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Homeland Defence

by

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This research project was commissioned by the Director of Land Strategic Concepts to provide insights into historical examples of homeland defence. The study establishes the respective threat situations, military participation, the outcome, the constitutional arrangements for each operation as applicable and the linkages established between the Department of National Defence, other government departments and civilian agencies. The aim of the study is to increase the understanding of past activities in order to better prepare for the future. The information contained herein is intended for information and evaluation purposes only. Opinions expressed in the research note are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts or of the Department of National Defence Canada.

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DLSC Study 01/02:

Homeland Defence: The Canadian Context, 1940-2000

By

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January 2001

Abstract

The purpose of the study is to provide DLSC with insights into historical examples of Homeland Defence (HLD). HLD is an emerging threat area that will require attention in the near future. We have an opportunity to inform interested agencies of the historical basis for the conduct of CF HLD operations during the last half century. This study establishes the respective threat situations, service participation, the outcome, the constitutional arrangements for each operation as applicable, and the linkages that the CF has forged with other government agencies in order to accomplish the national (and by extension, military) objective.

Several major points emerge from this study:

- 1) HLD has always been part of Canadian national security considerations. It is not something new and Canada has exhibited an awareness of asymmetric threats to the homeland since the 1940s.
- 2) Political will is necessary to effect change in the details or emphasis on how the CF handles HLD. Change in this area cannot come from within due to the importance and involvement of OGDs and wider Canadian interests.
- 3) Force structures and command/control arrangements must remain flexible, be trained to handle HLD threats, and exercise regularly. If they do not, they will be unable to handle rapidly developing threats to the homeland.
- 4) High- and mid-intensity capable forces can readily adapt to the lower conflict spectrum HLD missions but the reverse is not true.
- 5) Many HLD command and control arrangements were based on ad hoc structures and were personality dependent. HLD threats which rely on speed and surprise to attain an objective will be difficult to counter using such arrangements.

6) Though formal HLD arrangements existed with the United States to handle View 1 threats, the lack of similar arrangements to handle View 2 threats and inability to effectively coordinate Canadian and American governmental, police, intelligence and military activity has posed obstacles in cross-border operations.

7) A serious examination of the legal jurisdictional aspects of CF-RCMP operations and coordination outside of Canadian sovereign territory as such operations relate to HLD needs to be conducted.

Introduction

The purpose of the study is to provide DLSC with insights into historical examples of Homeland Defence (HLD). HLD is an emerging threat area that will require attention in the near future. The altered geostrategic and technological landscape has permitted the generation of potential, new and evolving threats to the Canadian national interest. Examples include:

- 1) A former non-commissioned member of the U.S. Army planned and executed a politically-motivated attack on a government information and intelligence node which killed nearly 300 people in the American midwest.¹
- 2) An apocalyptic religious cult, which included members of an elite police and intelligence unit, used home made chemical weapons to kill and incapacitate unaware citizens in an urban area of Japan.²
- 3) A non-governmental organization unilaterally declaring itself to be authorized by the United Nations charter to enforce UN maritime resolutions and therefore permitted to ignore national sovereignty and conduct quasi-military operations against economic targets.³
- 4) The widespread proliferation of Soviet nuclear, biological and chemical weapons information and expertise to states which are ideologically opposed to the continued existence of an economically globalized world order controlled by Western interests.⁴

¹. Morris Dees, Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat (New York: Harper Books, 1996) and Kenneth S. Stern, A Force Upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate (Toronto: Simon and Shuster, 1996).

². Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Henry Holt, 1999).

³. Paul Watson, Ocean Warrior: My Battle to end the Illegal Slaughter on the High Seas (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1994); see also Christopher Manes, Green Rage: Radical Environmentalism and the Unmaking of Civilization (Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1990).

⁴. Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, One Point Safe (Toronto: Doubleday, 1997); see also Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Neil C. Livingstone, American the Vulnerable: the Threat of Chemical/Biological Warfare (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987) for a prophetic earlier treatment.

5) On at least four occasions since 1990, the Russian Republic has threatened to or nearly launched a nuclear attack on North America in response to diplomatic crises or by misadventure.⁵

6) The massive and rapid increased economic and personal dependence on international computerized information infrastructure has opened new windows of vulnerability which affect not just numbers but policies and even physical objects which are dependent on computing power. These windows are exploited every hour by individuals, non-state and state groups intent on harming the Canadian national interest.⁶

7) An individual has gathered enough information to convincingly demonstrate that his design of a small but practical nuclear weapon is feasible. This situation prompted U.S. governmental intervention.⁷

A number of observers and analysts believe that the potential for these threat types to affect North America has dramatically increased. We have an opportunity to inform interested agencies of the historical basis for the conduct of CF HLD operations during the last half century. This study establishes the respective threat situations, service participation, the outcome, the constitutional arrangements for each operation as applicable, and the linkages that the CF has forged with other government agencies in order to accomplish the national (and by extension, military) objective. The study examines both conventional and non-conventional responses. The historical survey will form the basis for extrapolation forward to identify the emergence of new external/internal threats that would require the development of a HLD capability. In that regard, the study considers the following instances in which Homeland Defence operations were conducted:

a) Second World War: West Coast Defence Arrangements, 1939-45

⁵. Peter Vincent Pry, War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink (London: Praeger, 1999).

⁶. Winn Schwartz, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway (New York: Thunder Mounth's Press, 1994); James Adams, The Next World War (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1998), John Arquilla et al, In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997).

⁷. John Aristotle Phillips and David Michaelis, Mushroom: The Story of the A-Bomb Kid (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1978).

- b) Cold War: Mobile Striking Force Operations, 1947-55
- c) Cold War: Planning for National Survival, 1957-65
- d) Cold War: Operation GRAND BANKS: Counter-AGI Operations 1957-63
- e) Cold War: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
- f) Cold War: Defence of Canada Operations 1960-70
- g) Terrorism: Operations ESSAY and GINGER: The October Crisis, 1970
- h) Terrorism: Operation GAMESCAN 76: The 1976 Olympic Games
- i) Counter-Narcotics Operations 1970-present
- j) Native Unrest: Aid of the Civil Power Operations in the 1990s
 - Operation FEATHER/Operation AKWASASNE, 1990
 - Operation SALON, 1990
 - Operation MAPLE/Operation PANDA, 1995
 - Operation WALLABY, 1995

A note on terminology. There is a tendency within the national security policy establishment to blend certain types of operations for command/control and fiscal purposes. For example, the Area command system retains specific departments for dealing with Domestic Operations, usually the G-5 position. There are, in fact, different types of operations which are perhaps artificially grouped under Domestic Operations. These include military assistance to the civil authority and aid of the civil power operations. The first category is fairly broad and can include disaster assistance as well as the provision of equipment to law enforcement organizations. Aid of the civil power operations involve the use of formed CF units in an armed capacity in situations involving the provision of support to law enforcement activities. Homeland Defence operations are a separate and broader category which may include assistance to civil authority as well as aid of the civil power military activities. Homeland Defence operations differ from Domestic Operations in that there are forces external to Canada involved and the CF is involved in preventing or countering such influences on the nation.

The exact explanation for the blurring of the distinction between Domestic Operations and HLD must remain speculative. In the 1960s and 1970s natural disasters in Canada were handled on an ad hoc basis involving considerable local planning and execution. By the 1990s, natural disasters in Canada were used to exercise command and control and deployment methodologies. This was analogous to the blurring of the 'peacekeeping' and

'human security' missions overseas though it occurred in the domestic context probably for reasons of economy and public relations.

Current NATO doctrine delineates potential future threats into two categories: View 1 and View 2. View 1 threats are from "conventional conflict between national entities," while View 2 involves a "state opposed by armed bodies that are not organized armed forces."⁸

Limitations:

This study does not discuss Canadian SOF operations conducted within a HLD context due to lack of open source information on such activities. Similarly, the study was to have included a discussion of Operation ABACUS (1999-2000), but the lack of open source information on that operation precludes any analysis.

⁸. DLSC Study 99-2, The Future Security Environment (August 1999) p. 44.

1. Second World War: West Coast Defence Arrangements, 1939-45

The basis for Canadian-American homeland defence cooperation during the Second World War and well into the Cold War was the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). The formal agreement for a PJBD was a joint press release in August 1940 called the Ogdensburg Declaration:

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defense be set up at once by the two countries.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land, and air problems including personnel and materiel.

It will consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.⁹

Preparations of a detailed plan for the joint defence of North America were then formed. There would be two such joint plans formulated by Canadian and American planners for the Second World War. The actual strategic concept was not created by the PJBD. This was done on a chiefs of staff to chiefs of staff basis. The first plan was formally called the "Joint Canada-U.S. Basic Defence Plan 1940" or "Basic Plan No. 1." This plan assumed that Great Britain would fall and that the Royal Navy would lose control of the North Atlantic. This would allow the Germans, if they chose to do so, to attack North America via the North East Approaches in 'stepping stone' fashion. Basic Plan No. 1 noted, in passing, that there might be some aggressive action from an un-named "Asiatic Power". Basic Plan No. 1 was a

⁹. Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The United States Army in World War II, The Western Hemisphere: The Framework of Hemisphere Defense (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1960) p. 372.

defensive plan to be implemented to deny the Germans the various stepping stones.¹⁰

Once the situation in Europe stabilized somewhat in 1941, the British initiated a series of staff talks with Canada and the United States which resulted in an offensive plan against Germany and Italy called "ABC-1". Its ancillary plan, was "Joint Canada-U.S. Basic Defence Plan No. 2" or ABC-22. ABC-22 was to coordinate defensive measures in North America first to protect the mobilization and industrial base from which power would be projected to allied countries closer to the fighting. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 placed ABC-22 in effect once the United States entered the war.¹¹ In line with Basic Plan No. 1, ABC-22 postulated defending the Pacific 'stepping stones' in the North West approaches. One aspect handled by the PJBD was the shortage of American interceptor aircraft in Alaska, and offensive Japanese operations in the Aleutian islands chain prompted discussions on the deployment of RCAF P-40 squadrons to assist in protecting Alaska.¹²

In 1942 Japan invaded several islands in the Aleutian chain, including Attu and Kiska. There was an estimated garrison on all three islands of at least 9000 Japanese troops. The RCAF were involved in joint operations with American forces to prevent the Japanese forces from island-hopping up the chain to Alaska. Plans were made through the PJBD to include 13 Canadian Infantry Brigade and elements of the First Special Service Force to participate alongside American forces in re-taking Kiska. When the landings took place, the island was deserted and American intelligence services were rather embarrassed.¹³

Up until 1945, the only direct enemy military action taken against North America outside of Alaska amounted to two minor Japanese submarine operations (one using a deck gun against the Estevan lighthouse in British Columbia, the other using a E14Y seaplane to bomb a forest in Oregon) on

¹⁰. Directorate of History and Heritage [hereafter DHH], C.P. Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945."

¹¹. DHH, C.P. Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945."

¹². DHH, C.P. Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945"; W.A.B. Douglas, The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Vol. II: The Creation of a National Air Force (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) pp. 412-414.

¹³. C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain, and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 1955) pp. 494-497.

the West coast. The Germans, of course conducted extensive anti-shipping operations on the East coast and landed an automatic weather station in Labrador, but the closest they got to putting troops ashore was on Greenland and then only a small party.¹⁴

Between November 1944 and July 1945, the Japanese launched a poor man's strategic air campaign against Canada and the United States. The primary weapons in this case were incendiary bomb-laden balloons whose envelopes were constructed of rice paper or rubber. Launched from the Japanese home islands and utilizing the prevailing winds, 174 out of 15 000 balloons reached North America over a nine-month period and one even traveled as far east as Michigan. Continental defence measures emplaced during the course of the war through PJBD recommendations were rapidly brought to bear. RCAF interceptor aircraft directed by radar brought down several of the devices, while the information exchange mechanism established by the first recommendation of the PJBD in 1940 ensured a smooth flow of intelligence on the infernal devices. This balloon threat was not to be taken lightly. Though it appears that most of the balloons were equipped to start fires, the advanced nature of Japanese chemical and biological weapons capability caused some concern in Ottawa and Washington.¹⁵

There is more and more evidence that the Japanese possessed a viable atomic bomb programme during the Second World War. Some works even argue that in terms of physics and access to materials (particularly in Korea), the Japanese programme was superior to Nazi Germany's. It appears as though there was also some conception given by the Imperial Japanese Navy for the use of several very large I-400-class long-range submarines to deliver V-1-like flying bombs or other unmanned delivery systems against targets in North America and that such missiles would have been equipped with

¹⁴. See W.A.B. Douglas, The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Vol. II: The Creation of a National Air Force (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardi, World War II Airplanes Vol. 2 (New York: Rand McNally and Co., 1977) p. 148; Douglas Liversidge, The Third Front: The Strange Story of the Secret War in the Arctic (London: Souvenir Press Ltd., 1960).

¹⁵. National Archives of Canada, [hereafter NAC] RG 24 acc 83-84/167 vol. 222 file 1400-16 pt. 1, (1 Aug 45) War Department Military Intelligence Division, "General Report No. 7: Japanese Free Balloons and Related Incidents"; (13 Mar 45) DOR CGS, "Japanese Balloon Incidents Summary No. 5"; John Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947 (Toronto: Maclelland and Stewart, 1989) pp. 218-219.

nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads. So far there have been no Canadian sources unearthed that indicate that Canadian planners considered such a possible action seriously during the course of the war.¹⁶

2. Mobile Striking Force Operations, 1947-55

Canadian-American defence relations during the Cold War were based initially on the existing Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) structure and the newly-created Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) formed in 1946. The PJBD continued to serve as the link between the executive level leaderships and as the link between the foreign policy communities of both nations. The MCC was the link between the Canadian Joint Planning Committee and the American Joint Planning Staff. The MCC formulated the Canada-US Basic Security Plan (CUSBSP), while the PJBD was used to handle any disputes which arose during that process. Intelligence flowed openly in the MCC CUSBSP process.

The Canadian land component of the CUSBSP consisted of the Mobile Striking Force (MSF). There were four MSFs, one Canadian and three American. One of the three American MSFs was called the Northern Landing Force and consisted of a Marine Corps brigade group with associated amphibious shipping and air and naval gunfire support. The other two American MSFs were two brigade groups of the 82nd Airborne Division. Geographically, the American forces were committed to Alaska (one brigade), Greenland or Iceland (the Northern Landing Force) with the other airborne brigade in reserve. The Canadian MSF was responsible for defence operations on Canadian territory, including the Arctic. Each MSF reported to its respective country and service, ie: there was no combined MSF command for North America.

The general concept of operations for the MSFs revolved around the projected Soviet threat. The primary threat was that the Soviets would use their airborne or even small amphibious forces to establish rudimentary air bases in the Alaska-Canadian Arctic-Greenland-Iceland axis. The main

¹⁶. See Philip Henshall, The Nuclear Axis: Germany, Japan, and the Atomic Bomb Race 1939-45 (Smerset: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2000) and R.K. Wilcox, Japan's Secret War (Marlowe: New York, 1995)

Soviet strategic bomber of the day, the TU-4 BULL, was incapable of two-way missions against North America from Soviet bases. The BULLs were estimated to be capable of carrying nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as were 'reverse engineered' V-1 or V-2 missiles. Both manned and unmanned systems would launch against strategic targets from the forward base areas.¹⁷

The Canadian MSF consisted of three infantry battalion groups (infantry battalions with artillery, engineers, and service support). Each battalion group had an airborne (parachute) component and a glider component. The battalion groups were placed under the command of MSF HQ, also known as 23 Brigade Group, which would come into existence once the war started. The battalion groups could be used independently or together as a brigade if necessary. They could even be broken down into company groups if so required. 23 Brigade Group reported to the Chief of the General Staff who reported in turn to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.¹⁸

MSF exercises EAGLE, SWEETBRIAR, and SUNDOG II conducted in the 1950-51 time frame indicated that the Army and RCAF were not cooperating effectively. Consequently, a joint MSF headquarters was formed. The MSF now became what we would today call a JTF. It consisted of a permanent peacetime headquarters planning staff of eight located at Army HQ in Ottawa. This would be expanded in wartime. The RCAF added two squadrons of B-25 Mitchell light bombers and a staff increment to MSF HQ. RCAF air transport was earmarked to the MSF for immediate use in wartime (12 out of 35 C-119 transports, with the rest to follow on a priority basis with additional North Star long range transports). Other RCAF assets would support the MSF but would not be under command. These included the Lancasters conducting the Arctic reconnaissance programme which would identify the targets prior to insertion of the MSF by air.¹⁹

The Land/Air Warfare Committee at the joint staff level was used to formally resolve any peacetime doctrinal difficulties which arose. The MSF's concept of operations was practiced twice-yearly and involved joint exercises

¹⁷. DHH file 112.3M2 (D 400), (30 Jun 50) "The Employment of the Mobile Striking Force for the Reduction of Enemy Lodgements in Canada."

¹⁸. Sean M. Maloney, "The Mobile Striking Force and Continental Defence, 1948-1955," Canadian Military History Vol. 2 No. 2 Autumn 1993, pp. 75-88.

¹⁹. Ibid.

at the battalion group level. After the Soviets started deploying intercontinental jet bombers in the mid-1950s, the need for the MSF waned and the joint exercises ceased by the late 1950s.

3. Planning for National Survival, 1957-65

The introduction of Soviet megaton-yield nuclear weapons and their attachment to intercontinental bombers and ballistic missiles in the late 1950s drastically altered NATO conceptions on how a war would be fought. This in turn radically affected Canadian defence planning and seriously stimulated the Diefenbaker government's Continuity of Government (COG) policy. In basic terms, Canadian COG policy was structured to operate within the context of NATO's 1954 strategic concept MC 48. This strategic concept, arrived at by consensus within NATO, was based on a two-phase pattern of war:

Phase I: A period of violent large scale organized fighting of a comparatively short duration, not likely to exceed thirty days, the first few days which would be characterized by the greatest intensity of nuclear exchange.

Phase II: A longer period of indeterminate duration for reorganization, resupply, and the accomplishment of necessary military tasks leading to a conclusion of the war.²⁰

Phase II could last months or years.

The role of North America in MC 48 was two-fold. Canadian and American air and naval defence forces had to protect the United States Air Force's Strategic Air Command bases so that Phase I could end as quickly as possible in NATO's favour, and they had to protect or at least limit damage to the population and mobilization base in North America. Conventional and reinforcement forces to defend and/or re-take Europe had to be mobilized from this base in Phase II, since practically all of these forces would come from Canada and the United States. Continuity of Government was thus

²⁰. (23 Mar 1957) North Atlantic Military Committee, "MC 14/2(revised) A Report by the Military Committee on the Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area."

vital so that defence forces could be commanded as effectively as possible in Phase I, and so Canadian and European society would continue to exist in and after Phase II.²¹

Canada's Federal and Provincial governments, then, had to survive for up to thirty days against sustained opposition in the first few days and sporadic nuclear attack for three more weeks, command defence forces during the first thirty days of a nuclear war, and then rebuild and recover those portions of the country suffering from direct nuclear attack and fallout afterwards.

The St Laurent government recognized the need to plan for COG but was voted out of office before any serious work could be undertaken. Concurrently the Army studied the problem. In December 1956, Brigadier W.A.B. Anderson, was instructed by the CGS, Lieutenant General H.D Graham to assess the Militia and what its contribution might be in Phase I and Phase II of an MC-48-style conflict. Graham was motivated by financial and manpower considerations. There was also a need to harmonize the new National Survival role that evolved throughout the 1950s. The Army, both regular and Militia, was tasked by the Government with supporting the Civil Defence organization after a nuclear attack. It is clear that Graham wanted the study to reflect that the Militia should exclusively handle the National Survival task and the regular force should handle battlefield tasks.²²

Anderson's "Report on the Militia-1957" discussed the overall strategic concept (MC 48's Phase I/Phase II structure) but added some detail to Phase II which he believed was relevant to the study:

As a subsequent to the exploitation phase in which the likely tasks are to ensure the security of friendly territory against the residual strength of the enemy, to under write the stability of the government and the means of production, and to undertake the further operations necessary to ensure acceptance by the enemy of the reconstruction policies we intend to pursue ... [the land forces] to be used in this phase will be urgently needed and will have to come from countries which have been least heavily attacked....There is no reason to think that they may not be

²¹.DHH, The Raymont Collection, file 995 "Extract from MC 14/2." See MC 14/2.

²². DHH file 73/612, 31 Dec 56, memo Graham to Anderson, "Militia Study."

massive in size in order to achieve stability in the face of such widespread and unprecedented disorder.²³

This last part is extremely important, since no planners in Canada or in NATO had really considered what would happen in Phase II. The RCN and RCAF both left it vague and focused on Phase I.

Anderson also emphasized that the Army should not be locked completely into the MC 48 vision. The Army would be expected to fight Korean War-like conflicts alongside the US and the UK, probably by providing a brigade group and possibly a division. The existing regular Army structure could provide this force as necessary, since the units already existed, and they could be augmented with the Militia if a division were required. In what he termed "conditions short of armed conflict," (peacekeeping as we know it today), Anderson recognized that there was a "growing demand...to assist the UN in preventing the outbreak of hostilities, or in preventing hostilities from expanding into more widespread conflict." He figured Canada would provide a regular force battalion group, possibly a brigade group. These would be drawn from the regular Army as necessary, "provided always, that as new commitments are accepted, they are accompanied by authority to activate replacement units."²⁴ Anderson probably included this proviso in the aftermath of the Army's UNEF experience during the Suez Crisis in 1956.

Militia tasks in wartime consisted of internment, vital point security, and augmenting the regular Army in Europe with the balance (two brigade groups) of the division as soon as possible after M-Day, but before M+30, and producing two more divisions for service in Europe within a year. There was also the Civil Defence commitment, which included command and control of civil defence forces, radiation reconnaissance, rescue, and engineer services. Anderson stated that these tasks were in conflict with each other. How could the Militia train for conventional war in Europe, transport itself across the Atlantic, while guarding Canada and cleaning up after a nuclear attack?²⁵

Anderson found that there were two options; Either have some type of formation between Militia (part time) and regular force (full time) so that

²³. DHH file 73/612, Dec 56, "A Report on the Organization, Equipment, and Training of the Canadian Army (Militia)."

²⁴. Ibid.

²⁵. Ibid.

there was a larger pool of fully-trained men in order that the division could be augmented more quickly, while the lesser-trained men handle civil defence and guard tasks; or reorganize the Militia strictly for civil defence tasks and enlarge the regular force; or maintain the status quo, which meant trying to do all tasks with the forces available. Anderson recommended the second option.²⁶

Cabinet met and decided that the Department of National Defence take responsibility for National Survival programmes. The Civil Defence Order mandated that the Army finance and control:

- a. public warning systems
- b. determine the location of nuclear explosions and paths of fallout
- c. assess damage
- d. control and carry out re-entry into damaged areas and rescue citizens
- e. direct police and fire services
- f. direct municipal services like water and sewer services
- g. provide emergency support to provincial governments
- h. maintain and operate emergency communications
- i. maintain law and order and prevent panic.²⁷

With the Chiefs of Staff Committee's concurrence, a detailed Implementation Programme was created. Previously, the Department of Health and Welfare ran the public warning system: the Army took it over in September 1959. Detailed connections were made with NORAD HQ in Colorado and the USAF's Strategic Air Command in Omaha and small numbers of Canadian Army personnel were deployed to those locations. Army personnel were also established in the RCAF Air Defence Control Centres and the communications system expanded so that attack data could flow to the Army regional commands and the provincial and federal emergency command centres of the BRIDGE system which contained Regional Direction Centre emergency committees manned by police, intelligence, military, and political representatives. Over time, all the pieces of this scheme were dubbed The National Survival Attack Warning System (NSAWS).²⁸

²⁶. Ibid.

²⁷. DHH, file 112.3S4 (D3) (Sep 59) "Statement on the Role of the Army in Civil Defence."

²⁸. NAC RG 24 acc 83-84/215 file 1200-p4-2 vol. 18, (27 Jul 59) CCOS to the Minister, "Implementation Programme: National Survival Attack Warning System."

New facilities and organizations needed to be created and manned. For example, the Nuclear Detonation Detection system (NUDET) which handled fallout reporting and prediction needed a system of zones and sectors in potential target areas. If the NUDET personnel were located in the provincial/regional bunkers, they needed the means to gather, process and pass on information. Therefore, Target Area Headquarters (TAHQ's) were formed. These were small bunkers built using the basements of existing structures located just outside of the urban areas. The TAHQ's then had a communications link with the 'Diefenbunker' Continuity of Government sites. Such a system placed a great premium on signals and weather prediction personnel.²⁹

The overall re-entry script which the Militia was supposed to adapt to followed this pattern. The Soviets would target population centres in Canada during the initial phases of a conflict. Since there would be so much disruption during this first phase, there would be no time for mobilization and the existing deployed forces in Europe would have to fight on their own. After the initial attack, the population trapped in devastated cities would have to be rescued and infrastructure restored so that continuity of government and society could be retained. Then the reserve forces could be mobilized and deployed overseas to fight.

Given the nature of the nuclear threat, command and control for National Survival operations was highly decentralized and established in peacetime. The military response was coordinated through the War Book (see Cuban Missile Crisis section) which provided Government-accepted and predelegated authority to local commanders in the event of attack.

4. Operation GRAND BANKS: Counter-AGI Operations 1957-63

New intelligence on Soviet capabilities entered into the picture when the MCC submitted "MCC 600/2: Future Defence Analysis" to the COSC and JCS. MCC 600/2 argued that the Soviets would, by 1961, be able to maintain 41 submarines in the Atlantic and 16 in the Pacific Oceans in peacetime on station off the coasts of North America. Most of these submarines would be

²⁹. NAC RG 24 acc 83-84/215 file 1200-p4-2 vol. 18, CCOS to the Minister, "Implementation Programme: National Survival Attack Warning System."

equipped with nuclear mines, nuclear torpedoes, or nuclear guided missiles. They would be supported with covert minelayers (merchant ships equipped for this purpose) and long-range aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons. Targets would be land targets, probably SAC bases.³⁰

MCC 600/2 recommended to the COSC and JCS that a large number of improvements were critical and that the two nations:³¹

- a) develop an agreed-to ASW concept.
- b) integrate operational plans on both coasts and ensure that these plans resonated with NATO concepts and plans.
- c) improve measures to detect, maintain surveillance of, and identify submarines operating within striking range of North American targets.
- d) provide anti-submarine forces with improved detection and kill capabilities, including provision for the employment of atomic weapons.

The COSC accepted this as a basis for planning.³²

War planning recognized that SAC would be the priority target, with industry, government and population as secondary targets. Canada would have two or three hours warning from the DEW Line for a bomber attack, though submarines might be able to effect some attacks earlier. The Emergency Defence Plan (EDP) would be conducted "in the initial stages of a war and before SACLANT re-assigns forces to other tasks."³³ In doing so, MARCOMLANT's primary task was the destruction of enemy submarines, followed by the destruction of incoming cruise missiles launched from both submarines and long range aircraft, and the protection of Canadian ports from nuclear mines and torpedoes.³⁴

Dramatically increased Soviet trawler and submarine activity off the east coast of Canada throughout the early Cold War greatly disturbed Canadian national security policymakers. Some tended to discard the activity and write it off as routine. Others warned that

³⁰. DHH 112.012 (D1) (1 Jan 1958) "Canada-United States Future Defence Analysis MCC 600/2."

³¹. Ibid.

³². NAC RG 24 vol. 112 file 096 107.4 v.1, (30 Jan 58) memo De Wolfe to Foulkes, "Co-Ordinated Canada-United States Defence of North America Against Submarines"; DGHIST 112.3M2.009 (D 260) (8 Jan 58) "Extract from minutes of the 615th Meeting of the COSC."

³³. NAC RG 24 vol. 130 file 098.108, "Maritime Commander Atlantic Emergency Defence Plan-1958."

³⁴. Ibid.

We have at least seventeen trawlers off our east coast all the time, year in, year out. We have now become accustomed to that. A year ago or less we were having submarine reports and activity. All the Russians have to do is beef up their activity over a period and we become accustomed to that and go asleep again; and they can suddenly spring into action when they like.³⁵

CANCOMARLANT initiated Operation GRAND BANKS in 1958 with the express purpose of finding out what the enemy was up to. The trawlers were conducting detailed hydrographic, geographic, and weather surveys and appear to have laid a buoyed underwater system for communicating with their submarines. They were also strongly suspected of conducting nocturnal replenishment operations. In a massive operation, a Canadian aircraft carrier group, a surface destroyer group, and Neptune and Tracker aircraft photographed, buzzed, and hounded thirty five or so Soviet trawlers. A Tracker saw a swirl, gained a Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) contact and tracked one sub by sonobuoys. The Shelburne SOSUS station reported a 'snorter' and two Maritime Patrol Aircraft were vectored onto it, which produced MAD and sonobuoys readings. Suddenly, RCN ships reported communications jamming on multiple frequencies. RCN SIGINT facilities reported that Soviets were considerably agitated by the operation.³⁶

The AGI problem was multifaceted. The trawlers provided the Soviets with several capabilities. First, they could resupply their submarines far forward which increased their loiter time off Canada. Second, the trawlers were effective SIGINT platforms which could observe all manner of Canadian and American exercises relating to the defence of North America and NATO in Europe. There was also serious concern that an AGI could be used to deliver a 'Trojan Horse' nuclear weapon into any given port on the east coast of North America.³⁷

The trawler/submarine problem highlighted the problem of the transition between peace and war and the need for a mixed, flexible force structure. These enemy forces were pre-positioned in peacetime to support submarine

³⁵. DHH vol. 73/1223 file 2002, "Minutes of a Conference of Air Officers Commanding and Air Officers Held in the Air Council Room at Air Force Headquarters, Ottawa, 17 to 19 March 1959."

³⁶. DHH file 73/1132, (11 Apr 58) "Maritime Commander Atlantic Operation Order 2-58: Operation GRAND BANKS III."

³⁷.

operations in wartime against North America. Due to their stealthy characteristics, submarines could transit to the launch sites before the war started and coordinate with a bomber attack. They could open a hole in radar coverage for bombers to pass through and they could be used to destroy significant Strategic Air Command bombers on the ground.

The problem of transition from cold war to hot war was an object of deliberation within the Canadian and American maritime warfare communities. There was a relatively open exchange of information between the two services so that there would be no gaps. Some Canadian planners thought that a NORAD-like command should be established to deal with the guided missile launching submarine threat. Perhaps the Canadian maritime forces and the USN's Anti-Submarine Defence Force Atlantic (ASDEVFORLANT)³⁸ should come under a bi-national command instead of SACLANT. Perhaps SACLANT should handle everything past Iceland and leave the defence of North America in the hands of national forces under the CUSRPG.³⁹

The problem was that ASDEVFORLANT was an American national command that was not earmarked to SACLANT in war, whereas Canadian maritime forces in the Atlantic were for the most part so allocated. The concern was that if there was no sufficient warning, Canadian forces would be automatically transferred to SACLANT's command and he might task them elsewhere, like the GIUK Gap.⁴⁰ Removal of the forces from SACLANT and reassignment to Canada-US Regional Planning Group might cause political problems in NATO, even though by doing so the force structure which had been partly justified as a NATO commitment would remain so since CUSRPG was a NATO agency.

The US Navy was violently opposed to establishing such a command, pointing out that American national forces like ASDEVFORLANT came under CinCLANT, who was SACLANT anyway, who was also triple-hatted as WESTLANT too. Despite the convoluted structure, the chain of command

³⁸. ASDEVFORLANT was established by the USN in June 1957. Its mission was specifically to protect North America from missile launching and other submarine threats. See Tom Compere (ed.) The Navy Blue Book Vol. I (New York: Military Publishing Institute, Inc., 1960) p. 274.

³⁹. NAC RG 24 acc 83/84/167 vol. 1 file 098.105, (14 Oct 58) memo DAPP to CPlansI, "Briefing on NATO and CAN/US Maritime Plans."

⁴⁰. NAC RG 24 acc 83/84/167 vol. 1 file 098.105, (15 Oct 58) memo COps to CPlansI.

was flexible enough to allow for North American defence operations to go on without affecting other SACLANT operations.⁴¹

Canadian responses to Soviet threats in the Atlantic were handled by the Joint Services Committee Atlantic Coast, a tri-service command structure dedicated to handling the naval threat and any potential seaborne landings (see Defence of Canada Force section). The three services and the RCMP cooperated at the theatre level while at the same time chains of command for each service went back to their respective service chiefs in Ottawa. Any problems which arose were mediated at the Chiefs of Staff Committee level if necessary. Alliance problems were handled through the PJBD and MCC.

5. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

The problems raised by the lack of a formal Canada-US anti-submarine command similar to NORAD contributed to political problems encountered during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The continental defence system for North America was initially based on PJBD/MCC planning as enshrined in the CUSBSP in the late 1940s. By the early 1950s it was evident to policymakers on both sides of the 49th parallel that the air defence of the continent had to be viewed as a seamless operation. Steps were taken to create an entity called CinC Air Defence Canada-US (CinCADCANUS) but were put on hold in the United States in part because Canada was lagging behind in air defence systems and technology related to nuclear weapons. This was critical since the only reliable air defence system against enemy bombers could be based on tactical nuclear weapons. In time, CinC ADCANUS evolved into the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) which provided a joint commander for the air defence forces of both countries.⁴²

The problem was that the treaty which legalized NORAD was caught up in the 1957 election campaign in Canada. The government changed while the treaty and its operational provisions for implementation were about to be

⁴¹. NAC RG 24 acc 83/84/167 vol. 1 file 098.105, (15 Oct 58) memo COps to CPlansI; USN OA, Burke Papers, (15 Jan 60) CNO to Distribution List, "The Strategic Concept for Antisubmarine Warfare."

⁴². This section is based on Sean M. Maloney, Learning to Love The Bomb: Canada's Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1951-1968 (forthcoming).

signed. The Diefenbaker Government signed the treaty. It was then attacked by the Opposition in Parliament for doing so even though the previous government had initiated the process prior to 1957. NORAD became a cause celebre and the naval aspects of continental defence drifted into the shadows.⁴³

The operational provisions for implementing NORAD's war plan in the event of hostilities were somewhat vague when dealing with crises short of global thermonuclear war. This included the creation and acceptance of an agreed-to alerting system so that both Canadian and American air defence forces were compatible. Similarly, the NORAD agreement was predicated on the fact that Canada would have nuclear air defence weapons. The Diefenbaker government was overly-cautious in the new domestic political environment and anti-nuclear factions interfered with the nuclear weapons sharing arrangements. This dis-allowed full Canadian participation in NORAD planning.⁴⁴

That said, there were many informal links between the RCAF and the USAF, and the USN and RCN, particularly with regards to nuclear weapons employment, release, tactics, and safety since the Canadian forces were structured for nuclear weapons use under the terms of Canada's Cold War strategic concept.⁴⁵

The constitutional arrangements by which Canada went to war at this time were codified in the War Book, a Canadian document which was an interagency war plan connected to the Canadian, American, and NATO alerting systems. For example, if a NATO commander declared an alert level, there were sections in the War Book which explained what Canada's forces were to do, what postures to take, and so forth if they were committed to that commander. Canadian military commanders both abroad and at home were permitted certain discrete activities on their own at certain alert levels, but the higher levels had to be declared by the Minister of National Defence. The War Book also included draft legislation which could be immediately signed by the Prime Minister and Governor General.⁴⁶

⁴³. Ibid

⁴⁴. Ibid.

⁴⁵. Ibid.

⁴⁶. Ibid.

When the Cuban Missile Crisis sprang up in October 1962, the United States alerted its strategic nuclear forces and proceeded to implement some levels of their alert system. Since NORAD was connected to the American alert system, CinCNORAD prepared to increase his alert level and informed Canadian authorities. Diefenbaker refused to accept this and would not permit Canadian air defence forces to assume the same level of alert as American air defence forces. Since the Diefenbaker Government was still dithering on equipping the Canadian air defence forces with nuclear weapons, these forces as well as American squadrons based in Canada were not allowed to be properly equipped while the crisis suddenly escalated.⁴⁷

The RCN leadership pushed the boundaries of what they were permitted to do under the lower level alert activities so that they could keep track of the estimated 13 Soviet submarines in Canadian waters. The concern was that these submarines could fire their missiles at American SAC bases which would destabilize the West's deterrent and affect the outcome of the nuclear war if it were fought over Cuba. The lack of RCAF participation in the NORAD alert produced a situation where SAC bases in the mid-west were open and vulnerable. Put together, the inability of Canadian forces to fully contribute to North American defence seriously strained the American system beyond the limits it was designed for which produced an unstable deterrence system and increased the likelihood of nuclear war.⁴⁸

There was a serious Cabinet split between the Minister of National Defence on one hand and the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Prime Minister on the other. The arguments used by the Prime Minister that he was being pushed into defending Canada by the United States were used but did not hold water since the defence arrangements and procedures were in the War Book which had been approved by Cabinet. For three precarious days, the RCAF was not permitted by the elected governmental officials to prepare to defend Canada in the face of a massive Soviet nuclear threat. In time, the Minister of National Defence prevailed and certain measures associated with higher-level alert procedures were implemented. The damage to Canadian-American relations was, however, massive and beyond repair. In

⁴⁷. Ibid.

⁴⁸. Ibid.

time connections like the PJBD and MCC no longer retained the prestige they had enjoyed in the previous three decades.⁴⁹

Canadian behaviour during the Cuban Missile Crisis is a case study in how domestic politics can complicate rational and accepted contingency planning.

6. Defence of Canada Operations 1960-70

The Mobile Striking Force, as a formation, ceased to exist by the 1960s. The continental defence commitment, however, still existed though the threat estimate had changed. The concern now was that, given the adoption of a strategic concept in which conventional operations were possible prior to the outbreak of nuclear war, the Soviets might attempt to use small airborne, trawler, or submarine-landed special forces to destroy vital installations. The target installations were extremely vital for the defence of North America in an all-out nuclear war. They included nuclear weapon storage sites housing anti-bomber rockets and missiles like CFB Comox, BC; underwater listening SOSUS installations like CFS Shelburne, Nova Scotia; or radar and air defence control stations like CFS Holberg, BC.

Instead of having a MSF-like formation, the Army, and later Mobile Command, tasked each brigade group based in Canada to develop and exercise contingency plans for independent battalion group-level Defence of Canada Force (DCF) operations.

One of the first DCF exercises was Ex BOAT CLOAK held in 1963. BOAT CLOAK involved 1st Battalion, Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (the Black Watch), a detachment from the Royal Canadian Engineers, and two troops from the RCD Recce Squadron. Two ASW destroyers, Terra Nova and Chaudiere, along with the destroyer HMCS Buckingham, moved the composite force from Halifax, conducted a small-scale ASW exercise first, and then headed for Cape Breton. Several small recce parties were landed by boat several days before the main landing force went in under cover of naval gunfire support.⁵⁰

⁴⁹. Ibid.

⁵⁰. J.D. Barclay, "Exercise BOAT CLOAK," The Canadian Guardsman: 1964 Edition pp. 119-122.

On the west coast, there was Exercise CANLEX 64. 1st Battalion, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada was tasked by Mobile Command through 1 Brigade to develop a plan to protect or retake CFS Holberg, the western-most end of one cross-Canada air defence radar line. Two officers, one with Royal Marines assault training and another who was a graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger course, were put in charge of a 180-man composite company group. The unit trained for eight months. Starting from scratch, a Joint Operations Centre was established with Maritime Command forces at HMCS Dockyard in Victoria. Boarding, embarkation, and disembarkation drills were developed, and a composite beach party was formed. Soldiers and sailors who had D-Day experience assisted and even produced old doctrinal manuals.⁵¹

The DCF Company Group then boarded four Ocean Escorts (converted minesweepers) for the exercises. Tactical air support was provided by T-33's based out of CFB Comox. Naval gunfire support was also used. The DCF company group then tracked down the enemy landing force, raided its base camp, and successfully protected the radar station.⁵²

The amphibious exercises continued annually on each coast throughout the 1960s. These included Exercise MOHAWK (1964) held at CFS Shelburne (a SOSUS terminal). MOHAWK included six destroyers, submarines, and patrol aircraft as well as a company group. YEOMAN (1964) was held at Argentia, Newfoundland where the U.S. Navy had a SOSUS station and a nuclear weapons storage site. YEOMAN included nine Prestonian-class frigates, a diving support vessel with divers, and the Operational Support Ship (AOR) HMCS Provider with her helicopters and landing craft (assault). A composite company group drawn from 1st Bn, The Black Watch as well as several T-33 ground support aircraft participated. Similarly, Exercise SOCKEYE employed three destroyers, another Queen's Own Rifles company group in a mission to CFS Masset, a signals intelligence station located in the Queen Charlotte Islands.⁵³

Exercise POOL SHARK I and II (September/October 1970): Held on the west coast of Vancouver island, an infantry battalion with naval gunfire

⁵¹. Telephone interview with LGen Charles Belzile, 9 August 1998.

⁵². H.G. Leitch, "Exercise CANLEX," The Powder Horn: 1964 Edition pp. 39-41; "CANLEX '64," Crowsnest December 1964, p. 8.

⁵³. "Exercise SOCKEYE," The Powder Horn: 1965 Edition pp. 80-83; "Exercise YEOMAN," Crowsnest December 1964, pp. 5-7; "Joint Army-Navy Exercise Held," Crowsnest June 1964 P. 3.

support teams boarded the ASW destroyer HMCS Mackenzie and the minesweepers HMCS Fundy and Chignecto to 'eliminate' and enemy lodgment near Bamfield, a communications station.⁵⁴

Exercise POTLATCH (September 1974): Another northern Vancouver Island operation, POTLATCH was a joint Canada-US exercise involving a Canadian infantry battalion and a USMC battalion. The Canadian force was transported by the operational support ship HMCS Provider and the ASW destroyers HMCS Restigouche and Gatineau. The Marines were lifted by the landing ships USS Mount Vernon and Barber County. HMCS Rainbow, a Canadian submarine, opposed the amphibious force while in transit to the landing area.⁵⁵

Exercise KERNAL POTLACH II (September 1979): KERNAL POTLACH II was an even bigger version of POTLATCH and was probably the largest amphibious exercise held on the Canadian west coast. A Canadian infantry battalion group married up with a Marine Amphibious Unit in California for joint exercises. The land forces were then supported by, in the Canadian case, the operational support ship HMCS Provider and the ASW destroyers HMCS Gatineau, Terra Nova, and Restigouche, while the Americans were loaded into the landing ships USS Alamo, Cleveland, Mobile, Anchorage, and New Orleans. The second phase of the exercise was a transit to Vancouver Island while the escort vessels warded off enemy submarines and aircraft, played by Maritime Air Command Argus and USN P-3 maritime patrol aircraft and Air Command CF-100 electronic warfare aircraft based at CFB Comox. The amphibious force was screened by nine USN cruisers and destroyers, including USS Long Beach, and an undisclosed number of nuclear submarines.⁵⁶

Command and control relationships were decentralized to the CF headquarters on each coast and were very much considered a tertiary duty in the 1970s. The joint service relationship was ad hoc, as was the participation of the RCMP. Constitutionally, DCF operations were like MSF operations, that is, wartime events covered by the National Defence Act and linked to the War Book and Canadian Forces Alert System for activation.

⁵⁴. Dennis Ryan, "Combined Ops", Sentinel Januray 1971 pp. 26-27.

⁵⁵. Bill Aikman, "POTLACH", Sentinelle 1975/1, pp. 16-22.

⁵⁶. Len Herman, "Exercise KERNAL POTLACH II", Sentinel 1979/6. pp. 4-7.

7. Operations ESSAY and GINGER: The October Crisis, 1970

Separatist terrorism in Quebec started in 1963 and continued on a sporadic but escalating basis throughout the 1960s. Some FLQ terrorists received training overseas, particularly in Algeria, and the movement espoused a Marxian ideology. The FLQ bombed National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa in 1970 and then embarked on a terror campaign against foreign diplomats that October. Though the security forces were able to prevent attacks against Israeli and American diplomatic representatives, they were unable to stop an FLQ cell from kidnapping the British trade representative, James Cross.⁵⁷

One of the concessions the FLQ wanted in exchange for Cross was the publication and television transmission of their manifesto. At the same time, Mobile Command conducted Exercise NIGHT HAWK, a two-day covert deployment of an light armoured squadron to a base near Montreal "to form a quick reaction force for a possible deployment to Montreal."⁵⁸ This was an anticipatory move on the Mobile Commands part so that they could be in a better position to respond if the situation deteriorated. Five days later it did when another FLQ cell, kidnapped Quebec Minister for Labour Pierre Laporte and demanded the release of political prisoners. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau believed that any concession to the FLQ, however, was the equivalent of "putting our fingers into a gearbox from which we could never get out"⁵⁹ and refused to do so.

Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa called Trudeau after Laporte was snatched and asked him to "send in the Army" and pleaded with him to "think about invoking the War Measures Act"⁶⁰ since in the provincial government's view, the civil police were incapable of conducting searches, investigations, and protecting government facilities and personnel. Trudeau would only agree to respond to the Aid of the Civil Power request and then only when it was formally made, which Bourassa vacillated on for several

⁵⁷. Fournier, FLQ pp. 54-55; Interview with General Jean Victor Allard, former Chief of the Defence Staff, 16 April 1993, Lahr, Germany.

⁵⁸. (29 Jan 71) Mobile Command Headquarters, "Operation ESSAY-Final Report."

⁵⁹. Pierre Trudeau, Memoirs (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Inc., 1993) p. 134.

⁶⁰. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

days. The CDS was out of the country at a NATO meeting so the Vice CDS, General Michael Dare, was in command. General Dare directed the commander of Mobile Command, General Gilles Turcot, to establish liaison with the provincial Attorney General so that the Army could develop a plan to provide Aid of the Civil Power to Quebec if and when Bourassa formally requested aid. This plan was called Operation ESSAY.⁶¹

At the same time, Dare authorized Operation GINGER. Unlike ESSAY, GINGER was not an Aid of the Civil Power operation. The federal government, using the office of the Solicitor General of Canada as a medium, requested assistance to the civil authority. Mobile Command was asked to assist the RCMP with securing federal government buildings in Ottawa, to provide armed escort to federal government officials, and to provide a quick reaction force. 2 Combat Group, based in nearby Petawawa, Ontario, deployed 1000 soldiers for these tasks two days prior to the ESSAY deployment in Quebec. A special liaison staff was established at Canadian Forces Headquarters which included the RCMP and Ottawa city police. This was done to ensure coordination and application of resources.⁶²

Since Bourassa had not made up his mind, General Dare was directed to flesh out Op ESSAY so that the Canadian Forces would "participate in a symbolic show of force against the FLQ without antagonizing the rest of Quebec."⁶³ Air Command's C-130's, 707's, and Buffalo aircraft were placed a high state of readiness, as were the 9000 men of 2 and 5 Combat Groups. ESSAY tasks included protection of diplomats, government buildings and ministers in Quebec, as well as hydroelectric stations. Bourassa finally formally requested Aid of the Civil Power and Operation ESSAY commenced on 15 October. All Quebec-based forces from 5 Combat Group then deployed by helicopter, road, and transport aircraft to the some 150 potential targets, while a joint police-Army operation and liaison centre was established in Montreal.⁶⁴

Cabinet debated on whether or not to employ the War Measures Act. The Aid of the Civil Power legislation was too restrictive in Trudeau's view since

⁶¹. (23 Feb 78) Major J.O. Dendy, "Directorate of History Report CFHQ 19: Aid to the Civil Power," pp. 67-69.

⁶². Ibid., pp. 128-131.

⁶³. Ibid., p. 74.

⁶⁴. (29 Jan 71) Mobile Command Headquarters, "Operation ESSAY-Final Report."

it did not cross provincial boundaries (Ontario and Quebec were both targets and this produced command and control problems). The War Measures Act was the only way Trudeau could legally 'federalize' and unify the anti-FLQ effort.⁶⁵

Declaring that the FLQ had "no mandate but terror", Trudeau went on television to announce that the government had decided to implement the War Measures Act since criminal law enforcement was not adequate to deal with the FLQ. If the government gave into the FLQ demands, "the law of the jungle would rule."⁶⁶ Parliament backed the Government in the imposition of the War Measures Act.

Augmented by units from 1 Combat Group in Western Canada which had arrived by strategic airlift, forces committed to Op ESSAY now had additional tasks. These included assisting the police in cordon and search operations, mobile patrols in rural areas, and explosive ordnance disposal.⁶⁷ Sub-units of the Canadian Airborne Regiment were brought in to conduct special operations. One of these, Op EPIGRAM, involved an airmobile force which was used to raid an FLQ training camp in the hilly Laurentides area.⁶⁸ All operations were coordinated with provincial authorities, who were consulted and generally kept informed. Cordon and search operations consisted of police and military personnel under police direction but Army command.⁶⁹

The lack of established procedures for dealing closely with municipal and provincial police and federal intelligence services produced confusion in the transition from 'peace' to 'war'. The Regional Direction Centre (RDC), previously established to coordinate police responses to the existing crisis in Quebec, now had to absorb an increment from HQ 5e GdeC and FMC HQ and had to adapt to accelerated processes. Fortunately, the use of military intelligence assets earlier in the 1960s facilitated the flow and analysis of information from military sources to some extent.⁷⁰

⁶⁵. Interview with BGen C de L 'Kip' Kirby, 17 May 1997.

⁶⁶. National Film Board of Canada's documentary film, "Action: The October Crisis."

⁶⁷. (23 Feb 78) Major J.O. Dendy, "Directorate of History Report CFHQ 19: Aid to the Civil Power," p. 15-20; (29 Jan 71) Mobile Command Headquarters, "Operation ESSAY-Final Report."

⁶⁸. Confidential interview.

⁶⁹. Guy Morchain, "Peace-keeping at Home", Sentinel February-March 1971, pp. 2-10.

⁷⁰. Hasek, John. The Disarming of Canada (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1987) p. 181.

The role of the RDC in the decisionmaking process was thus unclear. BGen Chouinard's staff restructured the RDC so that the RDC acted as the police liaison cell to FMC and not the other way around. The Combat Group commander then made the decisions on the employment of his units in consultation with the police through Commander FMC and the RDC. Further problems arose because HQ 5e GdeC and the RDC were co-located in the QPP HQ building. they were later joined by HQ Canadian Airborne Regiment, which was responsible for planning and conducting special operations. The police did not understand the differences between FMC HQ, HQ 5e GdeC, and HQ CAR and tried to issue requests to the wrong organization which resulted in anomalies like the HQ CAR being asked to support a cordon and search operation without going through HQ FMC first.⁷¹

BGen Chouinard was hampered after the initial deployment. HQ 5e GdeC had the authority to accept new VP/VIP guard tasks. Joint police/FMC operations requests by the police had to be passed to HQ FMC where the actual plans were produced, rather than at HQ 5e GdeC. This situation constantly changed, since the federal government issued requests for VP guards on their facilities sometimes to FMC HQ, and sometimes to HQ 5 GdeC through the FDC.

In the end, the personalities of Generals Chouinard and Turcot and their staff officers were instrumental in making this flawed command system function so that the mission could be achieved. These traits included perseverance, a willingness to cooperate, and the jettisoning of personal agendas.

Pierre Laporte was murdered by his captors on 17 October, the day after the War Measures Act was implemented. Cross, however, remained imprisoned until December when a cordon and search operation stumbled across the FLQ unit holding him. After negotiations with the surrounded terrorists, the federal government provided the Cross kidnapers with military transport to Cuba in exchange for Cross's freedom. Some of Laporte's killers, in addition to other FLQ members were apprehended in later operations. On at least five and possibly eight occasions, security forces

⁷¹. BGen J. Chouinard, "Operation ESSAY: Final Report (29 Jan 71)."

prevented FLQ cells from conducting violent acts.⁷² The point had been made and the FLQ was successfully deterred from continuing its terrorist campaign. Operations ESSAY and GINGER stood down in January 1971.

There was serious concern throughout the crisis that outside entities would become involved in the FLQ situation. These entities included France, Palestinian liberation groups, Algerians, and perhaps even Cuba or China. The scale of involvement, if increased with FLQ successes, could have meant American involvement.⁷³

8. Operation GAMESCAN 76: The 1976 Olympic Games

The City of Montreal won the bid to host the 1976 XXI Olympiad in 1970. In 1972, the Vice Chief of the Defence staff directed the formation of a three-man evaluation group to examine what Canadian Forces support might be required for the event. This group, while touring the 1972 Olympic Games at Munich and examining the security arrangements, had a front row seat for the Black September seizure and murder of Israeli athletes. Their evaluation was forwarded to the CDS and Cabinet, who then determined that planned police support would be inadequate and that Canadian Forces participation was essential.⁷⁴

Cabinet decided that the best way to legally handle military support to the Olympics was to have the Solicitor General of Canada formally ask the Minister of National Defence to provide this support. In other words, Operation GAMESCAN 76 was an assistance to the civil authority operation, not an Aid of the Civil Power operation. Cabinet approved the establishment of the Chief Committee on Public Safety for the Olympic Games (CCPSJO). CCPSJO was chaired by Major General Roland Reid and consisted of

⁷². The nature and extent of these operations remains classified. See Dendy, "Directorate of History Report CFHQ 19: Aid to the Civil Power," pp. 20-25.

⁷³. See Jean-Francois Lisee, In the Eye of the Eagle (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1990); Eldon Black, Direct Intervention: Canada-France Relations 1967-1974 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996) and J.F. Boshier, The Gaullist Attack on Canada 1967-1997 (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999). The Boshier work should be viewed with circumspection when dealing with Mobile Command. For a corrective, see Sean M. Maloney, "A Mere Rustle of Leaves: Canadian Strategy and the 1970 FLQ Crisis," Canadian Military Journal Vol. 1 No. 2 Summer 2000 pp. 73-86.

⁷⁴. Bill Aikman, "The Beginings", Sentinel. 1977/1 pp. 4-9.

representatives of the Montreal police department, the RCMP, the Quebec provincial police, the Ontario Provincial Police, and the Canadian Forces.⁷⁵

Op GAMESCAN 76 was a series of formidable tasks. There were 24 competition venues, 59 training sites, and 3 housing sites, the bulk of which were spread out around the Montreal area, but also 150 miles away at Kingston, Ontario where the yachting events were to be held. A Royal Visit was also scheduled. Unlike the FLQ Crisis, all three services would be involved.⁷⁶ Canadian Forces tasks included the provision of VIP and Vital Point security at all of these sites and armed response to any situation that developed.

The CCPSJO planners assembled a joint intelligence centre which handled information collection on potential domestic threats and served as a conduit for information from international and allied sources. There were no threats from specific groups. Consequently, the threat scenarios were generic in nature, that is, they included demonstrations, lone madmen, Munich-like kidnapping, hijackings, bombings, and assassinations. All GAMESCAN 76 committed forces were specifically trained to deal with them.⁷⁷

The scope and magnitude of the Forces' deployment (16 000 personnel) was deliberately large. The planners wanted to provide a visible deterrent but without alarming visitors and the civil population. Unlike Op ESSAY, where the troops deployed in full battle order, most of the Op GAMESCAN 76 force wore daily working dress and berets rather than helmets and combat clothing. They were still armed, of course, with the usual array of small arms.⁷⁸

The dispersed nature of the deployment demanded the creation of a several Task Forces drawn from Mobile Command units. For the Montreal region, 5 Combat Group formed Task Force 1 while two-thirds of 2 Combat Group formed Task Force 2. These Task Forces were responsible for maintaining security at the Olympic venues and at Mirabel and Dorval airports. Task Force 3 consisted of an airmobile Quick Reaction Force consisting of elements of the Canadian Airborne Regiment located at a base

⁷⁵. David Charters, "Peace-keeping and Internal Security", Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989) pp. 152-153.

⁷⁶. Ibid.

⁷⁷. Interviews with BGen C de L. 'Kip' Kirby, (CF Ret'd), 17 June 1997; MGen G. Ronald Cheriton (CF Ret'd) 3 June 1997.

⁷⁸. Ibid.

just outside of the city. Task Force Air provided helicopter and interceptor support to police no-fly zones over the city, while the Maritime Support Force (three destroyers, a logistics ship, and a clearance diving unit) ensured that the Montreal harbour was secure, that no one interfered with the trans-Atlantic cable, and that terrorists did not lay any mines. A separate infantry battalion was tasked with the Queen's security.⁷⁹

Task Force 4 was a Joint Task Force stationed at Kingston. It had an infantry battalion group with helicopters and service support, three destroyers with their helicopters, a clearance diving unit and a flight of four CF-5 ground support aircraft on call. Task Force 4's mission was to handle VIP and vital point security in the Kingston area and to ensure that no one interfered with the yachting events held on Lake Ontario. The organization also had a Quick Reaction Force based right in the athlete's dormitory. Task Force 4 also conducted joint border patrol and intelligence gathering operations with the RCMP. A joint operations centre based on Task Force 4's headquarters also included the local Kingston police, the provincial police, and the RCMP.⁸⁰

In the end, there were no terrorist incidents during the XXI Olympiad.

9. Counter-Narcotics Operations 1970-present

Counter-narcotics operations became a staple CF activity starting in the 1970s. NORAD air surveillance and maritime forces were used in coordinated operations involving the RCMP and municipal police forces. All Canadian intelligence agencies, including those of the CF, conducted numerous joint operations. Army units also participated in some presence missions in the rugged regions of southern British Columbia. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive study on the CF and counter-narcotics operations.⁸¹

⁷⁹. Kirby and Chariton interviews; Michael Whitby, Relentless in Chase: A History of HMCS IROQUOIS I and II (published under the authority of the Commanding Officer, 1996) p. 13; See also the special Sentinel issue dealing with Op GAMESCAN 76 (issue 1, 1977) for a variety of articles describing each Task Force.

⁸⁰. Kirby interview.

⁸¹. Discussions with participating personnel. See also Vernon Oickle, Busted: Nova Scotia's War on Drugs (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing Inc, 1997) for several accounts of CF involvement with counter-narcotics activity.

The nature of the threat to Canada posed by illegal narcotics smuggling has, however, evolved since the 1970s. The exponential increases in funds available to the drug producing and smuggling entities eventually reached the point in the mid-1980s where such entities essentially possessed the power of a small country. Similarly, the laundering of illegal monies posed significant and increasing threats to the existing economic order. Subversion of military and governmental personnel engaged in counter-narcotics operations poses a threat to the operational effectiveness of the armed forces if not countered which in turn could have an impact in other areas of Canadian interest.⁸²

Some HLD-type activities conducted by the CF involve surveillance. In what was one of the first drug interdiction operations involving the Canadian Forces, the ASW destroyer HMCS Mackenzie was alerted to intercept an inbound target. The result of an international counter-narcotics effort, the former USN minesweeper Marysville had left Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, with a load of illegal narcotics. Tracked across the Pacific, other surveillance assets handed over to a Maritime Air Command Argus MPA aircraft. Sporadically tracked by the Argus, the vessel was intercepted and boarded by the Mackenzie and with a prize crew was taken to Esquimalt. Unfortunately, the Argus briefly lost contact with the Marysville at which point she unloaded her illicit cargo. The cargo was later intercepted on land by a combined Army-RCMP force.⁸³

In one notable operation, a smuggling vessel heaved overboard 700 kilograms of cocaine stashed in sealed plastic tubes when hailed by RCMP counter-narcotics forces. These tubes were piled in a fish net and weighted down with scrap iron. Without evidence, prosecution was a moot point. The diving support vessel HMCS Cormorant and her two submersibles PISCES IV and SDL-1 conducted a search and recovery effort. Using side scan sonar sub-bottom profiler and a visual search with the submersibles, Cormorant located and recovered the drugs. In a second operation, Cormorant located a

⁸². For perspectives on drug cartel activity and methodology, see James Mills, The Underground Empire: Where Governments and Crime Embrace (New York: Doubleday, 1986) and Mike Gray, Drug Crazy: How We Got into this Mess and How we Can Get Out (New York: Routledge, 2000).

⁸³. Telephone interview 9 September 1996 with Commander Roger Sweeny, RCN (Retd).

cartel-owned tramp freighter that had struck an iceberg and sank. Enough cocaine was found to prosecute the crew.⁸⁴

Constitutionally, counter-narcotics operations are handled by the RCMP and the CF provides assistance to the civil authority or aid of the civil power, depending on the level of force necessary for the operation. The obvious problems of tracking targets outside of Canadian law enforcement jurisdiction demands that the CF ultimately coordinate efforts though the principle of 'policy primacy' remains in effect once the operation is within Canadian jurisdiction.

10. Native Unrest: Aid of the Civil Power Operations in the 1990s

a) Operation FEATHER/Operation AKWASASNE: Akwasasne, 1990

There were several Mohawk factions in the Cornwall area vying for the political control of the reserves throughout 1989. The resultant economic benefits garnered from the use of the border areas not only for legitimate economic activity but for smuggling (mostly cigarettes but some drugs and weapons) and as pseudo 'free trade zones' for untaxed gasoline were but one objective. Serious violence broke out in Awkwasasne in 1987 between several groups over the gambling issue which escalated to the other reserves. In 1988, the Khanawake Mohawks occupied the Mercier Bridge to protest SQ anti-cigarette operations. These incidents were resolved peacefully.⁸⁵

The Mohawks in the United States, meanwhile, grew increasingly violent in March-April 1990. A U.S. Army helicopter was forced down by Warrior Society gunfire near Plattsburg. The perpetrators escaped, some to Akwasasne in Ontario-New York, some to Khanawake in Quebec. In April, violence between pro- and anti-gambling factions reached the point that CF units were placed on standby to assist the RCMP and OPP.⁸⁶

At least two natives were murdered which prompted a police investigation which was subsequently interfered with. There was serious concern that

⁸⁴. Telephone interview 10 September 1996 LCdr Leif Gundersen, Maritime Command.

⁸⁵. See Rick Hornung, One Nation Under the Gun: Inside the Mohawk Civil War (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1991).

⁸⁶. Ibid.

police forces could be targeted by local militants. Initial plans were to deploy APCs and secure communications to assist provincial and federal law enforcement officials movement through disputed areas safely. At this point there were 500 police personnel involved in the operations.⁸⁷

This operation was altered to include a company from 1 RCR equipped with AVGP Grizzly vehicles, engineering troops from 2 CER in Petawawa, and 2 (EW) Squadron from Kingston. Twenty Militia personnel from the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders and The Brockville Rifles, as well as the Military Police Platoon from 28 (Ottawa) Service Battalion were involved in Op FEATHER, changed to Operation AKWASASNE for politically correct reasons.⁸⁸

Contingency planning to extract police and non-combatants from the islands commenced as 1 RCR's Vanguard Company and 2(EW) Squadron arrived in Cornwall. There were also plans to evacuate native women and children from the area of operations to CFB Kingston if the Mohawk factions increased operations against each other. Police officials noted that if "the situation got out of hand, armed force by the military would be required to deploy along the border" but there "was no indication of what US Forces would do."⁸⁹

There were unconfirmed reports that one native faction possessed a 3.5" rocket launcher, while intelligence reports filtered in that there was Molotov Cocktail production in one village and that more Warriors were moving out from Akwasasne to Khanesatake near Montreal after 1 RCR conducted an amphibious exercise using 12 Grizzly AVGPs. At one point "some police believed a military operation would be required if the Warrior Society did not cooperate with police intervention."⁹⁰ In time negotiations took hold and the

⁸⁷. "Operation FEATHER: Regional Direction Centre Duty Officer's Log Extracts and activity Highlights."

⁸⁸. DND ATI, (14 May 90) Presentation of Op FEATHER by Comnd LFCA to Defence Management Committee; (21 Jun 90) After Action Report-2(EW) Squadron, Operation AWKWASASNE." Note that for political sesativity reasons Op FEATHER was renamed Op AWKWASASNE after the operation was completed.

⁸⁹. "Operation FEATHER: Regional Direction Centre Duty Officer's Log Extracts and activity Highlights."

⁹⁰. (14 May 90) "Presentation of Op FEATHER by Comd LFCA to Defence Management Committee."

situation settled down for the time being. CF units redeployed to their bases on 12 May 1990.⁹¹

The command and control as well as constitutional aspects of Operation AKWASASNE were slightly different than those used in the FLQ Crisis. 1 RCR reported to the Special Service Force in Petawawa which was in turn made responsible to Land Forces Central Area (LFCA) HQ in Toronto for domestic operations. FMC commander appointed LFCA as operational commander. Operation AKWASASNE was initially seen as a provincial situation but this quickly changed given the complex nature of the terrain and boundaries. It was re-cast as support to another government department, with the RCMP exercising the Solicitor General's authority on the scene. The RCMP were, in turn, there to support provincial police forces. Therefore, the on-site CF task force commander worked out an arrangement where he was involved in the planning process at the regional command centre working alongside the police forces. There were serious problems with coordination with American state police and military forces on the other side of the river: these were never fully resolved. In the case of Operation AKWASASNE, the post-operation report concluded that "On-site arrangements with local authorities can sometimes deal more effectively with issues that higher-level authorities find difficult or impossible to resolve."⁹²

b) Operation SALON: Oka, 1990

The intricacies of tribal politics militate against a detailed understanding of them in this study. As with Op FEATHER, there are several factions on each reserve, each with differing but overlapping agendas and even some overlapping personalities. Chronologically, violent incidents started in the 1970s between the elected tribal councils, which were recognized by the Canadian and American governments, and the Longhouse People, Mohawk traditionalists, who were not. Also in this mix was the loosely organized Warrior's Society, formed in 1972 which based its ideology on the

⁹¹. "Operation FEATHER: Regional Direction Centre Duty Officer's Log Extracts and activity Highlights."

⁹². (23 Jul 91) letter to Comd SSF from MGen R.I. Stewart, "Post Operations Report- Operation Akwasasne."

preservation of Mohawk values, outright Mohawk sovereignty, and violent confrontation.⁹³

By the 1980s, many Mohawks realized that the location of the reserves in the border area and the inability of the federal governments to patrol the region offered the opportunity to profit from illegal cigarette smuggling and the sale of duty-free gasoline. The Mohawks did not see this as illegal, as many have determined that they are a sovereign nation. In addition, the New York government encouraged the establishment of large gambling facilities under Mohawk control on the U.S. side of the border in Akwasasne. This in turn provoked a spate of violence in 1988-89 between a coalition of traditional leaders and anti-gambling elected chiefs versus the pro-gaming Mohawks. The Warrior's Society aligned itself with the pro-gambling faction since they saw the chiefs as an imposition on Mohawk sovereignty by the federal governments. The level of violence was so high in early 1990 that a U.S. National Guard helicopter was shot at and forced down by Warrior Society gunfire and a Canadian mechanized battalion was moved to Cornwall, Ontario in preparation for an Aid of the Civil Power mission, which was subsequently canceled.⁹⁴

At the same time, two other events unfolded. The Warrior Society was asked by pro-gambling Mohawks at Kahnawake to protect them from anti-gambling advocates. Armed Warriors deployed to Kahnawake and included some of the men wanted for questioning in the United States with regards to the helicopter incident. On the other side of the river at Kanesatake, the Oka municipal government decided to challenge the rights of the local Mohawk population to a piece of land with the aim of expanding the Oka golf course from 9 to 18 holes. In a matter of days, Warriors were advising the residents of Kanesatake on how to conduct armed resistance in the event that the Surete du Quebec were called in by the Oka municipality. This eventually did happen and in an inept assault by 100 SQ riot and SWAT policemen on 11 July 1990, a police corporal was shot and killed. The SQ retreated and

⁹³. Rick Hornung, One Nation Under the Gun (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1991) pp. 8-10; Tugwell and Thompson, The Legacy of Oka pp. 10-15.

⁹⁴. Hornung, One Nation Under the Gun pp. 15-20; Tugwell and Thompson, The Legacy of Oka pp. 15-16; House of Commons, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Issue No. 55 March 19, 1991 (Government of Canada: Supply and Services Canada, 1991) pp. 92.

established a perimeter around Khanesatake and much of their weapons, equipment and vehicles fell into Mohawk hands.⁹⁵

In a sympathy move, a mix of Khanawake locals and Warriors blockaded the Mercier Bridge and set up several barricades, which then forced the Quebecois living in the suburbs around Khanawake to commute two to three hours each way into Montreal. Warrior reinforcements and weapons then started to covertly flow into the region based in one sense on the belief that the standoff was a matter of exerting sovereign authority over Mohawk land and in another sense to protect the burgeoning economic benefits accrued through gambling and cigarette smuggling (apparently one enterprise, a shack known as Joe's Smoke Shop, brought in more than half a million dollars a year in illegal income).⁹⁶ Mohawk demands included the right to negotiate nation-to-nation, not province-to-Mohawk; return Oka land to Khanesatake group; full police withdrawal, and the placement of all issues before the World Court. Premier Bourassa refused to negotiate on these points. In any case, the Mohawks were unable to present a sustained united front for negotiating purposes.⁹⁷

On 6 August, the SQ informed the Provincial Government that they did not have the resources to handle the situation. The RCMP concurred with this assessment. Premier Robert Bourassa contacted Prime Minister Brian Mulroney first, who wanted to maintain as much distance from this political bombshell as possible and was told that he would have to make a formal request for Aid of the Civil Power to the CDS, General John De Chastelain. The CDS was in the Soviet Union at the time, so the VCDS tasked FMC Commander Lieutenant General Kent Foster to handle the operation.⁹⁸

Premier Bourassa met with the CDS on his return on 8 August. There were an estimated 200 insurgents at Khanesatake and 400 at Kahnawake. Fifty to seventy of these were estimated to be hard core radicals, mostly from

⁹⁵. Hornung, One Nation Under the Gun pp. 184-203, 220; Tugwell and Thompson, The Legacy of Oka pp. 19-20.

⁹⁶. Confidential source.

⁹⁷. Hornung, One Nation Under the Gun pp. 184-203, 220; Tugwell and Thompson, The Legacy of Oka pp. 19-20.

⁹⁸. House of Commons, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Issue No. 55 March 19, 1991 (Government of Canada: Supply and Services Canada, 1991) pp. 85; Joe C.W. Armstrong, Farewell the Peaceful Kingdom: The Seduction and Rape of Canada, 1963-1994 (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1995) p. 226; Interview with LGen Kent Foster, 9 June 1997.

the Warrior's Society. They were equipped with 500 weapons ranging from AK-47's and M-16's to .50 caliber snipers rifles and either RPG-7 or 66mm LAW anti-tank weapons. The insurgents were dug into a trench system and had erected obstacles. They had a communications system between Kanesatake, Kahnawake, and Awkwahasne. In addition, they used the waterways in small craft and possibly floatplanes to move between sites. The SQ had asked for and received C-7 assault rifles and body armour from the CF but even they concluded that there was no alternative to bringing in the military.⁹⁹

The CDS and FMC Commander met with Bourassa to develop the Army's mandate in light of the situation and to ensure that the Premier was cognizant of the nature and extent of the Army's capabilities. De Chastelain and Foster established four tasks for Operation SALON which were fully understood and agreed to by the Premier: remove barricades at both sites, restore freedom of movement across the Mercier Bridge, remove strong points, and restore public order and security. This last task was extremely important. The Quebec population on the north end of the Mercier Bridge and around Kahnawake were rioting, with tacit SQ support. Three hundred RCMP riot police were unable to contain the situation. In consultation with Commander FMC, commander of 5 Brigade Mechanise' du Canada (5 Brigade) Brigadier General Roy, determined that a massive show of force was required not only to intimidate the Mohawk insurgents but to interpose military forces, not unlike in traditional UN peacekeeping operations, between the Quebecois population, the SQ and the Mohawk insurgents so that high-level negotiations could proceed.¹⁰⁰

On 10 August, 5 Brigade, which consisted of 4400 men in three mechanized infantry battalions, elements of a light armoured regiment, an artillery regiment (largely dismounted, two towed 105mm batteries were deployed), and supporting arms and services were placed on standby in their bases while negotiations continued. Maritime Air Group Aurora reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area at low altitude to gather photo

⁹⁹. House of Commons, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Issue No. 55 March 19, 1991 (Government of Canada: Supply and Services Canada, 1991) pp. 84; J.A. Roy, "Operation SALON", Canadian Defence Quarterly April 1991, pp. 15-19.

¹⁰⁰. Ibid; Interview with LGen Kent Foster, 9 June 1997.

intelligence, while 2(EW) Squadron from Kingston collected SIGINT. A joint task force headquarters was deemed unnecessary, though some naval and air assets were used. At the Brigade level, there was a Coordination 'cell' consisting of the Army, the SQ, the RCMP, and the local police chaired by Brigadier General Roy. This reported to Commander, FMC who had a larger Coordination cell consisting of the same 'players' plus the Communications Security Establishment and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the Intelligence Collection and Analysis Centre manned by 1st Div Int Coy. De Chastelain sat in on Cabinet meetings, while Foster sat in on Bourassa's crisis cabinet meetings. This ensured that there was constant communications between the civilian authorities, the police, and the Army.¹⁰¹

By 13 August the police forces were thoroughly exhausted and 5 Brigade was moved into place on 17 August. 1 Int Coy was placed under command of 5 Brigade while 2 (EW) Sqn was retained at FMC, only deploying a liaison detachment to 5 Brigade. 5 Brigade's subsequent planning involved cordoning off and securing the operational area, patrolling, and contingency plans for an assault on the defensive positions if negotiations utterly failed. Minimum force was the main operating principle. This involved slow but constant pressure applied through incremental troop advances (backed with armoured vehicles) on areas sparsely controlled by the insurgents and the full battery of psychological operations, including frequent night patrols, low-level helicopter flights and well-aimed spotlights. The aim was to reduce the insurgent perimeters as much as to psychologically unhinge the opposition.¹⁰²

The Khanesatake perimeter incrementally shrank to the point where the insurgents (those that chose not to escape by river or through the bush) were corralled in the alcohol and drug detoxification centre. After continuous psychological pressure was applied, the insurgents eventually concluded that further resistance was futile. In the confusion of a staged riot that followed the evacuation of the detox centre, several Warrior members escaped but the

¹⁰¹. Interview with LGen Kent Foster, 9 June 1997.

¹⁰². House of Commons, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Issue No. 55 March 19, 1991 (Government of Canada: Supply and Services Canada, 1991) pp. 86; Geoffrey York and Loreen Pindera, People of the Pines: The Warriors and the Legacy of Oka (Toronto: Little Brown and Co., 1991) pp. 357-361.

remaining fifty were arrested and held in military custody. Operation SALON wound down in early October 1990.¹⁰³

c) Operations MAPLE and PANDA: Ipperwash, 1995

In 1994, DND planned to close out operations conducted at Camp Ipperwash, Ontario, which had been under DND control since the Second World War. DND was obligated to pursue an environmental evaluation for the site since there was the possibility of the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The legal aboriginal entity, the Kettle and Stoney Point Band (KSPB) demanded DND funds so that they could participate in the evaluation. DND was unwilling to meet the financial request of the KSPB. DND tendered a contract to a firm for the evaluation and the KSPB launched an injunction in provincial court to prevent the evaluation from taking place. The KSPB demanded financial compensation in addition to the other funds. DND deployed a security force consisting of 27 Military Police to Camp Ipperwash to protect the contractor as it prepared to carry out the evaluation.¹⁰⁴

The security force became "the object of harassment and violence from a splinter group of the KSPB who have occupied various areas of the camp since May 1993." The Stoney Point Group (SPG) emerged from the original splinter faction called the Stoney Point First Nation. These SPG illegal enclaves on the base were used to facilitate "incidences of public harassment" car theft and other criminal activity.¹⁰⁵ DND civilian officials decided that after Oka, DND would maintain "a non-confrontational approach towards this group." Illegal access points were not to be interfered with by the Ipperwash security force. The people of the Bosanquet township complained to the Minister and requested an increase in the security force. The fences

¹⁰³. House of Commons, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Issue No. 55 March 19, 1991 (Government of Canada: Supply and Services Canada, 1991) pp. 87; Geoffrey York and Loreen Pindera, People of the Pines: The Warriors and the Legacy of Oka pp. 366-400.

¹⁰⁴. "Briefing note for the DM and CDS on the Current Situation at the Former Camp Ipperwash"; (19 Apr 95) "Briefing note for the Minister Re: Camp Ipperwash."

¹⁰⁵. Ibid.

were closed by DND and backhoes were used to destroy roads and pathways.¹⁰⁶

On 29 July 1995, the SPG moved to occupy the DND camp buildings. The security force was ordered to withdraw to prevent the situation from escalating. There was clear evidence that the KSPB was no longer in control: "Since the occupation began, the leadership of this group has changed and the group itself has divided into smaller factions, some of which have been supported by non-band members including at least one Oneida Mohawk."¹⁰⁷ On 4 September 1995, some SPG personnel occupied Ipperwash Provincial Park. The OPP moved into the area and then an OPP helicopter was shot at. This prompted the deployment of the OPP tactical and crowd control units to Ipperwash.¹⁰⁸

Within DND circles, there was increased concern that Ipperwash could transform overnight into another Oka, complete with American Indian activists nursing grudges from the previous operation in 1990. There were further indications that there was outside interference in the Ipperwash affair as members of the American Indian Movement were identified in the area by OPP surveillance units. The militant factions had either requested aid or these men appeared spontaneously. In any event, their objective was to create a visible media platform on par with Oka. Barricades went up, though no weapons were visible. A school bus full of demonstrators ran an OPP checkpoint and tried to run down OPP Crowd Management Team personnel: shots were fired from the bus and the OPP returned fire killing one native and wounding two more. The OPP Tactical Operations Centre was then swarmed and overrun by a large number of natives: their gear was seized and documents compromised. Ipperwash Provincial Park buildings were burnt. Splinter groups then started to make death threats against non-native residents and the KSPB leadership.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶. (3 Feb 95) "Briefing note for the Minister: Ipperwash-Status of Security and Negotiations."

¹⁰⁷. (31 Jul 95) Briefing to the MND.

¹⁰⁸. (15 Sep 95) Briefing note for the Minister, "MOU Between the Federal Government's Department of Indian and Northern Affairs and the Chippewas of Kettle and Stoney Point First Nation."

¹⁰⁹. (8 Sep 95) DEM, "Operation MAPLE (Ipperwash)"; (8 Sep 95) message NDHQ to distribution list, "Security Intelligence item: Native Militancy-Ipperwash Situation"; (7 Sep 95) message LFCHQ to NDOC, "Op MAPLE SITREP 18/95"; interview with LFCHQ G-5 personnel.

The OPP then requested military assistance from Land Forces Central Area. The OPP wanted the use of Bison or Grizzly APCs and military equipment so that wounded personnel could be evacuated, officers could be extracted from dangerous situations, evacuation of threatened civilians, and to establish a presence. The plan was to re-paint the Bisons in OPP colours and put OPP insignia on them. Other CF support requested by the OPP included cell phone intercept capability, CS gas and masks, night vision equipment and para flares.¹¹⁰

In addition, LFCA developed a contingency plan, Plan PANDA, to deploy a mechanized infantry company from 1 RCR to Ipperwash. The OPP established an Executive Command Post to "relieve the onsite commander of extraneous administrative details and to plan at the strategic level." The CF deployed LOs to this body to facilitate coordination. The planned CF JTF, established as the Ipperwash Operations Centre at CFB London, developed a relationship with the ECP if further CF operations were required to assist the OPP.¹¹¹

The constitutional arrangements for Op MAPLE were complicated by the fact that DND and DIANA had a joint negotiating group at one level, while the land forces were encouraged by DND to cooperate with the OPP at the Area level for preparations like COP PANDA. If COP PANDA were required, the orders and command relationships would have followed a path similar to those employed during Op FEATHER and Op SALON in 1990, that is, the Provincial Premier would have had to ask the CDS for Aid of the Civil Power.

The DND strategy was to keep military involvement at arm's length and to allow for police primacy in the Ipperwash region while negotiations took place. Camp Ipperwash was then abandoned by military personnel.

By December, Op PANDA was stood down and Op MAPLE was transformed into the Ipperwash Property Management Team and then canceled as negotiations got under way. LFCA maintained a company-level Immediate Reaction Unit (COP ORION) well into 1996.¹¹²

¹¹⁰. (8 Sep 95) message LFCAHQ to NDHQ, "Op PANDA: Update";)9 Sep 95) message OPP to DND.

¹¹¹. Ibid.

¹¹². (14 May 96) memo LFCHQ to LFCAD, "COP ORION."

d) Operation WALLABY: Gustafsen Lake, 1995

A group of natives were legally using land lent to them by the James Cattle Ranch near the region of Gustafsen Lake in British Columbia. This land had traditionally been used for sundance ceremonies for several years. There had been no problems between the native population and the local municipality and the situation was regarded as amicable. In 1995, however, a group of radical natives set up 'No Trespassing' signs at the site, declaring that it was sacred ground and claimed sovereignty for the Shuswap Nation. Shots were fired at a forestry worker. Local RCMP were brought in to investigate and were shot at with military pattern weapons, probably FN type rifles in 7.62mm NATO calibre. The local tribal council from the Canoe Creek Band immediately distanced themselves from the radical group. The makeup of the group, according to RCMP sources, included "radical aboriginals" from The Warrior Society: some from Canada, and others from the United States.¹¹³ Native sources indicate that an international call for warriors was disseminated at this time "to prevent a massacre."¹¹⁴

The insurgent group referred to itself as "The Defenders of the Shuswap Nation." Intelligence data indicated that at least one member was an Akwasasne Mohawk who had participated in the Oka affair. Shots were fired continuously in the air and even at RCMP helicopters. The radical group then started to develop defensive measures, including the use of barb wire enclosures.¹¹⁵

Speculation then started that some people in the compound were being held against their will: RCMP contingency planning was conducted to effect a hostage rescue. In several cases, RCMP helicopters and fixed wing aircraft were shot at by the militants. RCMP morale was seen by the CF as low.¹¹⁶ Other nearby native entities were starting to show increased sympathy for the so-called Defenders of the Shuswap Nation. CF assessments indicated

¹¹³. (20 Aug 95) message LFWAHQ to NDOC, "LFWA/RGN HQ INTREP-Gustafsen Lake, BC"; discussions with participating CF personnel.

¹¹⁴. Janice G.A.E. Switlo, Gustafsen Lake: Under Siege (Peachland: Tiac Communications, 1997) p. 114.

¹¹⁵. (25 Aug 95) message LFWAHQ to NDOC, "LFWA/RGN HQ SITREP 003-Gustafsen Lake, BC"; (27 Aug 95) message LFWAHQ to NDOC, "LFWA/RGN HQ SITREP 005-Gustafsen Lake, BC."

¹¹⁶. (7 Sep 95) telecon COSJ3 and MGen C. Addy.

that "the hardcore militants still control the group. The recent events at Ipperwash parallel the hardcore faction's perspective at Gustafsen Lake and may serve as a catalyst for both greater confrontation from the militants and possibly a resort to increased native militancy in the Land Forces Western Area." In other words, there was a possibility things could get out of control in a number of places Canada-wide. Note that many CF bases and other federal properties are located adjacent to native band-controlled land.¹¹⁷

After another RCMP helicopter was shot at, the BC Attorney General requested military assistance. This was approved by the Minister of National Defence on 28 August. Several unarmed Bison APCs with crews and equipment for the RCMP units at Gustafsen Lake deployed from CFB Calgary by air, as well as liaison and surveillance personnel. On 1 September, the local RCMP commander on site determined that all levels of negotiation were almost exhausted. An RCMP fixed-wing aircraft was shot at again.¹¹⁸

The situation escalated when RCMP ERT personnel were engaged by armed natives. A native truck was ambushed and weapons seized. In a number of cases, Bisons were used to extract threatened RCMP officers who were under fire, including semiautomatic fire from FN type 7.62mm NATO rifles and automatic fire from at least one AK-47 rifle.¹¹⁹ By 15 September "intensive mediation efforts with the Defenders of the Shuswap Nation produced an agreement to surrender," though the DSN failed to arrive for a negotiating session. CF observers noted that RCMP morale improved with the Bison deployment.¹²⁰

The native militants surrendered on 18 September 1995.

Analysis and Conclusions

¹¹⁷. (7 Sep 95) message LFWAHQ to NDOC, "LFWA/RGN HQ SITREP 018-Gustafsen Lake, BC."

¹¹⁸. DEM Note: CF Operations for 28 August 95, 1 September 95, 5 September 95.

¹¹⁹. Switlo, Gustafsen Lake pp. 126-127; discussions with participating CF personnel.

¹²⁰. DEM Note: CF Operations for 15 September 95.

To properly assess the historical record of Canadian Homeland Defence operations, it is critical to situate it in the current context of Homeland Defence within existing policy and future projections of the security environment. The 1994 White Paper establishes overarching and clear policy objectives:

Sovereignty is a vital attribute of the nation-state. For Canada, sovereignty means ensuring that, within our area of jurisdiction, Canadian law is respected and enforced.¹²¹

This includes:

- Aid of the Civil Power
- Providing Peacetime Surveillance and Control
- Securing our Borders Against Illegal Activities¹²²

Similarly,

Intercontinental threats constitute a longer term problem....nuclear, chemical, biological, and theatre missile programmes cannot be discounted in planning for future contingencies. One reason is that sophisticated delivery mechanisms are not required in the case of biological or chemical weapons.¹²³

The current DLSC Future Security Environment study notes that "The Army will remain a fundamental tool of Canadian domestic policy and endure as the government's instrument of last resort."¹²⁴ Consequently, in the post-Cold War environment, there will be potential for the Army's use in Homeland Defence operations:

The geographical separation of Canadians leads to regional loyalties. Since the mid-1970s regional differences have become more pronounced and have sometimes caused internal discord....These issues could produce a serious social crisis in the coming decades....¹²⁵

¹²¹. Douglas L. Bland, Canada's National Defence Volume I Defence Policy (Kingston: School for Policy Studies, 1997) pp. 313-314.

¹²². Ibid pp. 314-316.

¹²³. Ibid. p. 320.

¹²⁴. DLSC Study 99-2, The Future Security Environment (August 1999) p. v.

¹²⁵. Ibid.

This situation will be exacerbated by Globalization which will produce situations where "emerging threats, both symmetric and asymmetric, will challenge traditional security responses and place Canada at direct risk."¹²⁶

Canadian analysis concludes that the dominant threat to Canadian interests will consist of a "state opposed by armed bodies that are not organized armed forces" though there is still recognition that "conventional conflict between national entities" still exists but is not as likely.¹²⁷

How does the historical record compare?

Threat Type:	National or Non-national Entity?
Balloons with HE or WMD potential (1940s)	National
Airborne or Seaborne incursions (1950-1990)	National
Bomber and Missile attack (1950s-present)	National
Information Warfare Attack (1950s-present)	National and Non-national
Clandestine Introduction of WMD (1950s-present)	National and Non-national
International Terrorism (1960s-present)	Non-national

¹²⁶. Ibid., pp. v-vi

¹²⁷. Ibid., p. 44.

Domestic Terrorism (1960s-present)	Non-national
Transnational Crime (1970s-present)	Non-national

It is simplistic to suggest that there was a radical change in Canada's experience with handling HLD threats once the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Canada was involved with countering information warfare back in the 1950s and has experience handling a low-tech WMD threat going back to the 1940s. The same techniques employed by asymmetric threat practitioners today had been countered by Army and police activity during the 1970 FLQ Crisis and the 1976 Olympic Games. Note that an NBCD protection capability was part of Operation GAMESCAN and that Canadian policymakers were concerned about the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons onto Canadian soil as early as 1957. Again, CF operations in countering transnational crime are not new.

What, then, of how the CF handled HLD threats? Has this changed? The pattern of CF response falls into several categories: command and control, liaison with OGDs, doctrine, and methodology or force structure.

Command and Control

Canadian experience with handling responses to HLD threats during the Second World War and the Cold War relied heavily on the bi-lateral Canada-US relationship and the arrangements established in those spheres to include the PJBD, the MCC, NORAD, and through NATO's naval command in the Atlantic, SACLANT. These threats were nation to nation and were to be countered or deterred with forces operating on the high-intensity portion of the spectrum of conflict. Such coordination required detailed command and control relationships between the alliance partners. The three services handled internal coordination and inter-service dispute management through a Land-Air Warfare Committee and a Sea-Air Warfare Committee both of which reported to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

When Canada was confronted with non-national HLD threats, the Canadian government based the command and control relationships on structures established for post-nuclear attack responses and on existing National Defence Act legislation. The first such case was the FLQ Crisis where the intelligence, police, and military components formed a joint command and control and intelligence processing body. This early attempt was progressively refined for the 1976 Olympics and was reactivated in the 1990s to handle native unrest and counter-narcotics operations.

In effect, there are two separate processes for handling HLD threats depending on whether or not they are View 1 or View 2 in nature. For View 1 threats, established military entities refer to a pre-planned series of responses with some political input, input that is already agreed to. For View 2, there is generally a greater degree of political input into the decisionmaking process and there is no detailed pre-planned response.

Canadian command and control structures have encountered problems in both View 1 and View 2 responses. In View 1, the level of situation awareness and understanding of the complex nature of the pre-planned responses by the political bodies has been minimal which attenuated the responses. The best example of this problem is the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In View 2, the problem is not so much coordinating Canadian agencies, the problem is making the Canadian structures interact with allied structures. The primary case here was Operation FEATHER when the American agencies in New York State could not coordinate effectively with the CF and police forces on the Canadian side of the border.

Liaison with OGDs

CF liaison with OGDs for HLD will be critical in handling View 2 threats. The CF has forty years of experience with OGD liaison. What emerges from an examination of this experience is that in practically every case, the joint CF-OGD command body is of an ad hoc nature and personality dependent. This state of affairs emerged despite the existence of doctrine and contingency planning. In many cases, the CF component must take the unofficial lead to effect efficiencies so that the operation can work. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies do not possess the training or resources

(particularly communications) to coordinate all elements of a large-scale or complex View 2 threat, yet at the same time the emphasis is on 'civilian control' due to the political nature of the crisis and the CF cannot appear to 'running the show'. This was evident during the FLQ Crisis and native unrest events of the 1990s. For smaller events, liaison between local authorities and the CF is generally good. Problems usually arise when OGDs sent high-level representatives from Ottawa to 'get into the act'. At Oka, the CF and the intelligence agencies had to create a separate 'committee' to handle data since some OGD personnel who, despite their 'rank', did not have security clearances to handle intelligence information.

Doctrine

Each View 2 HLD threat will be unique and will require the utmost flexibility on the part of the people of all departments involved. Scripting a response produces too much inflexibility. Doctrine can provide broad templates for how entities like Regional Direction Centres and such operate, number for manning, and so forth. Political guidance afforded by the National Defence Act serves as a basis for all CF HLD operations in any case. As far as the historical record allows, there has been no explicit HLD doctrine. There has been training for Aid of the Civil Power operations in the past and certain actions and techniques from peace support operations are invaluable for HLD operations. The establishment of centres in various headquarters to handle domestic operations was a definite contribution to how the CF responded in each case in the 1990s. In every case, the CF has operated using common sense as a guide coupled with a military leadership that was politically aware and a willingness to use ad hoc solutions at a low level. As such, there is little formal doctrine for the conduct of HLD operations.

Force Structure

One problem that emerges from this study is the relationship between time, space and force structure. During the Cold war, some HLD threats were

near-immediate ones which dictated that forces-in-being be deployed prior to the outbreak of declared war. Canada has historically created specialized units to handle certain View 1 HLD threats, usually those related to the delivery of WMD against Canadian soil. Examples include nuclear-equipped air interceptor squadrons, radar surveillance units, and nuclear-capable anti-submarine warfare forces. For lower-level HLD threats in the View 1 and View 2 conceptions, Canada has generally used general purpose combat capable forces to counter them. Existing doctrine, basic military training of a high standard and the flexibility bred into Canadian commanders has permitted rapid adaptation when HLD threats have emerged with little or no warning. The best examples include Operations ESSAY and Operation SALON.

In terms of equipment, practically every system employed by general purpose combat capable forces has been used in HLD operations. During Oka, ADATS radars were used for surveillance of the battlespace above the insurgents so that covert re-supply flights could be monitored. Leopard tanks were deployed to Oka and Cougar AVGPs were used in the Op SALON QRF. Bison APCs figured prominently in Operation WALLABY and in planning in the Ipperwash affair. Nuclear-capable ASW aircraft designed to destroy Soviet missile launching submarines have been employed in counter-narcotics surveillance. Electronic warfare units geared to direction find Soviet armoured formation in the NATO Central Region gathered sensitive SIGINT at Oka and Akwasasne. The entire Canada-based army consisting of three light brigade groups was converted to an internal security force during the Olympic Games in 1976, with Ferret scout cars occupying and patrolling potential SAM-7 launching positions around Mirabel and CF-5 fighter-bombers providing a highly visible daily aerial presence over Kingston and Montreal.

Several major points emerge from this study:

- 1) HLD has always been part of Canadian national security considerations. It is not something new and Canada has exhibited an awareness of asymmetric threats to the homeland since the 1940s.

- 2) Political will is necessary to effect change in the details or emphasis on how the CF handles HLD. Change in this area cannot come from within due to the importance and involvement of OGDs and wider Canadian interests.
- 3) Force structures and command/control arrangements must remain flexible, be trained to handle HLD threats, and exercise regularly. If they do not, they will be unable to handle rapidly developing threats to the homeland.
- 4) High- and mid-intensity capable forces can readily adapt to the lower conflict spectrum HLD missions but the reverse is not true.
- 5) Many HLD command and control arrangements were based on ad hoc structures and were personality dependent. HLD threats which rely on speed and surprise to attain an objective will be difficult to counter using such arrangements.
- 6) Though formal HLD arrangements existed with the United States to handle View 1 threats, the lack of similar arrangements to handle View 2 threats and inability to effectively coordinate Canadian and American governmental, police, intelligence and military activity has posed obstacles in cross-border operations.
- 7) A serious examination of the legal jurisdictional aspects of CF-RCMP operations and coordination outside of Canadian sovereign territory as such operations relate to HLD needs to be conducted.

A Note on Sources

Since HLD operations during the Second World War and Cold War were linked to the larger struggles against the totalitarians, there are many works dealing with air and naval defence aspects of North America from which the requisite information can be distilled. There is, however, a serious lack of

internal CF studies on the planning and conduct of HLD operations that fall into the View 2 category. Though there is an internal DHH history of the FLQ Crisis, it reads like a logistics movement table and not a narrative. There are no operational histories of Operations GAMESCAN 76, SALON, MAPLE, WALLABY, FEATHER, or ABACUS. Finally, there is a paucity of open source discussion of the CF and counter-narcotics operations.