Korea

Speaking Notes of Static Phase of Korea

With the successful defence against the Chinese spring offensive, and the subsequent successful UN offensive ops PILEDRIVER and COMMANDO, the Chinese and North Koreans were once again willing to discuss cease-fire conditions at PANMUNJOM on the 25th of October. However, these talks could continue sporadically for another 21 months (B). The success of OP COMMANDO and the establishment of the Jamestown line, of which the 25th Canadian Infantry BriBeuthchgade was a part, would mark the beginning of the static phase of the war.

The static phase of the War, which saw the UN forces holding of the line vice the resumption of large-scale offensive operations, was a result of the United States’, indeed the West’s, strategic interests. The decision to wage such a war was based on a risk aversion deeply rooted in the realpolitik of the Cold War. In terms of the campaign’s strategy, it was felt that increased pressure would result in the withdrawal of the Communists from the peace negotiation table. This, in turn, would lead to a prolonged land war that would not be in the US’ best interest. Arguably, it was just such a pressure that had forced them to the peace table in the first place. Second, and more importantly, in terms of the US’ global strategy, it was felt that further offensive action to seize the whole of the Korean peninsula would cause the Soviets to enter the fray, thereby escalating the already tense Cold War.

The term “static phase” was deceiving since more Canadians were killed during this static phase than were killed during the active phase of the war. The static phase was truly a trade-off between strategic and tactical considerations. At the tactical level, Bn commanders were not to attack and seize Chinese positions, but rather were to wage a defensive battle. Further, no offensive action above company level was to be undertaken. Thus, though the UN forces had seized the initiative through the attack, they were now to stop their advance and instead present themselves as targets to the Communists. Indeed, commanders at the tactical level had been dealt an almost unplayable hand.

The month of October would also mark the beginning of the end of the 2nd Battalion’s illustrious tenure in Korea. On the 18th of August 1951, the 1st Patricias had received the warning order to move to Korea. By the fifth of October, the first two companies had arrived in theatre and three weeks later, the 3rd company had also arrived. After receiving a short course on weapons and tactical trg, the 1st Battalion joined the line on 14 Oct 1951. The 1st Battalion was trained specifically for Korea and would benefit from many of the war’s lessons learned. Specifically, the ability to climb steep hills and then fight on their summits was emphasized during pre-deployment trg.

By Nov 1951, three Coys of 2VP, and three Coys of the newly arrived 1st Bn were defending a sector of the Jamestown line. The Jamestown line was to be a trip-wire to any major Chinese offensive. It was an extended line that had little in the way of a reserve or heavy arty fire support, the majority of which was concentrated in the Kansas line (8 km further back) and the Wyoming lie (12 km further back). That said, while it wasn’t intended to stop the Chinese threat cold, the Jamestown line would serve as the UN’s front line until the cessation of hostilities in 1953.

For their part, the Canadians of the 25th Infantry Bde dug in, and prepared their defensive positions with minefields, pre-sited targets, wire, and comms networks. David J. Bercuson , author of the Regt’s most recent history as well as the book “Blood on the Hills, the Canadian Army in the Korean War” argues that the defensive positions were largely based on the way that the Canadians had dug-in in during the Italian Campaign of World War II. Almost from the start of that campaign, the Germans were relegated to a fighting withdrawal or to the defence of fortified positions such as the Winter and Gothic lines. Due to the hilly terrain in Korea, it was difficult if not impossible to have a series of trenches as had existed in other wars. Further, there was little direction provided from the Division WRT the overall defensive concept of operations. As a result, in many cases, defensive positions were not centred on dominating features or hilltops, but rather on every single hilltop on the line. The result was that the line was very thin, there was little depth, and little opportunity for mutual support and interlocking arcs of fire amongst these defensive positions. Further there was no reserve set aside for c moves or reinforcement of the line.

The Canadian defences would be put to the test on 5 Nov 1951. At that time, D Coy of 1 PPCLI was opposed by a Bn’s worth of Chinese. The Coy first endured earth shaking shelling and mortaring from the Chinese and was then the target of an infantry attack. The Bn FOO called for searchlights to be turned on so that concentrations of Chinese troops could be identified and then fired upon. Subsequently, Canadian gunners, machine-gunners and mortar men fired round after round in order to keep the advancing horde at bay. However, as would often be the case, the Chinese, seemingly undeterred by earthly considerations, struck back under the cover of a massive artillery barrage and resumed their attack on D Coy’s 10 and 12 Pls. The men of 10 Pl valiantly fought until their last bullet and then withdrew to the main company position with the Chinese pressing at their heels. The Chinese lost the momentum when shortly thereafter, the very ground to the front of the Canadian position trembled as it was hit with a heavy bombardment from B-29 bombers. While it was difficult to estimate how much real damage was inflicted, this was a great boost to morale since it showed that UN air support would act even at night. Shortly thereafter, the men of 10 Pl had stealthily infiltrated back into their original defensive position during a lull in the battle. Supported by 81mm artillery and US Corps artillery, they turned the tides of the battle. D Coy then engaged the attackers with small arms and grenades inflicting heavy casualties. As a result, the Chinese sounded the withdrawal. Though the 1st Battalion had been green up until that point, they successfully repulsed the Chinese attack while sustaining only three killed and fifteen wounded.

This example also brings to light one of the common themes of the static war; namely a Chinese attack involving a large number of troops supported by a great deal of rockets, mortars, and artillery. True to form, the UN forces responded with a great deal of indirect fire sp of their own, and made use of their air superiority. That said, the UN forces were on their heels, fighting the defensive war for much of the static war.

Clearly UN firepower would be key to repulsing any Chinese attack. In virtually every battle, the UN forces would call upon indirect fire in order to decimate the ranks of the Communist horde and there are several examples of indirect fire being called down with great effect in front of, and sometimes on, Canadian positions. Similarly, the Patricias enjoyed excellent integral indirect fire support by way of their mortar platoon that could respond quickly and effectively to Communist advances and breakthroughs. In many cases, indirect dire was the hammer that would smash the Chinese swarm.

If the defensive battle was one theme, then patrolling was the other theme of the static war. Patrolling was conducted not just to determine en locations and disposition but also to thwart his attack and to deny him freedom of movement. The Chinese made use of night patrols so as to diminish the arty and air superiority of the UN forces. The UN forces thus had to maintain a constant presence in the no-man’s land between the Communist and Allied positions. Told to maintain a defensive posture, patrolling was the only manoeuvre permitted to the UN forces. It was a chance for the UN forces to take the fight to the enemy, even if only on a very small scale. Patrolling allowed the troops to maintain their fighting spirit, and created a sense of initiative, whether real or perceived. Fighting spirit was important when you consider the fact that the UN forces had had such considerable success while on the offence. They had broken out from the Pusan Perimeter and re-established the 38th parallel. They had seen first-hand, the benefits of the French maxim “L’attaque, toujours l’attaque”. Now, they were forced to halt their advance, and it is understandable that, being told to hold the line and being killed in ones and twos with no end in sight, they would lose a sense of that warrior spirit. Patrolling was thus one way to remedy such sentiment.

By April 1952, all units that had arrived in Korea a year earlier would be sent back to Canada, however the 1st Battalion would remain. On 20 June there was a revival of raiding policy and the 1st Patricias would get the nod as 35 men from B Coy were ordered into no-man’s-land. The patrol set out and made it to within 35m of the closest Chinese crawl trenches. The patrol leader then radioed back to req indirect fire within the Chinese position. At the same time, three explosions were heard as Chinese command detonated land mines tore through the Canadian patrol Confused radio reports were sent back to Coy HQ which quickly became aware that things had gone horribly wrong. There were many casualties and the patrol leader was down. Luckily, the Chinese held their fire enabling stretcher-bearers and anyone brave enough to help, to evacuate the casualties to safety. All told, seven Patricias were killed and seventeen more were injured without any inroads having been made. The string of bad luck would continue as 1RCR and 1R22eR would also try their hand at raiding only to meet similar setbacks. As a result, raiding would be suspended for the time being. The Chinese would respond with even more patrolling and even greater arty bombardments in order to seize the initiative.

This particular patrol may not seem like a remarkable tale and yet it was indicative of the static war. For the 25th Infantry Brigade, there were no awe-inspiring and daring offensives, nor were there many wide-ranging defensives and c moves. Patrolling and smaller scale defensive battles were the norm, and quite often casualties occurred in ones and twos, vice the hundreds. With little out of the ordinary to report, journalists soon observed a great deal of apathy for the Korean War from their readership.

In late October 1952, the 1st Bn were replaced by the 3rd Battalion, and the Canadian Brigade was assigned to an area known as the hook which was a constant target of Chinese rocket and arty attack.

By mid-April 1953, it appeared that an armistice was within sight due to three primary factors. The first was the death of Josef Stalin, a long-time proponent and supporter of the Communist Cause. Second was the election of President Eisenhower, a former soldier and no-nonsense type who was considering the use of nuclear weapons against China proper. And third was the decimating effect that the war effort was having on the Chinese economy. In order to pursue peace from a position of strength, the Chinese would attempt to make inroads into the American sector. Unsuccessful at their attempt, the Chinese then focussed their efforts on the Canadian-held hill 123 but were again pushed back by the Canadians.

The battle for hill 123 marked the last battle between the Canadians and the Communists. On 27 July an Armistice was signed that called for a cease-fire 12 hours later and the removal of troops from the newly created demilitarized zone 72 hours later. By Oct of 1953, the 3rd Battalion would leave Korea, and eight weeks later, the Bde would stand down and its HQ would be closed.

There were strategic, operational, and tactical lessons to be learned from the Korean War. In terms of the strategic lessons learned, first was the fact that war could quickly erupt almost anywhere in the world. In the second half of the twentieth century, military build-up and posturing, such as had occurred with Germany in the 1930’s would be the exception rather than the norm. Second, Canadian politicians realized that, regardless of whether Canada had an interest in a particular conflict, it would be drawn into the conflict if its allies chose to enter the fray. As a smaller contingent and junior partner, Canadians would also have to realize that they would have little say in the overall direction of the strategic campaign.

Though there were many lessons learned from Korea, it was felt that not all of them would apply to the next war. UN Command’s decision to wage a defensive battle upon establishing the Jamestown line stifled creativity and tied the hands of the front-line commanders. Further, it would not be a model for future conflict especially potential conflict with the Warsaw Pact. In addition, the UN forces enjoyed complete air supremacy and unhindered supply lines. As mentioned, Div HQ did not coord a Divisional defensive plan, but rather left the Bdes to fend for themselves, which in turn, resulted in poor mutual support and coord.

Third, military leaders realized that they would have to modify existing doctrine in order to compensate for differences in terrain, or posture (such as the UN’s assumption of a purely def war upon the establishment of the Jamestown line). Last, the Korean war should have dispelled the Canadian militia myth and led policy-makers to understand that a professional and competent fighting force could not be assembled on a moment’s notice but rather would reqr constant training and funding, and development.

As far as the progression of the Canadian contingent was concerned, the 2nd Bns, which formed the first Special Force sent to Korea, were slapped together with whatever excess kit was lying around or with what the Americans were willing to spare. They were under-armed, under-trained, and poorly equipped. They were sent to hold the line and did much better than what might have been expected. The 1st Bns sent as the first rotation were arguably the best-trained soldiers that Canada ever sent directly into a theatre of war. Having studied the lessons learned of their predecessors, they were truly a professional force. The 3rd Bns, for their part, trained especially for Korea for 18months prior to their deployment and as such, ought to have been the best. They performed courageously but it was felt that their true grit and the full extent of their trg were never fully tested.

To conclude, The 370,000 US, ROK, and Commonwealth soldiers who were killed during the Korean War did not die in vain. The Patricias, for their part, answered the call of duty and performed all assigned tasks with daring, bravery, and determination. Certainly, the exploits of the second Battalion in the active phase of the war including the battle of Kapyong are well documented and worthy of our admiration. However, we must not forget the contributions that all Patricia Bns made during the static phase of the war.

Though their exploits did not always make headlines or create popular support amongst the largely apathetic civilian population, many Patricias made the ultimate sacrifice in fighting off the Chinese hordes, or in conducting night patrols of no-man’s-land. In so doing, they helped establish the conditions for success and denied any advantage to the Communists. Of the 3800 Patricias that served in the Korean War, 107 were killed and 429 were wounded.

The Korean War was the first ever attempt by a communist state to take control of a non-communist state by force of arms. The Patricias for their part, allowed The UN to hold the line and stop the communists in their tracks thereby winning the first battle of the Cold War in the hills of Korea.

On the 15th of August 1950, the Second Battalion of the Regiment was formed as part of the Canadian Army Special Force. On the same date, the serving unit was designated First Battalion.

Second Battalion trained at Sarcee and Wainwright. On 26 November 1950, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Stone, DSO, MC, the battalion sailed from Seattle, Washington on the PRIVATE JOE P. MARTINEZ bound for Pusan, Korea.

A Presidential Unit Citation was won at Kapyong, Korea on 25 April 1951 by Second Battalion while serving with the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. Transferred to 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade of the British Commonwealth Division, the battalion completed its tour of duty in the fall of 1951.

Second Battalion was relieved in Korea by the First Battalion and returned to Calgary to take over the airborne role

When the 2nd Bn had arrived in Korea in 1950 there were fewer Chinese than North Koreans in the enemy's order of battle. As 1951 drew to a close, the situation had been reversed. Not only were the numbers favourable for the Chinese, but also they were also now better trained and supported by a far heavier artillery and mortars. The Bn faced barrages as fierce as any that had been seen in the Second World War. The light field defences that had previously held were no longer effective and more drastic measures were required. The result was a Jamestown Line that would have done credit to the Western Front in World War I. The renovations proved effective and the Jamestown Line stood with ominous strength against the Chinese bombardment.

The focus of the Chinese moved away from the Patricia AO to their right flank. This allowed for a more offensive posture for the Bn in the form of patrolling. In mid December D Coy was able to mount a Coy level Raid. Despite meeting heavy casualties the raid transferred momentum back to Allied forces. As a result the Bn was able to take a three period to celebrate Christmas. Each Coy was able to spend a day in the B Ech where they received a hot shower, clean clothes, turkey dinner, beer, a movie and a night in a bed in a warm tent.

It had been necessary to send forward sparse United Nation reserves to plug holes in the eastern flank, as the result of guerilla activity in the rearward areas increased. Saboteurs and bushwhackers often dressed in American uniforms might be encountered anywhere.

On 14 January 1951, two New Zealand soldiers were murdered and mutilated on the main Pusan-Miryang road a few miles south of the Patricias’ encampment. Three days later Lieutant H.T. Ross, found himself wounded by a sniper in the battalion training area.

The situation required a counter-action. “B” Company and 150 South Korean police were dispatched on a sweep through the mountainous district to the west of Miryang. They closed in on an area where the guerillas were suspected and picketed a number of trails. During the first night, two firefights occurred; on the second night three Koreans were killed in similar clashes. The South Korean police did not distinguish themselves in the search for guerillas, most vanished as soon as the shooting began.

On the 18 January 1951, RSM J. D. Wood DCM was killed by the premature explosion of an anti-personnel mine about to be used in a demonstration. The outstanding warrant officer, who won his decoration at the crossing of the Savio in Italy, had been a tower of strength to the Battalion.

17th of February 1951

The month of February served as the mounting phase for the Korean War. The Patricia's witnessed their first consequences of combat during this month, in addition to a recruitment campaign that fed upcoming forces into battle.

The Patricia's were committed to battle on the 17th of February 1951. Temperatures at that time of year were below freezing during the day and much colder at night. The second day the battalion came across some 65 slain American troops at Chaum-ni. Averse to mounting the hilltops and digging in, they chose to strake their bedding down in several warm village structures in a valley setting. It appears they also neglected to set out sentries. They were later slaughtered by Chinese troops who had silently observed their movements from their hilltops. (The commander of the US unit involved did not report this slaughter of his troops to his superiors. It was later revealed in an article written by Bill Boss, a Canadian War Correspondent, who fortunately had the photographs to prove the validity of his article). Upon this revelation, our commanding officer, LCol. James R. Stone, withdrew all sleeping bags and ordered that only one blanket be carried by each soldier for additional warmth in slit trenches during cold winter nights. The Patricia's also learned, in short order, that the parkas they had been issued were not wholly suited for fighting conditions, as their hoods were not removable. Due to the mountainous terrain and lack of serviceable roads, (A Echelon was up to 10 miles behind the front lines) hot meals could not be brought forward. Stone demanded the highest form of vigilance at all times and set conditions to ensure the battalion adhered to his orders. It was a chilling start to their yearlong tour of duty.

Additionally, during the month of February one of the most influential leaders in the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light infantry was born. Lieutenant Colonel James Riley Stone, DSO and 2 Bars MCE, Commanding officer 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, Korea, 1950-51. Born February 08, 1908, England. LCol Stone (Ret'd) is one of only 22 officers in Canadian history to be awarded three DSO's.

By Charmion Chaplin-Thomas
February 19, 1951

In Hill 419, South Korea; February 24, 1951: Pte Bill Hoskins of 2 PPCLI, the second man in his section’s Bren-gun team, hauls nearly his own weight in ammunition and other kit.Korea, the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Stone in command) is finally moving into the line, after two months of brutal training to condition them for the rigors of mountain fighting. The mission has changed a lot while 2 PPCLI has been forming, travelling and training, and the soldiers originally recruited as occupying troops arrived in Korea to find themselves slated for the front line in one of the most difficult campaigns in living memory. Despite considerable pressure from very high command, however, LCol Stone has firmly refused to take his battalion into the line until they are ready.

The battalion is much smaller than it was when it left Canada; dozens of men with old injuries and long-standing problems like bronchitis, arthritis and alcoholism were unceremoniously raked out of the ranks and sent home as “unlikely to be efficient”. LCol Stone has also implemented a fierce disciplinary régime to eliminate drunkenness, carelessness and theft among his soldiers. The tactical situation is difficult enough, facing a tough, wily enemy in this harsh landscape in the dead of winter. Only discipline, fitness and field-craft will bring the Patricias through the next few weeks.

In January, during their collective training, the battalion spent four days searching for Communst guerrillas in the hills around Miryang. With Major C.V. Lilley (OC B Company) in charge, B Company and C Company surrounded and attacked the guerrillas’ rocky caves one after another, finding caches of ammunition and food, and blood trails that indicated considerable improvement in their shooting skills. Maj Lilley considered the operation the best training the unit could get, writing in his after-action report: “Men learnt to live, keep warm and alive in the open. I consider hunting guerrillas the best company exercise… It brings out all the tactical and administrative lessons that have to be learnt.” The finishing touches were applied in Exercise MAPLE LEAF, held during the first week of February, to test the soldiers in all aspects of the advance, attack, defence and withdrawal.

On February 15, they were ready to go into the line, and at 1 p.m. on February 17, the battalion’s main body arrived in their concentration area near the town of Changhowon-ni, located at a river and road junction about 3 km south of Yoju and 75 km southeast of Seoul. 2 PPCLI is now part of the 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade (Brigadier B.A. Coad), a seasoned formation that also includes the 1st Battalion, The Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge’s Own), the 1st Battalion, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise’s), the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, the 60th Indian Field Ambulance, and the 16th Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery. The battered villages nearby are occupied only by a few terrorized civilians burdened by sickness and the still-unburied bodies of relatives and neighbours killed in recent fighting. The weather is bitterly cold, with occasional gusts of snow.

Today, LCol Stone is under orders to take the battalion north up the valley to capture Hill 404, one of Korea’s hundreds of hills identified only by its height in metres. First they move to Chuam-ni, in the brigade area, and then at 11 a.m. they begin the advance. That afternoon, they come across a terrible sight: the remains of an entire company of Americans overrun and slaughtered by the Chinese. Worst of all are the 65 soldiers found dead in their sleeping bags, killed before they could even get on their feet. From this point on, Canadian soldiers in Korea will use only blankets, never sleeping bags.

This encounter makes the news in Canada in days: “Pats learn grim lesson from sight of slain GIs”, dated February 22, appears in papers across the country under the byline of experienced war correspondent Bill Boss. Despite having passed the military censors, the story ruffles feathers at every level of the US Army, for the incident has never been mentioned in any of their press briefings.

March 7th 1951, 2 PPCLI were to participate in a 27th Commonwealth Brigade attack: Patricia's objective is Hill 532, to their right 3 RAR are to take Hill 410. The battalion at the conclusion of the day suffered 7 killed and 28 wounded, all but one from D Coy. Almost one quarter of the company are casualties. Captain Gordon Turnball, acting company commander, reported to LCol Stone that Lt Mike Levy, 10 Pl Comd, had under- performed during the attack. Such a report would represent the very antithesis of the expectation for officers serving under James Riley Stone. Is it possible Turnball's reports left Stone with a lingering concern about Levy's fighting abilities? Had Levy become Turnball's pawn in an attempt to camouflage his own mistakes? Stone, after Hill 532, removed Capt Turnball from combat command to become adjutant. Levy retained command of 10 Platoon. The recollection of the high rate of casualties at Hill 532 would be ingrained in Stone's memory.

In July of 1951 2PPCLI and the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade became part of the 1st Commonwealth Division in Korea. On 3 Oct 03 1951, the 1st Commonwealth Brigade under the command of the 1st US Corps launched Operation Commando and pushed forward past the Imjin River, establishing a new UN defensive line. It was dubbed the Jamestown Line. Originally, the Jamestown Line was intended to act as a trip wire to warn of further North Korean offensives. However, with the opening of peace negations at Panmunjong, the Jamestown Line became the new frontline for the remainder of the War.

Because of the hilly terrain it was impossible for the men of the 25th Brigade to build a continuous trench system, instead they selected hilltops along the Jamestown line and fortified these positions. Furthermore, they used wire, mines and other obstacles in conjunction with pre-registered mortar and artillery targets to control the no-mans-land between the two sides.

While the cease-fire was being negotiated, the delicate political situation began to dictate the extent to which the UN forces were allowed to continue large-scale operations. The Patricia's, who were used to large offensive and defensive actions, switched to smaller scale patrolling and raiding. Once again the Patricias proved themselves as a formidable fighting force. They adapted to a difficult situation on the ground by developing new tactics, which still influence Canadian Army doctrine today.

130 members of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry were killed in action during The Korean War conflict.

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