

# “Global Mobile”: Flexible Response, Peacekeeping and the Origins of Forces Mobile Command, 1958-1964

by Sean M. Maloney, PhD

Although peace-keeping is a fundamentally different occupation to the countering of subversion, there is a surprising similarity in the outward forms of many of the techniques involved. . . . It is also important that those involved in countering subversion should realize that they are involved in this activity and not peace-keeping. It is not difficult to become confused in this respect.

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*Low Intensity Operations*<sup>1</sup>

*This is the first part of a two-part series dealing with the origins and early history of Mobile Command. The second part, entitled “‘Global Mobile’ II: The Development of Forces Mobile Command, 1965-1970,” will appear in a future issue of the Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin.*

## INTRODUCTION

**C**anadian operations in Egypt and in the Congo in the late 1950s and early 1960s highlighted serious deficiencies in Canada’s approach to United Nations peace operations: Canada’s military forces were not structured, trained, or equipped to carry out protracted peace operations in the UN context. It was all very well for a government to develop peace operations policy; it was something quite different to be able to implement it both quickly and effectively.

Peace observation missions were conducted by individual Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen seconded to those bodies responsible for the operations. They carried their own personal kit and were integrated into international teams living off the economy of the regions in which they were



**Lieutenant-General “Fin” Clark, Chief of the General Staff, 1958 to 1961. Clark became the youngest major-general ever in the Canadian Army when he was promoted to that rank in 1949 at age 40. Clark oversaw the development of the “Standby Force”. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)**

deployed. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was the first example of formed Canadian units deploying on UN missions, but those units were ad hoc composite ones squeezed out of the Canadian Army and RCAF’s existing force structure. The question was, could or should Canada multi-task its armed forces to handle both NATO hot war and peripheral area Cold War tasks?

NATO military and political leaders were attempting to understand the role of low intensity conflict within the NATO Area itself and such a conflict’s relationship to conventional and nuclear war. The focal point was now

the crisis over the city of Berlin, which had implications for NATO activities on the peripheries. “Flank O’ Mania” surged onto the scene, a trend which influenced Canada’s attempts to create a military force structure that could conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. Problems in force structure and application from 1960 to 1963 laid the groundwork for more radical peace-keeping concepts implemented by the Pearson government after 1963 and further blurred the distinction between NATO and UN interests in the Canadian context.

## PROTO-FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, BRUSHFIRE WARS AND PEACEKEEPING: 1958-1962

**T**he adoption of the Canadian UN Standby Battalion concept in 1958 appears to be the first concrete step taken by the armed services towards accepting that a permanent peace operations capability would exist as part of Canada’s force structure. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld had, throughout early 1957 and in the wake of the Suez Crisis, “steadily developed the idea of an active role for the United Nations through practical demonstrations of what the organization could do.” In particular, Hammarskjöld was drawn to the idea of using the UN proactively as a preventative diplomatic tool, to cut international crises off at the pass and, if necessary, deploying existing “standby” peacekeeping forces to stamp out the brushfires. In the Secretary General’s view, the best nations to carry this out were “middle powers”—Ireland, Norway, Tunisia, The Netherlands and Canada—coupled with “Great Power” support. It was essentially a refined and more systematic approach than that which had started back in the late 1940s.<sup>2</sup> These ideas were known within

the UN community and were known to Canadian national security policymakers in 1957.<sup>3</sup>

The Diefenbaker government's response was to take a December 1956 External Affairs study on establishing a permanent on-call multi-national UN Emergency Force and make it policy. The Government announced in early 1958 that a Canadian UN Standby Force had been formed. It would take the Canadian Army another three years to actually work out how such a force would deploy and actually carry out its ambiguous task, something left rather vague. It was not clear whether an entire brigade or a battalion group should be dedicated to the UN. The fact that the Canadian Army was already fully committed to its NATO and home defence tasks was not taken into account. What really mattered to the Diefenbaker government was the announcement of the establishment of the force. The details or its *modus operandi* were of secondary importance.<sup>4</sup>

Throughout 1959, the Army sorted out how it would meet the government-directed UN Standby Force commitment. Lieutenant General "Fin" Clark, the Chief of the General Staff, was operating in a vacuum. Even General Charles Foulkes, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, could not get more explicit political guidance on the size of the commitment or what it was supposed to be able to do. This despite the fact that Minister of National Defence George Pearkes told the Air Staff that Canada would be called on more and more to contribute to "peace preserving teams to prevent the outbreak of war in many parts of the world."<sup>5</sup> Therefore, the original idea that Canada's UN Standby Force would be a light infantry brigade with a reconnaissance squadron was discarded. Consequently, Army planners developed a number of assumptions: the Standby Force would be an infantry battalion or company; it was to be air transported by the RCAF and its role was to "carry out police-type duties" in a UNEF context; its training would consist of normal infantry training; the unit was to be kept at 90% strength and be deployable in seven days.<sup>6</sup>

Previous crisis responses, including Operation RAPID STEP (the deployment of UNEF to Suez) in 1956, were all ad hoc affairs. There was no peace operations doctrine. From 1958 forward, a great deal of effort would be spent by the Armed Forces on formalizing the new capability. This effort, however, did not occur in a Canadian vacuum. It was part and parcel of larger trends in NATO circles relating to revolutionary warfare.

Military theorists of the day recognized that Communist-inspired revolutionary warfare existed long before the Cold War started in 1946, but the term came into its own throughout the 1950s as the French and British armies fought their de-colonization campaigns. Like the term "peacekeeping," the West's response to revolutionary warfare had a myriad of terms that helped obfuscate doctrinal matters. "Counter-revolutionary warfare," "counter-insurgency" and "low intensity warfare" are some of those terms.

Revolutionary warfare, in essence, included some or all of the following activities: political subversion, black propaganda and white propaganda, the supplying of arms and training by proxy, political assassination, sabotage, ambushes and small sub-unit activity. In short, revolutionary warfare consisted of any combination of methods, perhaps in conjunction with traditional military engagements between formed bodies of identifiable soldiers directed towards achieving political objectives. The process by which Western armies identified and responded to this type of warfare was an arduous one and was in progress throughout the 1950s.<sup>7</sup>

Looking back, we can categorize Cold War conflict in the Third World in a number of ways. There were the long-term insurgencies in larger colonies like Algeria (1954-62). There were conflicts of smaller scale and shorter duration like Kenya (1952-55). There were crisis flashpoints like Suez (1956) and Lebanon (1958). Some had direct Communist support; others did not. At the time, however, such fine distinctions had not been made because Western theorists lacked the vocabulary and means to categorize them. They were



**Lieutenant-General G. Walsh, Chief of the General Staff, 1961 to 1964, expressed concern regarding the impact of UN commitments on the Army. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)**

all lumped together and placed within the Cold War strategic framework.

NATO debated and accepted that revolutionary warfare techniques might in fact be applied against the NATO Area as well as the Third World: NATO strategic concept MC 14/2 (revised) recognized this in 1957. Thus, when the Berlin Crisis started in 1958-59, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Lauris Norstad had some agreed-to strategic basis from which to formulate a response to low-level Soviet military and political activity. This related to the larger problems of linking Western nuclear response to Soviet activity either inside or outside the NATO Area. NATO's strategy was ambiguous and deliberately so. The problem was, would or should NATO use nuclear weapons in response to a border incident involving Warsaw Pact and NATO forces? If the Soviets blockaded Berlin? If Soviet naval forces interfered with Norwegian sovereignty? If

Syrian forces crossed the Turkish border near Iskendrun? Employing a small conventional NATO force to contain such a situation was conceptually similar to the employment of UNEF at Suez, though the specifics of the method differed.<sup>8</sup>

***“The problem was that there was a lack of strategic lift to get it there in a timely fashion and it was very expensive ...”***

To forestall the necessity of selecting armageddon as the only response, Norstad formed a special contingency planning group called LIVE OAK in 1959. It was not a NATO organization: it was a tripartite French-British-American body strictly designed to deal with low level Soviet military activity related to Berlin. It used forces committed to NATO in West Germany by those three powers and was capable of providing a conventional Western military response from platoon to brigade in size. LIVE OAK allowed the West a flexible, graduated response and crisis management tool for situations in and around Berlin.<sup>9</sup>

Norstad initially wanted to reorganize the Canadian Army NATO commitment, 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, as an air-portable and air-mobile light infantry formation to handle what were referred to as “fire brigade tasks” throughout the Allied Command Europe area. He wanted a force that could “strengthen his deterrent power in the event of a border incident” since only a single nation force which “was not suspect by the Warsaw Pact peoples” could do the job. Conceptually, such a force would deploy to a border area to demonstrate NATO will and prevent escalation to nuclear weapons use over a minor incident involving the Warsaw Pact. This plan was not implemented for a variety of political reasons relating to French and British intransigence over NATO strategy.<sup>10</sup>

The principle of Forward Defence of the NATO Area took concrete form. This meant the Central Region was no longer viewed in isolation from the Northern Flank (Norway, Denmark) and the Southern Flank (Mediterranean). The Soviets might employ a diplomatic offensive combined with threatening gestures (exercises) and political subversion in attempts to isolate and wear down the political will of flank countries to resist. Norstad again looked to the Canadian NATO forces to provide a brigade-sized air-portable force that could rapidly deploy to the flanks when a crisis started to escalate in order to signal the Warsaw Pact or the United Arab Republic that NATO meant business. This force was supposed to be capable of dealing with low-level military activity as well as functioning as a deterrent manoeuvre. The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force concept would become a reality in 1964, though it was multi-national in composition and not strictly Canadian.<sup>11</sup>

LIVE OAK and ACE Mobile Force demonstrate that NATO was seriously engaged in examining military crisis management options that overlapped with peace operations and counter-insurgency. The fact that Canada was frequently and actively consulted on such activity and its similarity to the planning underway for Canada’s UN Standby force was critical in the development of Canadian conceptualization for low intensity operations.

This development accelerated when Douglas Harkness replaced George Pearkes as Minister of National Defence in 1960. That same year, General Charles Foulkes handed over the reins of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to Air Vice Marshal Frank Miller. A whirlwind series of Senate hearings in 1960 on defence expenditures forced the Diefenbaker government to articulate some of its more ambiguous defence policies. The Privy Council Office consulted with External Affairs and produced an analysis they called “The Defence Problem.” Though the bulk of the study dealt with NATO, disarmament and nuclear weapons, it also suggested that “limited wars may well occur around the peripheries of the Soviet and Western Blocs. . . . the provision of suitable standby forces in

Canada for such wars should be one of the objectives of Canadian policy.” The study went so far as to suggest that:

Indeed it may be that practically all branches of the Canadian forces may make their greatest contribution to the defence of the West and Canada if they concentrate on preparation for limited wars . . . . our forces should be trained and equipped to protect themselves against the effects of [nuclear weapons] for fear that limited wars in which they are engaged should spread and the great powers, using nuclear weapons, should intervene.<sup>12</sup>

The study argued that intervention forces, some of which might be naval forces, would eventually be needed in the Caribbean, Gaza Strip, and “elsewhere in the Middle East.” There was acknowledged overlap between peace operations and counter-insurgency since “the conventional forces needed as a standby in Canada for duties in limited wars should also be capable of performing police or inspection duties as non-combatants.”<sup>13</sup> The anti-nuclear components of the study suggest strong External Affairs influence, a perspective which was not accepted by those in National Defence or the armed services. Nevertheless, Air Marshal Frank Miller passed it on to Douglas Harkness as a background paper. The limited war themes resonated in ongoing National Defence examinations of having a rapidly deployable force.

Canada’s rapid deployment force development was, however, driven less by post-Operation MALLARD (Canadian participation in the UN counter-insurgency and nation building operations in the Congo) analysis than by the Diefenbaker government’s prodding. The unwillingness of the Diefenbaker government to deploy the existing UN Standby Force infantry battalion to the Congo because Diefenbaker feared the effects of potentially placing white Canadians in the position of fighting and killing black Africans<sup>14</sup> forced the Army to re-assess the standby force concept. In 1960, the Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant-General “Fin” Clark directed that a second standby force concept be

examined, one which would consist of administrative and signal troops as opposed to combat arms.

In the course of this study, several important factors became clear. First, “the nature and extent of any United Nations request for Canadian contribution cannot be anticipated in detail.” Second, the Canadian Army’s priority was NATO, followed by national survival operations and the defence of North America. There were simply not enough troops to cover all of the commitments and create a separate UN standby force. An existing unit would have to be “dual hatted” in the role. The problem of strategic lift was not examined in detail.<sup>15</sup>

An entirely separate study was needed to determine exactly what the force was to do. In general terms, the first time the Army actually defined peacekeeping operations was when the Director General for Planning and Operations commissioned an operational research study in 1961. The terms of reference generated by Army HQ indicated that the following missions were likely for “the Canadian Army in the UN Police Role”:

- supervisory organizations—the supervision of truce or other agreements;
- border-watching—the separation of forces and the identification of transgressors;
- occupation—the positioning of a force in a country to fill a political vacuum during an interregnum; the conduct of a plebiscite as was done in the Saar in 1936 by the League of Nations;
- suppression of a para-military force—an example of, and a precedent for, this type of task is the employment of Commonwealth forces in the independent state of Malaya; and
- limited war.<sup>16</sup>

Clearly peacekeeping meant more to the Canadian Army than just interpositional operations. Other supporting



**Gazing into the future. Vice Admiral Rayner (Chief of the Naval Staff 1960 to 1964), Deputy Minister Elgin Strong, the Honourable Paul Hellyer (Minister of National Defence 1963 to 1967) and Rear-Admiral Brock (Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast) in Halifax, 1964. All had something to say about the future of warfare and force structure. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)**

studies amplified the idea that peacekeeping was not just Kashmir or Suez: “maintaining internal order” also appeared alongside “policing a demarcation line.”<sup>17</sup>

The Strategic Studies Group (SSG) was commissioned by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to study UN military operations in March 1961. In its report, the SSG noted that “The term ‘UN Police Force’ has been applied indiscriminately to all three types of forces”: observer commissions, UNEFs in Egypt and the Congo, and those forces operating in the Korean War. This tended to blur the political objectives of each mission. Observer missions and the Suez operation were more straight forward than the UN operation in the Congo (*Operation des Nations Unies au Congo* or ONUC). The SSG argued that “the UN has acquired many of the responsibilities of a colonial power” since UN forces were involved in economic matters “in the face of the inability of the Congo government to do [so],”<sup>18</sup> while at the same time it could not replace the Congolese government.

The Congo would be the model for a new type of UN peacekeeping operation:

There is a potential role for further UNEFs elsewhere in Africa, Berlin, Formosa, and in other disputed areas. It is probable, however, that a UNEF can only be deployed if there is at least tacit agreement between the two superpowers to neutralize the area concerned. The role of the UNEFs is therefore influenced by the realities of power politics.<sup>19</sup>

The SSG staff was quite cognizant of how future situations would evolve in the context of the Cold War:

Despite the efforts of the UN, it seems likely that limited warfare will continue to occur in a variety of forms, including civil war aided and abetted by unofficially sponsored volunteers and military supplies from outside countries, boundary incidents and outright aggression. Countries initiating future international incidents are likely to so endeavour to arrange matters that the UN cannot readily become militarily involved . . . they can draw from past UN experience and avoid the mistakes of their predecessors. Thus each future UN incident may be expected to be as unique as its perpetrators can make it.<sup>20</sup>

Consequently, maximum flexibility on Canada's part was required, particularly with the type of forces Canada established. They had to be capable of fighting their way out of a situation. They could not be based on a previous model like Suez. Each mission would be unique.<sup>21</sup> The Chiefs of Staff Committee accepted the SSG study as the basis for UN force planning. When the study was distributed to External Affairs, it "caused considerable anguish" because of its brutally realistic approach to the facts of life in the Cold War world. External Affairs personnel like Norman Robertson and Howard Green were, however, in no position to dictate to Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness how National Defence organized and prepared forces to meet the vague but established government policy that Canada have a UN Standby force ready to deploy globally.<sup>22</sup>

By mid-1961, the Joint Planning Committee was brought in to clarify inter-service aspects of where the armed services stood on matters relating to UN military operations. In essence operations like Kashmir, Suez and the Congo would be the norm as opposed to Korean War-like operations. The problem was that earmarking existing Canadian forces for UN operations detracted from the main force structure dedicated to NATO commitments that were paramount to deterring nuclear war. Therefore, dual-tasking existing forces was the only answer barring additional government funds. Notably, "Limited war might occur outside UN auspices and we must retain the capability of taking part..."<sup>23</sup> External Affairs was kept fully informed of military developments in this field, but they rarely commented on them.<sup>24</sup>

The Army's view in 1961, then, was that UN operations were not high on the priority list since "the meeting of



**A less certain view. Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, Chief of the General Staff from 1951 to 1955, argued that Canada develop a tri-service force focussed on peacekeeping. The exact force structure he foresaw was never clearly articulated. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)**

these commitments inevitably detracts from the Army's ability to fulfill its wartime tasks . . . it is not considered feasible to make any reasonably accurate forecast of [additional commitments]." The best that could be done was to earmark forces and hold them at a higher state of readiness.<sup>25</sup> Lieutenant General Geoffrey Walsh, the new CGS, believed that "there is a tendency to underestimate the extent to which the [UN] commitments which this government has undertaken have an impact on the Army."<sup>26</sup>

What of the Royal Canadian Navy? The Chief of the Naval Service Vice-Admiral Herbert Rayner and his staff were no slouches when it came to limited warfare trends. At the time the RCN was

preparing to reorganize the fleet to deal with new trends in warfare. As early as January 1959, the Naval Board incorporated a "General Purpose Destroyer" into future ship acquisition plans. By 1960, the Naval Board recommended that "the RCN must be prepared to assist United Nations police force actions. . . . the RCN must assume it will be required to provide escorts and appropriate logistics support."<sup>27</sup>

A 1961 RCN study group, the Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives, examined the problem of fitting a limited warfare capability into the fleet to support UN operations. The report to the Chief of the Naval Staff, called the Brock Report, acknowledged up front that Canadian participation in UN operations was secondary to NATO and continental defence and thus geared to "stabilize situations that threaten to lead to wider conflict." It also recognized that Canadian troops assigned to these duties have been given virtually no special training: "Guerrilla warfare, equipment and inter-service training which would enable our services to so-operate effectively in other than a European-type war have played very little part in high level Canadian defence planning."<sup>28</sup>

The Brock Report identified a spectrum of conflict that included no-warning nuclear attack and unlimited war as a result of escalation. Another type was limited war or "a number of situations involving national forces from one or more countries in the immediate area of the origin of hostilities." The next type was "sporadic hostilities in trouble spots," particularly Asia, Latin America and Africa where the methods were "internal disorder, subversion or infiltration and involving intervention forces from outside countries for stabilizing the situation."<sup>29</sup>

As with Army thinking, there was overlap between peace operations and counter-insurgency. For economic purposes, Canada's force structure had to accommodate all contingencies with the same force structure for "limited war and 'brush fire' situations." Speed was of the essence, the study group argued, and Canada had to "posses highly mobile and flexible and versatile forces trained to prevent disorder rather than to inflame passions by the application of more force than is needed. The best police forces are equipped with motor cars and side arms, rather than tanks and mortars."<sup>30</sup>

As for a naval force structure:

for limited war, intervention or policing action, the basic maritime requirement is for general purpose, versatile forces which can cooperate with the other services. . . . a capability is needed for escorting and transporting army units to almost any area in the world where trouble might develop and support them.<sup>31</sup>

The primary platform for such activity as envisioned by the Navy in 1961 was the General Purpose Frigate (GPF). The eight planned GPFs would be structured for brushfire wars but had the additional capability to conduct anti-submarine operations. The GPF was to carry a helicopter, an anti-aircraft missile system and a gun capable of supporting landing operations. Each GPF was also to have the capability to carry 200 troops and land them by landing craft and/or helicopter.<sup>32</sup>

The Royal Canadian Air Force leadership kept abreast of Army and Navy efforts. Like the Navy, there had been high-level musings throughout 1959 by Air Marshal Larry Dunlap and his senior staff. They debated the difference between limited war and policing operations and concluded that there was a difference—UN operations involved "a police force in military uniform, transported by the Air Force . . ."—and that the Air Force "subscribed to the 'police concept'" without further definition.<sup>33</sup>

In 1960, however, the annual high-level Air Force meeting of minds brought Air Commodore Fred Carpenter into the limelight on "brushfire war" issues. Carpenter was head of Air Transport Command and about to become engaged in dealing with the UN on Operation MALLARD in the Congo. He advocated a radical idea: there should be one service instead of three and it should "be a kind of combat police force. This means inaugurating a body to operate in a disarmament inspection role." Canada should have a mobile force afloat with two or three "commando carriers" that would serve "as bases in moving in police forces." Others did not go along with Carpenter's thinking, particularly the Chief of the Air Staff, since the bulk of discussion was directed towards providing air defence forces in North America and nuclear strike forces for NATO in Europe.<sup>34</sup>

***"The main problem for Canada now was where should it put its military resources?"***


By the time the Army and Navy were producing more detailed thinking in 1961, however, there was less discussion in Air Force circles on brushfire wars. Carpenter admonished his boss for not doing enough to support the UN. Air Vice Marshal Campbell took issue with this: "We are quite willing to do things willingly vis-a-vis the Congo. As you remember originally the Government was very keen to get in there with all four feet. Well, the attitude of the coloured man to the white man quickly changed that. The treatment meted out to some of the troops makes the government wonder whether white troops should be in there."<sup>35</sup>

International events accelerated the armed forces' interest in rapid deployment forces. The most important was the Berlin Crisis round in August-September 1961. Canada planned to send 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group from Canada to reinforce 4 Brigade in West Germany as part of NATO's deterrent manoeuvre at the height of the crisis. The problem was

that there was a lack of strategic lift to get it there in a timely fashion and it was very expensive besides. Similar problems affected American and British forces, which prompted changes to their force structures.<sup>36</sup> How could the two NATO reinforcement brigades in Canada be configured for more rapid deployment?

Canadian aspirations in the development of a rapid reaction UN standby capability should, therefore, be put in the context of Allied developments. British thinking on the use of a strategically air portable reserve dated back to 1953 when proposals were made to develop a rapid reinforcement capability for operations East of Suez. By 1957, the Royal Navy deployed one of four available aircraft carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean to back up a strategic air deployment. The 1958 Lebanese Crisis and the 1961 Kuwait Crisis highlighted the need for more systematic planning. By 1961, the British Army Central Strategic Reserve was reorganized into the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division (two brigades) and the 16<sup>th</sup> Independent Parachute Brigade. 38 Group RAF consisting of two ground attack squadrons, two helicopter squadrons and a variety of strategic transports worked closely with the Central Strategic Reserve. Missions for the force tended to reside on the lower intensity band of the spectrum of conflict in existing and former British colonies East of Suez and in Africa.<sup>37</sup>

The United States formed a joint organization called Strike Command (STRICOM) in January 1962. STRICOM consisted of the US Army Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and the USAF's Tactical Air Command (40 squadrons). STRAC was largely air deployable and had two airborne divisions and two infantry divisions. A 250 man company was on one hours notice to move, followed by an 1800 man battle group at four hours notice to move. The motives underlying STRICOM's creation related to problems with rapidly mobilizing and reinforcing NATO Europe during the 1961 round of the Berlin Crisis as much as developing a global limited war capability, though the Kennedy Administration strongly and



**The problems of defending Canada and meeting other commitments affected force structure. Here soldiers of the Mobile Striking Force (1948 to 1955), an air transportable formation, board a C-119 Flying Boxcar. Heavy RCAF involvement was crucial for the concept to succeed. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)**

publicly advocated the development of such a capability.<sup>38</sup>

The Canadian Army's post-Berlin assessment concluded that a rapid deployment capability would contribute to reinforcing Europe more efficiently and the matter of a UN Standby force could be solved simultaneously. In early 1962, the Army looked at establishing 3 Brigade as a dual-tasked NATO reinforcement and UN Standby brigade group.<sup>39</sup> One battalion in 3 Brigade was the designated UN Standby Battalion Group; it was placed on seven days notice to move. The battalion's training tasks were defined as "supervising UN-sponsored political and military arrangements; to maintain order; and to create a situation in which it can not be defied without creating an overt incident."<sup>40</sup> This last role was inserted to cover the projected NATO ACE Mobile Force requirements that SACEUR was currently working on.

Then the Joint Planning Committee got involved since strategic lift and sustainment was a joint task with the other services. The Navy and Air Force identified the areas in which they thought they could provide such support without seriously affecting Canada's priority NATO commitments. Matters did not proceed much beyond this brief identification and no in-depth joint planning was conducted at this time.<sup>41</sup>

This did not prevent the Army from fine-tuning its views on UN operations. In his five-year program initiated in 1962, General Walsh stated that "UN military intervention, as a result of Communist influence or infiltration, could be expected in the under-developed nations. Additionally the UN may be asked to intervene militarily should clashes develop between Western and Communist-supported nations." Once again, the Canadian conceptual link between intervention and UN "police actions" was maintained.<sup>42</sup>

#### THE WHITE PAPER PROCESS AND MOBILE FORCE PLANNING: 1963

Newly-elected Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson promised the Canadian people a defence review, and Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer set out almost immediately to do so. The product was the 1964 White Paper on Defence, which was released in March 1964. The process by which this white paper was formulated, however, provides significant insight into the continuing Canadian conceptual overlap between counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations and the means by which such operations were to be carried out. Essentially, Hellyer held open hearings in the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence (SCOD). At the same time, Hellyer formed the closed Ad Hoc Committee on Defence consisting of

military and civilian analytical personnel from the three services. In addition to these forums, several tri-service committees were struck to examine specific military problems. All of these inputs flowed back to Hellyer and the White Paper was derived from this data by the Minister himself.

SCOD, held in June 1963, was designed to allow a variety of views to be aired and trial balloons launched. It was essentially a politically antagonistic brain-storming session that allowed the Pearson government

to claim it was involved in bi-partisan defence policy formulation, something that was new to the Canadian political process. Many influential ideas developed during the hearings gained saliency during the re-organization of the armed forces.

Hellyer's presentation to SCOD subordinated UN peacekeeping to NATO operations. His view at the time was that "from time to time suggestions have been made that we should turn over part of our armed forces to the UN. To date there has been no inclination on the part of the UN to accept this kind of offer and the maintenance of a standby battalion . . . seems to be the best alternative in these circumstances."<sup>43</sup> In fact, the bulk of discussion on Hellyer's presentation related to nuclear weapons and NATO strategy.

Each service presented its current establishment and deployment. The Navy ignored UN operations in its presentation. The Army explained that UN operations provided the variety that was necessary to offset the boredom of garrison life in Canada. SCOD members also learned that the standby battalion had, in fact, been alerted for service in Lebanon and in the Congo and that the designated unit exercised regularly. In one case, "last month we moved the battalion from Valcartier to Wainwright, and on landing it carried out an exercise to restore law and order."<sup>44</sup> No eye-

brows were raised amongst the SCOD members. The Air Force presentation noted the number of UN airlift operations it had supported, but as with previous presentations, the question and answer period revolved around NATO and nuclear weapons.<sup>45</sup>

SCOD also heard from Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin. Building on his existing foundation, Martin told the committee that:

we have been living under a massive threat from militant communism in circumstances of cold war which robbed the United Nations of its ability to perform its main peace-keeping operations under article 43 of the charter. Clearly our first duty has been to help maintain the peace through collective security arrangements, and this we have done through playing our full part in NATO and NORAD consistent with our resources. It represents our contribution to the deterrent, which has successfully kept a precarious peace. . . .<sup>46</sup>

Martin also noted that:

at the same time and in the same period, there has been an urgent need to improve the international means of dealing with limited wars and regional disputes and otherwise developing the means for a peaceful settlement of potentially dangerous conflicts. Here our support for the United Nations both in its mediation functions and its peacekeeping roles has been the main vehicle for Canadian action.<sup>47</sup>

The main problem for Canada now was where should it put its military resources? Martin believed that there should be more focus on developing means to deal with limited conflict, but did not specifically refer to UN peacekeeping as the mechanism to do so.<sup>48</sup> Again, as before, NATO and nuclear weapons dominated the discussion agenda.

There was one blip, however. A retired Navy Commodore, James Plomer, leveled a series of public accusations

against the Navy leadership. Plomer's attack was comprehensive and he noted that there was a lack of strategic sea-lift. As if to ridicule the status quo, Plomer cited a plan to rent a Canadian Steamship Lines freighter for the sum of one dollar so that Canada's ONUC contingent could deploy.<sup>49</sup> Opposition members in SCOD pursued this, perhaps as a means of embarrassing the government, and implied that the government was not doing enough to support the UN with naval forces. The Chief of the Naval Staff, Herbert Rayner, pointed out that there were no standing UN naval commitments and "Our present ships are adaptable to the peace-keeping or policing operations. If there was going to be more emphasis placed on that role then we would move to a certain type of ship."



**Terror in the Congo. Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Mayer of the Canadian Guards (right) speaks to Congolese troops prior to a Canadian operation to rescue missionaries. Mayer received the George Medal for his efforts. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)**

The priority was, however, hunting Soviet nuclear missile submarines in the North Atlantic.<sup>50</sup>

SCOD also heard from the now-retired Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, former Chief of the General Staff, and General Charles Foulkes, the former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Simonds had definite ideas on the future of the Canadian armed forces, and he was not shy about presenting them:

I believe that a role which is suited to a country of our size and having regard to the financial burdens possible to be borne out over a lengthy term, would be a tri-service force whose main objective was peace-keeping. I believe its organization should be very much like that of the United States Marine Corps, which is a mobile force complete with all its ancillaries and able to meet what are commonly called brushfire situations.<sup>51</sup>

Simonds thought Canada should move away from nuclear commitments in the NATO Central Region and focus on making "a contribution to preventing a situation developing which would lead to thermonuclear exchange."<sup>52</sup> It

is unclear, exactly, as to what Simonds was referring. It appears to have been a hybrid between NATO's ACE Mobile Force and a UN peacekeeping force, something which was rapidly deployable and either capable of fighting a low intensity war to generate a peaceful environment or a force to be inserted after peace had been made through the UN. He did indicate that it should be the size of a division and equipped with strategic air transport.<sup>53</sup>

Charles Foulkes was then grilled on the possibility of a Canadian mobile force for peacekeeping. Foulkes had originally suggested back in 1959 that the brigade group committed to NATO in West Germany should be re-equipped as an air-portable formation capable of nuclear and conventional operations. The committee members, not coming from a military background, were clearly confused and tended to lump all points on the spectrum of conflict short of nuclear war together. They thought Foulkes had been referring to a concept similar to Simonds.<sup>54</sup>

Foulkes chose to address the idea about turning over the entire Canadian armed forces to the UN. The former Chairman noted that Canada had played critical roles in UN peace operations and that the UN should have some permanent standby arrangement with member countries but that turning the Canadian forces into such a force was ridiculous. Foulkes pointed out that even UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld did not think this was feasible since each emergency situation demanded a different type of response:

To suggest that Canada should put all of its forces at the disposal of the United Nations is not a sound proposition. . . . it should be constant Canadian policy to make our armed forces available for United Nations service as required. This does not mean, however, that Canada or any other country is expected to turn over its forces to the direction of a non-existent United Nations command to be used in accordance with the will of any fleeting majority in the Security Council or assembly.<sup>55</sup>

Eventually, SCOD called back Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Walsh, the Chief of the General Staff, for more extensive discussions about strategic lift for a mobile force. Walsh had to explain in great detail that there was one brigade group deployed in West Germany and two more in Canada dedicated to NATO as a strategic reserve force. There was an additional brigade group for operations in North America. There was not enough shipping to move the two Canada-based brigades with



**Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, The Black Watch of Canada (Royal Highland Regiment) boarding HMCS Algonquin for an amphibious exercise in 1959. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)**

their tanks, vehicles, ammunition and artillery to Europe in an emergency—this had been tested during the 1961 Berlin Crisis but the previous government chose not to do anything about it.<sup>56</sup>

After SCOD wrapped up, Hellyer formed several internal committees to explore the ideas in more detail. One of these was the Mobile Force Committee, which met from August to November 1963. Hellyer instructed the Committee to determine what such a force would look like and how much would it cost. Specifically, he instructed the Committee:

The type of mobile force I have in mind is basically an air transportable fighting unit which could be airlifted with its equipment for quick deployment anywhere in the world. The force should be mechanized and have a high fire power and great flexibility which would make it adaptable to varying circumstances. It should be flexible enough that it could form part of the mobile reserve of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe or serve in a United Nations operation or other circumstances as required to meet national policy. It may be desirable that some units be air droppable, but the principle

criterion is air portability of the entire force.<sup>57</sup>

The Minister thought that the force should be of division size with its own air transport and close air support capability. Thought was to be given to ability to lift the force by sea and land it.

The Joint Planning Committee set about fulfilling the Minister's direction, but there was some confusion. When Hellyer used the term "mobile force," was he referring to NATO's ACE Mobile Force (Land) (AMF[L]), the multinational brigade group of which Canada was not yet a member? If he was, this didn't make sense since AMF(L) was to act as a "show of force" deterrent manoeuvre on NATO's flanks. AMF(L) had special deployment criteria in a crisis situation with the Soviets so that this manoeuvre could be made. How was the Canadian mobile force supposed to interface with this? There was also the question of a force having a high volume of firepower and at the same time being light and air portable. Was that firepower to be nuclear, conventional or both?<sup>58</sup> There was no further direction, and the committee went off on its own to deliberate.

The mobile force committee concluded that such a Canadian force could fulfill defence of Canada and NATO

ACE Mobile Force tasks, but that the UN task was "more difficult as it could range from a UN police-type effort similar to the Congo or UNEF force to the Korean-type conflict."<sup>59</sup> The existing models examined by the committee included the US Marine Corps, the US Army Strike Command, the UK Strategic Reserve force and UNEF I. Essentially, the planners were looking for a division that could morph into whatever role was needed at the time. An early concept was devised where there was a brigade group dedicated to NATO AMF(L) missions, an airborne brigade group and an amphibious brigade group for UN tasks.<sup>60</sup>

There were still many things to be clarified. Air Marshal Miller, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, elaborated where he thought he should. The problem was one of nuclear armament. If the mobile force was going to participate in NATO operations either alongside the AMF(L) or other NATO formations, it had to have a nuclear capability for it to function within NATO's strategic framework. Miller thought that the Canadian mobile force should be nuclear capable and "posses equipment which was nuclear adaptable" like the air-portable Little John nuclear rocket which could be carried by helicopter.<sup>61</sup>

All involved noted the serious obstacles to the creation of such a force. No companion study on strategic air or sea lift had been conducted, so that if the Canadian mobile force were to be created from the existing Army units, it would still be in the same boat as it was during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Secondly, the structure for the planned mobile force was dependent on equipment and technologies that did not exist or were unavailable at that time. Fielding this force would be an expensive proposition. Finally, such a force would be light on the ground in the NATO context. This was unacceptable since the enemy forces were heavily mechanized with tanks, armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery. Such a force might be able to function in a UN context but not in a NATO one, and, there-



fore, it was incapable of meeting the Minister's requirements.<sup>62</sup>

Hellyer finally redefined the committee's terms of reference. Could the West Germany-based heavy mechanized brigade co-exist with the mobile force? This would solve the NATO problem. The mobile force could then come from the three brigade groups based in Canada.<sup>63</sup> A Joint Service Study Group was also formed to look at strategic lift. Their report was quite pessimistic: there was barely enough airlift to move one battalion, let alone nine.<sup>64</sup> Hellyer's demand that the mobile force have its

***“. . . the mobile force planners were never able to reconcile the need for mechanization and the requirement that the force be light and air portable.”***

own close air support capability caused a certain amount of heartache with the Air Force, which was not used to joint operations. In any event, the Air Force members thought that a squadron of F-4C Phantom II should be acquired for recce and interdiction, while two squadrons of A-6 Intruders or A4D Skyhawks could provide close air support to the mobile force. All three aircraft types were dual capable conventional-nuclear delivery platforms.<sup>65</sup>

In their final analysis, the mobile force planners were never able to reconcile the need for mechanization and the requirement that the force be light and air portable. They were frustrated

in their attempts to design a formation with homogeneous brigades. The strategic lift issue was one that needed to be addressed jointly at a higher level. Hellyer's insistence that the formation be capable of instantaneous deployment into an incredibly varied set of scenarios proved too much for the committee to handle, though they were intellectually honest in their approach to the problem.

Hellyer formed the Ad Hoc Committee on Defence Policy, which carried out its deliberations concurrent with the mobile force and other committees. Since the final product of this committee seriously influenced the 1964 White Paper, it is useful to examine its conclusions on the role of the UN and UN peacekeeping in Canadian national security policy.

Led by Dr. R.J. Sutherland of the Defence Research Board, the five-man tri-service committee explored where Canadian defence and foreign policy had been since 1945 and where it was going well into the 1970s. Hellyer's terms of reference for the committee included the development of alternatives to the status quo. The primary focus was on the NATO commitments, whether or not Canada could or should disengage from them, and to what degree was this possible or even desirable.<sup>66</sup> The report concluded that "the purpose of Canadian defence programmes and activities is to support an alliance policy. In terms of Canadian national interests, the rationale of Canadian defence is to maintain influence with our allies. The immediate purpose of Canadian defence is to serve as an effective support of Canada's intra-alliance diplomacy." Therefore, was the UN a more effective agent than NATO, the Commonwealth or the Canada-US relationship in the achievement of these objectives?

Essentially, there were two predominant public views on the future of the UN. Either the UN would become a "functioning world government" or it would cease to exist. If the UN were to


change from the status quo of 1963, it would do so through uncontrolled international forces not through “the proliferation of ingenuous schemes by persons who, being unable to reform the world, believe they can reform the United Nations.” The Security Council was “impotent,” and the probable trend was “more effective Great Power diplomacy pursued independently of the UN.” The UN General Assembly was a “world debating forum which reflects neither the realities of power nor a political consensus.” That said, however, “the UN will continue to serve as the focus of a non-public multilateral diplomacy.”<sup>67</sup>

What about UN peacekeeping? The members thought that interested parties were delving into the minutiae of UN operations to the detriment of more fundamental issues. The three existing control bodies of the UN—the Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretary-General—were in varying degrees incapable of positive sustained action. The possibility of a new controlling body for peace operations existed but “any organ of the UN which does not reflect the realities of power cannot make effective use of force. To ignore this is probably the one sure means of destroying the UN.”<sup>68</sup>

The report also tackled the “UN Army” concept:

It is worth noticing that the enthusiastic support for a permanent UN military force which is felt by certain Western nations such as Canada, the Scandinavian countries and Ireland, is not shared by the great majority of Afro-Asian, including such important nations as India. The reasons are not hard to find. Few Canadians would welcome the idea that the UN should interest itself in the grievances of the North American Indian, the rights of the Sons of Freedom or the Columbia River Treaty. The majority of Afro-Asians regards a permanent UN military force as a potential instrument of intervention in matters which they consider with equal definiteness to be their own business.<sup>69</sup>

## Canadian Army Standby Force 1963 - 1964



**Infantry Grouping  
had four options:**  
Battalion  
Battalion (-)  
Company Group  
Battalion with armour squadron

**Could also include:**  
Signal Platoon, Engineer Troop  
and Service Platoon

Figure 1 - Canadian Army Standby Force 1963 - 1964


Canada should not, however, shy away from participating in UN peace operations. The problem was a preoccupation in the media and in academia that Canada should re-orient the armed forces strictly for UN operations: “Such proposals have tended to be conceived in the abstract and without much regard to the tangible circumstances of the UN or for Canadian national interest. In some cases, political innocence has been carried to rather excessive lengths.”<sup>70</sup>

The committee looked askance at these ideas since “it is quite possible that Canada would be instructed to make war on South Africa or to defend Cuba against the United States.” Therefore, the most likely Canadian employment of force under the UN umbrella was the provision of “technical troops not readily available from other sources,” airlift and light aircraft and staff officers since “it is unlikely that Canadian combatant forces would be acceptable.” This was not just because Canada was part of NATO, as alleged by many detractors, since “Canada is a white nation. Canada is too powerful a nation to be innocuous and Canada’s interests are too clearly

identified with those of the North Atlantic community to qualify as a neutral.”<sup>71</sup>

The drafting of the new defence policy continued throughout late 1963 and early 1964. Hellyer wrote the first draft himself, which was then sent to External Affairs for comment. There were two major differences of opinion between the departments: Hellyer’s views on NATO strategy and Hellyer’s views on UN peacekeeping.

Hellyer wanted to explain to the public that massive retaliation and trip wire nuclear defence doctrines were obsolete in the 1960s. He took pains in the draft to explain that Canada’s forces had to be able to operate or flexibly respond across the whole spectrum of military force (from peace observation to nuclear warfare) in order to deter as well as fight if necessary. This was in accordance with the general direction of NATO strategy in 1963. The External Affairs personnel altered this to emphasize that flexibility in Canadian force structure was necessary so that the majority of Canadian forces at home would be available for UN duty. Hellyer



**FROM ARMY TO MOBILE COMMAND: 1964**

The Army was not idle during the 1964 White Paper process and was engaged in anticipatory planning throughout 1963. Army planners believed that the main front was still NATO's Central Region. Army appreciation of the future world situation, however, placed some emphasis on preparing for "peripheral wars" that were "local in scale and will probably involve the Western powers in peace-keeping rather than fighting roles."

**Figure 2 - Outline Organization Army Division - Mobile Force, 1963**

was, in effect, skeptical about the future utility of UN peacekeeping. Similarly, Hellyer's section on UN peacekeeping was a far more critical one than the final version which was influenced by External Affairs. Hellyer was quite critical of UN operations and the validity of UN standby forces. All of this was removed and replaced with a list of Canadian participation in the UN operations, a section which had a smug, self-congratulatory tone.<sup>72</sup>

The final version of the White Paper was a departure from previous defence statements: it was explicit, clear and public. NATO deterrence operations were clearly ascendant. The objective of Canadian defence policy was "to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression" and then "support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our participation in international organizations."<sup>73</sup>

The main threat to Canadian interests was still the Soviet nuclear and conventional forces directed against the NATO Area. Notably, however, the policy now recognized that "Communist countries can be expected to continue to promote expansionist aims by measures short of all-out war." Canadian defence policy formally recognized a spectrum of conflict and formally set

out to institutionalize its force structure to operate within it. Canada anticipated having NATO forces hold the line and UN peace operations to handle crises that might affect superpower peace.<sup>74</sup>

The controversial part of the White Paper did not involve strategy or objectives. It was the section on the future shape of the Canadian forces which overrode all things. Hellyer proposed the merger of all three services into a single service, essentially one big "triphibious" interoperable mobile force—the details of that controversy are beyond the scope of this work.<sup>75</sup> Within that great new structure, one brigade group was to remain in Europe for service with NATO, while two of the Canada-based brigade groups would be retrained and re-equipped "to permit their effective deployment in circumstances ranging from service [with NATO] to United Nations peacekeeping operations." The fourth brigade group was to be modified into an air-portable formation for rapid deployment.<sup>76</sup>

Where the White Paper fell down was on the question of strategic lift. A small section noted that a modest capability should be acquired, but there were no specifics. There was a lot of talk about mobility and flexibility but not how to achieve it.

In addition to maintaining a capability to react to those, Army planners assumed that a global capability be retained by the smaller Western powers "so that a confrontation of the major powers can be avoided." In other words, pro-NATO middle powers should be able to take on peripheral conflicts as surrogates.<sup>77</sup>

For the 1960s, Army planners thought there would be continuing moves towards the creation of a standing international UN force, but the more probable type of UN operations would remain the Suez, Lebanon and Congo variants. The participation of Army combat units was "unlikely to be accepted . . . from a nation so firmly in the Western camp as Canada." The deployment of technical units, as in the UNEF I and ONUC, was more likely.<sup>78</sup>

The main problem was training and organization to operate across a spectrum of conflict that included nuclear war, conventional mechanized war, counter-insurgency and peacekeeping. Consequently, the forces required to fight in the main battle area in NATO's Central Region "are neither organized nor equipped for the type of role Canada is likely to assume in UN operations." To do so would necessitate having two sets of equipment and two training syllabi. There would have to be two armies.<sup>79</sup> To be fair, by 1963, many in the Army were skeptical about the UN standby battalion role. In their view "at no time has the demanded or agreed

upon Canadian contribution for a UN operation matched the Canadian Army units assigned to the UN standby role." Maintaining forces that would not be sent at such a high readiness placed great strains on the personnel.<sup>80</sup>

Paul Hellyer thought the Army was dragging its feet. In early 1964 he committed Canada to providing two infantry battalions to NATO's ACE Mobile Force (Land). He was interested in:

pressuring the Canadian military into beefing up the capability of our land forces and giving that capability higher priority vis-a-vis the nuclear concept than they had been willing to do. I felt that a well-equipped, well-trained "bird in the hand" was of greater potential use than a non-existent division to be mobilized over some ill-defined period.<sup>81</sup>

Chief of the General Staff Geoffrey Walsh then converted 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (2 CIBG) to "a Special Service Force [SSF] with an emphasis on air portability" on 26 March 1964.<sup>82</sup> By November, 2 CIBG was the repository of the AMF(L) commitments and the existing UN Standby Battalion role.<sup>83</sup> Therefore, Canada had a mechanized brigade group in West Germany as part of NATO, this new, barely air portable SSF and two other brigade groups that were supposed to handle defence of Canada operations and serve as reinforcements to the Germany-based brigade group. In effect, 2 Brigade became the Army's low intensity conflict rapid deployment force.<sup>84</sup>

Indeed, SSF elements were utilized twice before the Army was disbanded. When inter-communal violence in Cyprus threatened NATO interests on the island in 1964, Canada's UN Standby Battalion Group (based on 1 R22<sup>e</sup>R) was activated and deployed, closely followed by the RCD Recce Squadron, to form the Canadian Contingent of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Operation SNOW GOOSE also used the aircraft carrier HMCS *Bonaventure* and

the destroyer HMCS *Restigouche* in addition to strategic airlift provided by RCAF Air Transport Command Yukon, Northstar and Hercules aircraft. The air deployment was initiated within 24 hours of Cabinet deciding to send the UN Standby Battalion Group, and within four days the naval task group departed. As the situation in Cyprus deteriorated in mid 1964, UNFICYP required more robust command and control capabilities. Consequently, headquarters 2 CIBG (the SSF headquarters in Petawawa) deployed in April 1964.<sup>85</sup>

***"The obstacles in this vast project were incredible in that it necessitated severe cultural shifts which took years to implement."***

The 1964 White Paper was released in March 1964 at the height of the crisis in Cyprus. Over the next year, the Army, Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force and their associated headquarters ceased to exist in an exercise referred to as "unification." The replacement organization was the Canadian Armed Forces led by a Chief of the Defence Staff who commanded Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ). It consisted of several functional commands that reported directly to CFHQ. The functional commands included Maritime Command (Atlantic) and Maritime Command (Pacific)—

which incorporated the naval and maritime anti-submarine forces on each coast—Air Defence Command, Air Transport Command, 1 Air Division (the NATO-committed nuclear strike force in Europe), 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (the NATO-committed land force in Europe) and Mobile Command.<sup>86</sup>

The obstacles in this vast project were incredible in that it necessitated severe cultural shifts which took years to implement. There was no Army or Army headquarters, so much corporate know-

edge was in danger of being lost in the interim. Continuity of operations overseas was also in danger of disruption. Mobile Command was now responsible for peacekeeping and low intensity operations, while the rest of the commands handled the deterrent forces in North America and Europe. The

matter of Canada possessing the ability to deploy Mobile Command became a secondary issue for the time being.

*Part II of this article will explore the role of General Jean Victor Allard in the creation of FMC, how FMC was originally structured and equipped, and what roles it was supposed to undertake.*



#### ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Dr Sean Maloney received his BA and MA from the University of New Brunswick and his Ph.D from Temple University in Philadelphia. His military service included duty with the 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) as a troop officer and the official historian to 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. His writing and research focuses on Canadian national security policy. Dr Maloney's publications include *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951 – 1993* (1997), numerous articles and the forthcoming book *Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada's Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1951 – 1968*. He is currently the Social Sciences Humanities Research Council of Canada Post-Doctoral Fellow at The Royal Military College of Canada, where he also teaches in the War Studies Programme.

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81. Letter Hellyer to Maloney, 16 August 1995.

82. DHH file 112.1.009 (D39), (26 Mar 64) message CANARMY to all commands.

83. DHH file 112.1.009 (D39), (30 Nov 64) "Special Service Force: Organization and Employment."

84. Note that the 1963-65 Special Service Force should not be confused with the 1970s incarnation of the same name. The 1960s SSF consisted of HQ 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, 4 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (to be converted to a light artillery regiment), 1st Battalion, Canadian Guards, 2nd Battalion, Royal Highland Regiment of Canada, and 1st Battalion, Queen's Own Rifles. A light armoured regiment was added later on. See DHH, Raymont Collection file 3284 , (2 Apr 65) "Special Service Force Establishments."

85. NAC RG 24 vol. 21501 file: 2146.1.1 v2, (10 Aug 64) memo to MND, "Chronological List of Events Leading to Canadian Participation in CYPRUS."

86. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence* p. 83.