOND After Action Report."
75. Ibid.
76. ATI DND, (28 Nov 88) A/DGMPO to DCDS "Operation VAGABOND Lessons Learned."
77. Note that this term was in use from the 1960s to the 1980s and that it is very similar to the 1990s American term "operations other than war."
78. ATI DND, HQDP 900, "NDOC Augmentation: Operations Short of War or National Crises."
79. Confidential interviews.
80. Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Transitional Assistance Group Namibia," in William Durch's *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 353-376.
81. ATI, DND, (24 Feb 89) memo to MND, "CF Participation in United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia,"; (4 Jun 90) "UNTAG Evaluation: DND Participation."
82. Ibid.
83. ATI, DND, (4 Jun 90) "UNTAG Evaluation: DND Participation."
84. ATI, DND, (15 Mar 89) "Peacekeeping Support-Namibia."
85. ATI, DND, (4 Jun 90) "UNTAG Evaluation: DND Participation."
86. Douglas interview; confidential interviews.
87. ATI, DND, (4 Jun 90) "UNTAG Evaluation: DND Participation."
88. ATI, DND, (February 1989) Final Report, "NDHQ Study Directive S1/88: The Functions and Organization of National Defence Headquarters in Emergencies and War." [hereafter referred to as the Little/Hunter Study]
89. ATI, DND, (18 Apr 88) memo NDHQ Secretariat to dl, "NDHQ Study Directive S1/88: The Functions and Organization of National Defence Headquarters in Emergencies and War."
90. Little/Hunter Study, pp. ii, 4-4, 4-8.
91. Ibid., pp. 4-1, 5-1.
92. Ibid., pp. 5-1 to 5-3.
93. Ibid., p. 1-2.
94. Ibid., pp. 5-13 to 5-16.
95. Ibid., p. 5-17.
96. Ibid., pp. 5-26 to 5-27.
97. Ibid., pp. 6-1 to 6-3.
98. Ibid., p. 6.8.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid., p. 7-1.
101. See Annex U to NDHQ Study S1/88 Final Report, "Outline Concept for an NDHQ Crisis Management System."
102. Ibid.