

NEVER SAY NEVER:

NON-ALLIANCE OPERATIONS IN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT

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We have conditioned ourselves to believe that the Canadian Forces, and thus Canada's Army, will not conduct operations outside of an alliance or coalition context. At first glance, the history of operations in the First, Second, and Cold Wars supports this assertion, which is now enshrined as doctrine in *Canada's Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee*. The two non-domestic Mission Objectives (Defence of North America and Contributing to International Security) are supposed to be conducted within a bilateral or multinational framework. There is no mention of independent Canadian military activity save that the Army is to be prepared to assist in the protection and evacuation of Canadians from areas of conflict.¹

Is the Army prepared for such operations? Ambiguous language on such a matter could lead to a disastrous operation in the future if not re-examined and dealt with accordingly. In our rush to confront the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Future Security Environment(s), we may overlook non-alliance operations to the detriment of their conduct, for the need to be able to conduct such operations will not go away. The Canadian Forces, and thus the Canadian army, has historically been involved with planned and executed independent operations in support of Canadian policy objectives despite the belief that all we do is operate within a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations (UN), or bilateral Canada-United States (CAN-US) context. We have to have a doctrinally recognized capability to conduct non-alliance operations since Canadian national security interests exist outside of these three spheres.

WHY NON-ALLIANCE OPERATIONS?

National security policy is the sum of foreign, defence, and economic policy which then supports Canadian domestic objectives which are the preservation of Canada as a unified, economically prosperous, free and independent nation. We join alliances and coalitions to accomplish Canadian national security objectives. We may be compelled to join alliances and coalitions by outside forces due to threats by monolithic totalitarianism or regional instability, but we do it freely as an independent nation.

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Unfortunately, over time some have come to believe that the alliance tail now wags the Canadian dog. There is a perception which has become reality that Canada merely serves the interests of her alliances and coalitions, which generally reflect American national security prerogatives. Some even go as far as to argue that Canada has no control over her national security. We are now in a situation where the draw down of the CF has gone too far. Some now believe that, because of budgetary limitations, Canada must pick a small number of operational capabilities rather than retain the ability to support all aspects of our national security policy with military force. Consequently, the logic goes, Canada should find niches within the UN and to a lesser extent in NATO, jack in, play

the alliance game at minimal cost, and derive the attendant security, economic or other benefits like we did during the 1990-91 Gulf War.

We got away with this during the last half of the Cold War (1970-1990), particularly in the NATO context where the alliance game and the world situation was clearly defined and ossified. It can no longer work in what is now a multipolar world. This approach is only viable for the time that those niches are important to our larger allies and if the foreign policy side of the national security policy formulation understands how to make use of these niches. I have my doubts as to the existence of this high level of understanding within the community that generates Canadian foreign policy.

The ability to have a military force structure that can only plug into those niches, a force structure which does not have the even nascent capability to support contingency operations, will not allow Canada the flexibility she needs to retain an independent national security policy. Relying on our allies for these sorts of operations diminishes our prestige by producing a situation in which we are seen to be victims incapable of helping our own people and incapable of protecting our interests. Here are some cases in which Canada deployed military forces overseas for national purposes outside of an alliance or coalition context.²

HAITI 1963

The vicious pathological regime led by voodoo aficionado 'Papa Doc' Duvalier initiated several waves of xenophobic violence in Haiti throughout 1963. At

the time there were an estimated 400 Canadian missionaries and aid workers on the island, the bulk of them from Quebec. The newly-elected government of Canada led by Mike Pearson was at the time confronting emergent and violent Quebec separatism. If the Tonton Macoutes (Haitian secret police) disembowelled or otherwise harassed 400 French Canadians, there would be serious political repercussions for Canadian unity. Cabinet members met to examine the matter. Some members thought that the Americans should be asked to pull out Canadian nationals (a United States Navy carrier task group was in the vicinity) but Pearson argued that the Americans should not be asked to do what Canada was perfectly capable of doing herself. Consequently, the Prime Minister authorized a military deployment to Haiti.³

The destroyer HMCS *Saskatchewan* was transiting from the West to the East coast and was ordered to proceed to Haiti and stand by. The Captain formed ad hoc landing parties and was prepared to evacuate Canadian nationals with armed force. Canada's only aircraft carrier, HMCS *Bonaventure* and her destroyer escort force was visiting Charleston, South Carolina at the time. The 'Bonnie' was placed on four hours notice to move to support *Saskatchewan*.⁴ Diplomatic, economic, and military pressure from Canada, France, and the United States played a role in persuading Duvalier to rein in the violence. *Saskatchewan* spent 12 days on station in a presence role and departed. It is possible that if the crisis had escalated, Pearson would have authorized the use of the assigned UN Standby Battalion Group which at the time was the French-speaking 2e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment. Even though such an operation would not have been UN-backed, the Standby Battalion Group was a rapid-reaction air transportable formation which was retained at a high state of readiness in 1963 and could have been employed in a non-alliance contingency operation.

At the time UN Standby Battalion Group doctrine included forced entry into non-permissible environments.⁵

OP LEAVEN: 1967

The Canadian United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) I contingent in the Sinai and Gaza Strip, numbering some 800 personnel, was ordered off Egyptian soil by President Nassar in May 1967. UNEF I was in Nassar's way and he was intent on going to war once again with Israel. From its earliest days, UNEF contingency planning for a withdrawal had been discouraged by UN HQ in New York. This was based on the erroneous belief that even the thought or mention of withdrawal would undermine the mission. Consequently, there was no serious plan at the UNEF headquarters level for such a withdrawal. Fortunately for the Canadian contingent, verbal contingency planning had been conducted within the Canadian contingent commander, Canadian Base Units Middle East-UNEF (CBUME).⁶

The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) ordered that a contingency plan be developed and an ad hoc planning staff in Canadian Forces Headquarters put it together. The plan was pushed down to the Air Transport Command level which proceeded to produce an airlift plan to remove the entire UNEF, not just the Canadian contingent. Other problems intervened, however, Nassar targeted the Canadian contingent (probably because it was the most impartial) and ordered it out one month earlier. Then landing clearances were denied to RCAF transport aircraft.⁷

This forced CFHQ to reassess the situation and examine a naval option. This was readily done and Maritime Command sent the supply vessel, or AOR, HMCS *Provider*, a destroyer escort, HMCS *Kootenay* and the helicopter-carrying, DDH, HMCS *Saguenay*. The problem was Mobile Command wanted to embark CH-113

Voyageur medium lift helicopters on *Provider* but were told this was not feasible. Sea Kings were instead substituted.⁸

The naval task force, Operation LEAVEN, was to proceed to the Azores and then Malta. However, heavy seas damaged *Saguenay*. Maritime Command replaced her with the DDH *Annapolis*. Diplomatic efforts eventually permitted the airlift to start as the ships headed to the Mediterranean. Ten Air Transport Command C-130 Hercules and four Yukons were eventually deployed to lift UNEF out.⁹ If the situation had deteriorated further and Canada could not deftly extract her contingent, the CDS had a series of eight contingency plans of escalating levels of violence for "an autonomous Canadian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean region." This planning exercise had two code names, LAZARUS and PHOENIX, and incorporated a unilateral forceful Canadian intervention between Arab and Israeli forces using offensive operations before a war could start and threaten Canadian UNEF forces.¹⁰

WESTPLOY 1/73, 2/73

The International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) replaced the defunct International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) as the non-UN peace observation body in Southeast Asia in 1973. The signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973 afforded the opportunity for the ICCS to assist the Joint Military Commission to facilitate prisoner of war exchanges and impartial ceasefire violation observation.¹¹ Despite the ICCS presence, North Vietnam prepared for further offensive activity in the region. In addition, a Canadian ICCS observer was assassinated by communist forces when his helicopter was shot down. Consequently, the CDS directed Maritime Forces Pacific to prepare and send a ship to South East Asia to

evacuate the 300-man Canadian ICCS contingent from South Vietnam. Canadian ICCS personnel were scattered over 74 sites in the region. ICCS Planners deemed South Vietnamese airports as prime communist targets and felt that Air Command transport aircraft would be unable to get in, while Maritime Forces Pacific planners thought that offensive North Vietnamese air operations might be conducted against Canadian ships and ICCS personnel. The anti-submarine warfare (ASW) destroyer HMCS *Terra Nova* was engaged in Exercise TOP GALLANT, a logistics exercise, when it was ordered to deploy. Communist Poland, also a member of the ICCS, planned to deploy a destroyer to shadow *Terra Nova*, which would have complicated any Canadian evacuation effort.¹²

Terra Nova patrolled off the Vietnamese coast for five months until she was relieved by the ASW destroyer HMCS *Kootenay* for four more months. *Kootenay* was modified to add several heavy and medium machine guns to her deck and bridge and her crew practised deploying in boats to pick up personnel from shore. Liaison was established with the Canadian ICCS delegation, which generated a complex contingency plan to move Canadian observers to the coast from areas as far inland as the Cambodian and Laotian borders. Rendezvous points were established for pickup by the Canadian vessels on the coast. The Canadian government, fed up with the inability of the ICCS to make any headway in limiting the conflict, pulled the Canadian contingent out by air later in 1973 during a lull in the fighting.¹³

JAMAICA 1979

Canadian interests in Jamaica are long standing ones and revolved around the fact that the island is the largest producer of alumina outside of Australia. Two of the five processing plants were constructed with Canadian

money and belonged to Canadian companies. By the late 1970s, Canada was Jamaica's third largest trading partner, the bulk of it in alumina and sugar. Jamaica, however, was increasingly politically unstable. The 1979-80 election was rife with violence.¹⁴

The Canadian military relationship with Jamaica was also a longstanding one. Canada conducted espionage operations from Kingston, Jamaica against other nations in the region.¹⁵ Air Command had a substantial training exchange programme with the JDF air element.¹⁶ In 1969, Canada twice flew its UN Standby Battalion to Jamaica. Ex NIMROD CAPER was repeated annually each with a different battalion group. For example, The Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed in 1972 and in addition to military exercises, conducted civic action-type operations in some of the poorer parts of the island.¹⁷

There is not much data available on the planned unilateral Canadian intervention in Jamaica. This is in part due to the convoluted National Defence Headquarters planning process which wracked the CF in the late 1970s. Planning commenced in 1979 after the election announcement was made and related to the possibility of massive violence and even overthrow of the Manley government. The exact level or office in the Canadian Government which ordered the creation of a contingency plan is unknown. The reasons for doing so are speculative and in any case, the plan was not executed.

The violent nature of Jamaican politics at election times coupled with the dramatic increase in Canadian investment in Manley's Jamaica linked to, perhaps, perceived or known evidence that Cuba may have been supporting Jamaican radical groups were probably the primary reasons. The nature and scope of the contingency plan, however, indicates that the plan was no mere non-combatant evacuation operation.

The planning called for an AOR and its four landing craft, one Tribal-class DDH with its two Sea Kings, and three DDH's or DDE's to accompany a Canadian National Marine ferry loaded with a battalion group from the Royal Canadian Regiment. It apparently utilized Defence of Canada Force amphibious exercises as a basis. The objectives of the operation revolved around securing and protecting of the ALCAN facilities from mob unrest, seizure or sabotage. There appears to have been no provision made for combined operations with other nations. Whether the Jamaican government was party to this contingency plan is unknown but seems likely.¹⁸ The level of violence planners thought would trigger a deployment never materialized.

OP BATON, 1978-79

The Shah of Iran abdicated power in the midst of an extremely violent fundamentalist Islamic revolution precipitated by the return of the Ayatollah Khomeini to Tehran in 1978. The Iranian armed forces was split and widespread chaos ensued with several massacres occurring in September. The vociferous revolutionaries despised the west, particularly the United States and allies which in turn put all western nationals in Iran at risk. Oil production dropped off and economic confusion prevailed. On December 30, western diplomats in Tehran recommended to their various home nations that diplomats and dependants be evacuated since there was a belief that widespread anarchy would seize Iran. To make matters worse, Iranian air traffic control workers went on strike and refused to allow and American or Israeli aircraft to land in Iran.¹⁹

NDHQ anticipated that the situation in Iran would get worse. A CF 707 and two C-130 transports were pre-positioned from Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Lahr, Germany along with an 105-man unit consisting of air loading, maintenance and intelligence personnel

to Ankara, Turkey between 9 and 16 December. It should also be noted that the Ankara airhead for Op BATON was under some risk by a lower level state of unrest in Turkey generally. The aircrafts re-deployed back to CFB Trenton by 23 December. When the situation in Iran deteriorated on 30 December, however, the 707 which was on standby departed Canada, followed soon after by the first of four C-130s dedicated to the operation. Delays by the situation in Tehran prevented the Op BATON flights from landing until 3 January 1979. There was no electronic navigation assistance provided to the CF aircraft, which had to operate visually. It was never clear who controlled the airport facilities.²⁰

Eventually, the first series of Op BATON flights evacuated 400 Canadians and other foreign nationals who were mostly from NATO countries. A number of Canadian oil men working at the facilities in Rasht on the Caspian Sea were also evacuated by air. A second series was laid on at the beginning of February when intelligence reports indicated that remaining Canadians might be in some danger.²¹

Apparently, planners in NDHQ considered sending an armed unit or sub-unit drawn from the Airborne Regiment or other Special Service Force units to either the airhead at Ankara or to Lahr. Tentatively called Operation SKY HOOK, it is unclear whether the force had an intervention capability to extract evacuees, was structured to protect landed aircraft in the area of operations or both. There is no indication that it actually deployed to Lahr or Ankara and should not be considered 'Desert One Lite' by any stretch of the imagination.²²

Op SPEAR/Op BANDIT: 1987-88

Under international pressure, Haitian leader 'Baby Doc' Duvalier (Papa Doc's son) abdicated power in 1985. Duvalierist elements in Haiti waited until

the 1987 elections and threatened widespread violence if they were not returned to power. The Canadian ambassador concluded that there was a credible threat to Canadian nationals in Haiti in the January 1988 election period and requested that the CF plan an evacuation mission. NDHQ planners developed two plans: an immediate use plan (Op SPEAR) if the situation deteriorated immediately, and another less ad hoc arrangement (Op BANDIT). Op SPEAR came in several versions. All featured an air evacuation under permissive and non-permissive situations. The non-permissive scenarios included the deployment of an infantry company loaded aboard several Falcon jets accompanying C-130 Hercules transports.²³

Op BANDIT was far more detailed. Intelligence assets identified four airfields, two of them secured by hostile forces, and two others which would not be able to handle C-130 aircraft. This meant that a purely air operation was not feasible. Helicopters and ships were needed and ground forces would also be needed to secure the pick up zones. There were three options which the Department of External Affairs (DEA) and the Department of National Defence agreed would constitute the contingency plan:

- ✦ Ongoing legal peacetime activity such as voluntary evacuation.
- ✦ Military activity with the consent of the government of Haiti.
- ✦ Military action without the consent of the government of Haiti.²⁴

Fourteen-hundred Canadians were identified as residing in Haiti, but External Affairs estimated that only 600-800 would want to leave.²⁵ Overland evacuation of Canadians to the Dominican Republic was considered far too hazardous.²⁶ Eventually options for the use of Canadian military forces explored by a special joint DEA-DND team came down to the deployment of two helicopter-carrying destroyers

(DDH) with Sea King helicopters and the use of CC-115 Buffalo aircraft using outlying airfields to pick up Canadians in the countryside. This was the original option for evacuation in a permissive environment. The other option was the use of a naval force with helicopters and infantry in support to rescue Canadians from outlying villages and then evacuating them by C-130 Hercules from secured airheads.²⁷

The naval task group would proceed to the operating area on order from either the Minister of National Defence, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, or the Prime Minister. The two DDH's would have three Sea Kings, while the accompanying AOR would have two Sea Kings and the Twin Huey's. Six Hercules and four Buffalo's would move 3e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment (3 R22eR) to the staging base and then one company would embark on the ships. One company would remain with the transport aircraft and fly in with them if they were ordered in. The other would remain in reserve at either Puerto Rico or Guantanamo Bay. The sea-going company would secure beach and helicopter landing zones.²⁸

The task group consisted of AOR HMCS *Preserver*, the 280-class DDH HMCS *Athabaskan*, and DDH HMCS *Skeena* and sailed from Halifax on 5 Jan 1988.²⁹ 3 R22eR, a platoon from 5e Ambulance de Campagne, a troop from 119 Air Defence battery, and two flights of Twin Hueys from 403 Tactical Helicopter Squadron stood by. A small planning cell from 3 R22eR embarked prior to departure from Halifax.

A poor deception plan and a consequent failure in operational security of the BANDIT force, in addition to irresponsible media speculation prompted an outcry in Haiti which, in turn, increased the potential threat to Canadian nationals while the BANDIT force was deploying. The BANDIT force remained outside Haitian territorial waters and 3 R22eR remained on alert until the situation calmed down.

Duvalierist forces kept their thugs on a leash and the anticipated levels of violence did not materialize. The BANDIT task group exerted a Canadian presence in the region for another three weeks and returned home.

OP CAULDRON AND OP DIALOGUE: 1993

The situation encountered during Op BANDIT repeated itself in 1993. The elected leader of Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was deposed by a junta led by Raoul Cedras. Canadian and American efforts through the UN resulted in negotiations between the parties which in turn agreed to permit a Canadian-American construction force to land in Haiti and improve local infrastructure (Op CAULDRON). The situation was tense. As a result, a MARCOM task group consisting of the AOR HMCS *Preserver*, the DDH *Fraser* and DDE *Gatineau* sailed for the Caribbean to participate in 'exercises' at the same time the UN Security Council resolution allowing the deployment of the infrastructure team was adopted in September 1993. The Canadian task group was Operation DIALOGUE, which also included an alert of 1st Commando of the Canadian Airborne Regiment for deployment to Haiti.³⁰ The DIALOGUE task group remained outside Haitian territorial waters, prepared to intervene and extract the CAULDRON personnel if necessary. The Canadian construction engineer team, aboard the LST USS *Harlan County*, was not permitted to land by a mass demonstration of hired Haitian goons. The LST left and the Op DIALOGUE force withdrew. This incident sparked the later 1994 American-supported UN intervention which toppled the Cedras junta.

INDEPENDENT WITHDRAWALS FROM UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Though not strictly non-alliance operations, several UN peacekeeping operations have encountered situations in which Canadian contingents have been forced to plan independent operations. As noted in the case of Op LEAVEN, the UN does not like

contingents to conduct independent planning for fear that the mission will be compromised. Canadian commanders have recognized that the view from New York does not always correspond with the view from the UN troops at the front.

For example, in 1974 the Turks invaded Cyprus to protect the Turkish minority from violence perpetrated by the Greek Cypriot population. United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) troops were caught in the middle. The Canadian contingent, the Airborne Regiment, was not fully deployed to the island. The UN requested reinforcements for UNFICYP and the remainder of the regiment was airlifted into a hostile environment. At one level, this was a reinforcement operation to beef up UNFICYP presence and monitor a newly-brokered peace. At another level the Canadian commanders on the island were preparing to withdraw to a defended location, protect that location, and extract from Cyprus without UN concurrence or help from the other contingents.³¹

Similarly, when the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina seriously deteriorated in 1995, contingency planning dubbed Op COBRA was conducted to plan the extraction of CANLOGBAT, CANBAT I and CANBAT II from the region. In the case of United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), did Canada have the ability to extract the Canadian contingent from Central Africa in a non-permissive environment or would the Canadian contingent have joined the other 500 000 dead people there? If we are going to put our people in harm's way, we must have the ability to bring them out if we choose to. We may not be able to rely on our allies, either politically or materially. Are we going to permit skittishness on the part of others to prevent us from protecting our interests and our people?

CONCLUSION

What are some of the factors common to previous Canadian non-Alliance operations?

* The bulk of them were planned, potential or actual evacuation or intervention operations conducted in a non-permissive environment.

* With the exception of the later operations in Haiti, the bulk of the operations were ad hoc and did not contain a full protective capability for the evacuees in the form of armed CF personnel.

* The lift platforms used for the operations were not optimized for evacuation or intervention operations.

* Almost all occurred within a joint context.

* These operations were planned/executed under political conditions not generally foreseen by External Affairs or National Defence. Despite the pronouncements of the past five Defence White Papers, the Canadian Forces will at time operate outside of established national security parameters.

WHAT DO WE NEED?

Naturally, we need more money, a larger land force, better joint planning, more joint exercises, and the recognition by policy generators that Canada needs the capability to support her interests with contingency forces. The 1994 White Paper alludes to this but is ambiguous. Whether we can get the resources is always in question. We need:

* Well-trained soldiers in all arms that are capable of adapting and respond to different missions on a moment's notice.

* Well-trained and educated officers at all levels that are flexible people and can adapt and respond in a timely fashion.

* To recognize that high and mid intensity conflict is our ultimate *raison d'être* and that from this flows our operations other than war/low intensity conflict flexibility. It should not preclude it. Unlike our critics who want merely an operation-other than war/low-intensity-conflict (OOTW/LIC) structure for constabulary operations, we must recognize and explain that it is

easier and cheaper for a high to mid-intensity force structure to adapt to OOTW/LIC than for the opposite to occur.

* Joint training at all levels must accommodate flexibility and our doctrine must allow for it. We must have a joint doctrine for armed evacuation or intervention operations conducted

outside of an alliance or coalition context. For example, why doesn't Joint Task Force 2 train for maritime contingencies?

* The modification of existing equipment on a cost effective basis for evacuation/intervention operations. For example, the addition of machine

gun mounts for all shipboard helicopters.

WILL WE GET IT?

This is up to YOU.



About the Author . . .

Sean Maloney received his BA and MA from the University of New Brunswick and his PhD from Temple University in Philadelphia. His military service included duty with the 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) as a troop officer and the official historian to 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. To date his writing and research has focused on Canadian national security policy. He has completed one book, as well as numerous articles and has a second book forthcoming. He is currently the Social Sciences Humanities Research Council of Canada Post-Doctoral Fellow at The Royal Military College of Canada, where he also teaches in the War Studies Programme.

ENDNOTES

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2 I have specifically excluded domestic operations from this discussion. The point that Canada needs forces that can operate outside of an alliance/coalition context can best be made with examples drawn from the more unknown overseas operations. These examples are drawn from three studies conducted by the author: *Purple Skies in the Cold Dawn: The Origins of the Joint Staff*, *Maple Leaf Over the Caribbean: Gunboat Diplomacy-Canadian Style* which will appear in a book produced by Dalhousie University later this year; *The Context and Record of Canadian Maritime Contingency Operations, 1946-1998*, an internal study conducted for the Center for Naval Analyses, Fairfax, Virginia, USA.

3 National Archives of Canada, RG 2, Cabinet Conclusions, 15 May 1963.

4 "The RCN in 1963", *Crownsnest* Vol. 16 No. 1, January 1964, pp. 6-7

5 See, for example, "Fight'n Charlie on Exercise VOL OUEST," *The Powderhorn: The Chronicle of the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada* 1963 Edition, pp. 68-70; "Exercise WHITE ELK," *The Powderhorn: The Chronicle of the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada* 1965 Edition, pp. 66-69.

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8 *Ibid.*, pp. 38-47.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

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14 Clyde Sander, *Half a Loaf: Canada's Semi-Role Among Developing Countries* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969), pp. 132, 138; Irving Kaplan et al., *Area Handbook for Jamaica* (DA Pam 550-177, US Government Printing Office, 1976) pp. 224, 356, 261.

15 Mike Frost and Michel Gratton, *Spyworld: Inside the Canadian and American Intelligence Establishments* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1994) pp. 118-122.

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17 "Nimrod Caper," *Sentinel*, June 1970, pp. 15-18; Bill Whitehead, "Hardley a Caper," *Sentinel* June 1971, pp. 32-35; Geoff Haswell, "Where a Bandage is a Status Symbol," *Sentinel* July-August 1972 pp. 21-24; *The Connecting File 1971 Edition: The Journal of The Royal Canadian Regiment*, p. 40; *The Connecting File 1969 Edition: The Journal of The Royal Canadian Regiment*, p. 86.

18 Telecon Peter Haydon, 6 September 1996.

19 Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), Chapter VI.

20 DHH file 82/465 (16 Jan 79) "Operation BATON-Phase I-III"; "Canadian Forces Evacuate over 400 from Iran," *Der Kanadier* 12 Jan 79.

21 *Ibid.*, "Final Iranian Airlift Completed by 436 Squadron," *Der Kanadier* 16 Feb 79.

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23 Access to Information [ATI] DND, (18 Dec 87) *Potential Evacuation of Canadian Citizens from Haiti: Codename Op BANDIT*; ATI DND, (15 Jul 88) *Operation BANDIT After Action Report*; confidential interview.

24 ATI, DND, (4 Jan 88) *National Defence Logistics Coordination Centre Sitrep Operation BANDIT as of 0600 hrs 04 Jan 88*.

25 ATI, DND, (4 Jan 88) Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence, *Operation Bandit Update*.

26 ATI, DND, (18 Dec 87) Aide-memoir for the MND, *Op BANDIT*.

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